While several populist parties with ties to the left side of the ideological scale have become more prominent in the electoral arenas across Western Europe, the literature on populism still has a disproportionate focus on the right. To enhance the existing research on explanatory factors to the electoral fortunes of left-wing populist parties, this study tests two competing theories using multivariate regression analysis. The first theory concerns the effect of mainstream party convergence, and the second, the increased tension between governing parties’ responsive role towards the electorate and their responsible role as national leaders, here operationalized as the implementation of fiscal consolidation. The results show that austerity is conducive to left-wing populist success, and correspondingly supports the theory of the tension between governing parties’ responsibility and responsiveness. However, the effect is weaker when controlling for economic factors, which might be an indication of a partly spurious relationship or the included variables being endogenous. Despite a flexible operationalization, the convergence theory receives marginal to no support and the direction is opposite to what is expected in two of the models, rendering the results even more ambiguous and difficult to analyze. Whereas a lack of variation in the data denotes that the findings should be interpreted with caution, there is hence an indication that existing theories concerning the success of the populist left should not be taken for granted as long as empirical research is limited.

1. Può un Modello DSGE spiegare una disinflazione costosa? Questo lavoro mostra che un modello DSGE non è in grado di spiegare una disinflazione costosa con indicizzazione parziale e bassa dei prezzi e dei salari. Il modello invece è in grado di replicare una disinflazione recessiva sostituendo il meccanismo di modellizazione delle rigidità nominali di Calvo (1983) con quello di Rotemberg (1982). 2. Disinflazione e Diseguaglianza in un Modello Monetario DSGE: Un’Analisi di Welfare Questo lavoro analizza gli effetti redistributivi di una politica disinflazionistica in un modello DSGE con Partecipazione Limitata ai Mercati degli Assets. Due sono i meccanismi che guidano a distribuzione del consumo e del reddito: il markup delle imprese e il cosiddetto vincolo cash in advance. I risultati suggeriscono che la disinflazione aumenta inequivocabilmente la diseguaglianza con il meccanismo di Rotemberg. Invece con il meccanismo di Calvo questo effetto viene ottenuto soltanto se le imprese non sono costrette ad indebitarsi per finanziare il fattore lavoro. 3. Consolidamento Fiscale e Consumatori Rule of Thumb Questo lavoro simula un esperimento di consolidamento fiscale in un modello DSGE con partecipazione limitata ai mercati degli assets. I risultati mostrano che durante un processo di consolidamento fiscale riduzioni temporanee delle tasse o aumenti temporanei di transfers consentono sia di ridurre il debito che stimolare il consumo. / 1. Can a DSGE Model Explain a Costly Disinflation? This paper shows that a medium scale DSGE model fails to explain a costly disinflation with low and partial indexation of prices and wages. Alternatively to Calvo (1982) price setting, with the Rotemberg (1982) framework the model can replicate a recessionary disinflation for any indexation degree. 2. Disinflation and Inequality in a DSGE Monetary Model: A Welfare Analysis This paper investigates the redistributive effects of a disinflation experiment in a standard DSGE model with Limited Asset Market Participation. There are two key mechanisms driving consumption and income distribution: firms’ markup and the cash in advance channel. Results show that disinflation unambiguously increases inequality under Rotemberg. Under Calvo this effect only obtains if the cash in advance doesn’t bind firms ability to finance their working capital. 3. Fiscal Consolidation and Rule of Thumb Consumers: Gain With or Without Pain? This paper simulates a fiscal consolidation in a medium scale DSGE model augmented with Limited Asset Market Participation. Results show that during the consolidation process temporary tax reductions or temporary transfer increases allow to both reduce public debt and boost consumption. A countercyclical monetary policy is an effective complement to fiscal policy as stabilization tool.