Thesis (LLD (Public Law))—University of Stellenbosch, / In this dissertation a comparative study is made of the constitutional accommodation of the distribution of financial resources and constitutional obligations to the various spheres of government in Germany and South Africa. Both countries have decentralised or multi-level systems of government and can be classified, in terms of current studies on federalism, as integrated or cooperative federal systems. An overview of the historical developments, the political contexts, the fundamental principles and the constitutional frameworks for government in Germany and South Africa is provided as a basis for the in-depth analysis regarding the financial intergovernmental relations in these countries. This study has shown that economic theory is important in the design of decentralised systems of government and that political and socio-economic considerations, for example, the need for rebuilding Germany after World War II and the need to eliminate severe poverty in South Africa after 1994, often play a dominant role in the design and implementation of decentralised constitutional systems. The economic theory applicable to decentralised systems of government suggests a balanced approach to the distribution of financial resources and constitutional obligations with a view to obtaining the most efficient and equitable solution. In both countries the particular constitutional allocation of obligations and financial resources created a fiscal gap that required some form of revenue sharing or financial equalisation. The German financial equalisation system has been developed over fifty years and is quite complex. It attempts to balance the constitutional aim of reasonable equalisation of the financial disparity of the Länder with the financial autonomy of the Länder as required by the Basic Law. The huge financial and economic demands from the eastern Länder after unification in 1990 placed an additional burden on the available funds and on the financial equalisation system. Germany currently faces reform of its financial equalisation system and possibly also bigger constitutional reform. The South African constitutional system is only a decade old and the financial equalisation system that is less complex than the German system, is functioning reasonably well but needs time to develop to its full potential. The system may however require some adjustment in order to enhance accountability, efficiency and equity. A lack of sufficient skills and administrative capacity at municipal government level and in some provinces hampers service delivery and good governance and places additional pressure on the financial equalisation system. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Constitutional Court play important roles in Germany and South Africa in upholding the principle of constitutional supremacy, and make a valuable contribution to the better understanding of the constitutional systems and the further development thereof. This study has shown that clear principles in constitutional texts, for example, such as those contained in the Basic Law, guide the development of applicable financial legislation and add value to the provisions on financial equalisation and how they are implemented. These principles in the Basic Law are justiciable and give the Bundesverfassungsgericht an important tool to adjudicate the financial equalisation legislation. The study of the constitutional accommodation of the distribution of financial resources and constitutional obligations in Germany and South Africa is not an abstract academic exercise and should be seen in the particular political and socio-economic contexts within which the respective constitutions function. The need to give effect to the realisation of socio-economic rights, for example, the right of access to health services, places additional demands on the financial equalisation system. The South African society experienced a major transformation from the apartheid system to a democratic constitutional order that in itself has had a significant influence on financial intergovernmental relations. This dissertation focuses on a distinct part of constitutional law that can be described as financial constitutional law. This comparative analysis of the two countries has provided some lessons for the further development of South Africa’s young democracy, in particular the financial intergovernmental relations system.

对于转型期中国地方政府行为的研究，现有文献日益重视正式制度对官员行为的激励和约束作用：以GDP为标尺的相对绩效考核制度是改革开放后中国经济成功的决定因素，同时该正式制度也是地方政府忽视公共物品供给的重要原因。即使在考虑了正式制度及社会经济因素之后，本研究仍然观察到地方政府在公共物品供给水平上存在着显著的地区和时间差异。然而，对于此差异背后的决定因素，现有文献却考察不足。本文认为，非正式制度是造成该差异的原因。通过采用地区领导人籍贯作为非正式制度的代理并利用1990年至2010年的中国地级市数据，本研究系统检验了上述假设。本文发现，和来自外地的地方领导人相比，那些在其籍贯地任职的官员有更大的动力为本地区提供公共服务：本地籍贯的领导在基础教育、公共医疗和环境保护上的财政投入比重显著高于外地籍贯的领导。本研究同时发现，公共服务支出份额的增加是以基础设施建设支出的减少为代价的：本地籍贯官员对该项支出的投入比重显著低于外地籍贯官员。同时，利用省级数据及相同的模型设定，本文也发现非正式制度在省级行政单位依然发挥作用，但作用程度减弱。上述发现彰显出在一个正式制度主导的环境中，非正式制度依然发挥着显著的作用，并在一定程度上弥补了前者的不足。在实证发现的基础上，本研究又通过案例分析和访谈进一步考察了非正式制度发挥作用的机制。通过分析两个地级市的本地籍贯领导大力发展民生项目的行为以及普通民众对本地官员和外地官员的看法，本文详细说明了非正式制度对官员行为产生影响的机制，从而为实证分析揭示出的因果机制提供了证据。本研究认为，造成上述差异的原因在于：相比于外地官员，本地官员更多地被嵌入到当地的人际网络中，出于对本人及本家族在家乡声望的重视，他们会对民生项目有更多的投入。本文对非正式制度及两种制度互动的考察凸显出非民主国家内部官员行为丰富的制度动态。 / Literature on local government behavior in transitional China has primarily examined the impact of formal institutions on the motivations of officials in promoting local economic growth. In particular, investigations focused on how the existing personnel management system provides a “yardstick competition among local officials and therefore guarantees the success of economic reform. Meanwhile, such formal institutions have similarly been studied for the crucial reason that local government ignores the provision of public goods. Nevertheless, even after controlling the influence of formal institutions and socio-economic factors, variations could still be observed on the level of efforts among local governments regarding the provision of public goods. However, these variations cannot be sufficiently explained by existing literature. This research, based on prefectural data in China in 1990-2010, aims to fill this gap through a systematic examination of the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior, especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This research, based on prefectural data in China in 19902010, aims to fill this gap by systematically examining the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior, especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This study finds that holding other variables equal, a native prefectural leader would significantly increase fiscal expenditure rates on basic education, public health, and environmental protection in his jurisdiction, compared with a leader with a different hometown. However, the increased expenditure on public goods impacts those on infrastructure construction, which tends to incur a lower expenditure rate from a local leader compared with that of an official from other prefectures. Meanwhile, using provincial data, this research determines that informal institutions influence the upper-level government, though the effects have weakened. These findings reveal that, in an environment dominated by formal institutions, informal institutions still influence the behavior of officials. In addition, to a certain extent, informal institutions could mitigate the negative effects of formal institutions on the behavior of officials. Based on empirical findings, I used two cases and several interviews with local people and officials to further investigate the mechanism of this influence from informal institutions. By analyzing the efforts of native leaders on promoting the provision of local public goods, I illustrate the mechanism on how the informal institution shapes the behavior of officials, thereby providing evidence for a casual causal relationship. I attribute such pattern to the constraints of local reputation imposed on native officials, who would be deeply embedded in local personnel networks and therefore focus on the evaluation from local people. Local reputation thus imposes additional constraints on the behavior of native officials, which serves as a kind of bottom-up accountability. By investigating the effects of informal institutions and the interaction of formal-informal institutions, this research would help deepen our understanding on the dynamics of institutions under nondemocratic regimes and enable more accurate predictions of political behavior. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 王芳. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-154). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Wang Fang. / Chapter 第1章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第2章 --- 制度及官员行为：一个综述 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1 --- 制度 --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 正式-非正式制度的划分标准 --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 非正式制度发挥作用的机制 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- 正式制度与官员行为 --- p.17 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 当代中国的人事管理制度 --- p.18 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 人事管理制度的影响 --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- 人事管理制度与公共物品供给 --- p.35 / Chapter 2.3 --- 非正式制度与官员行为 --- p.37 / Chapter 第3章 --- 地方政府公共物品供给 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1 --- 地方政府概况 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 各级政府的性质、地位和职能 --- p.47 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 地级市政府：历史沿革 --- p.51 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- 地级市政府：决策过程 --- p.54 / Chapter 3.2 --- 公共物品供给的法律规定及各级政府职责 --- p.62 / Chapter 3.3 --- 经济学文献上的中国公共物品供给研究 --- p.72 / Chapter 第4章 --- 籍贯：一个非正式制度 --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1 --- 官员籍贯回避制度 --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 帝制中国的避籍制度 --- p.77 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- 当代中国的避籍制度 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.2 --- 籍贯与官员行为 --- p.89 / Chapter 第5章 --- 数据及实证分析 --- p.93 / Chapter 5.1 --- 数据及模型 --- p.93 / Chapter 5.2 --- 实证结果及讨论 --- p.103 / Chapter 5.3 --- 非正式制度对省级政府行为的影响 --- p.109 / Chapter 第6章 --- 因果机制：案例研究 --- p.114 / Chapter 6.1 --- 案例分析 --- p.114 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- 山东省东营市市委书记石军 --- p.115 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- 甘肃省兰州市市委书记陈宝生 --- p.120 / Chapter 6.2 --- 访谈资料 --- p.124 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- 宁夏回族自治区固原市 --- p.125 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- 江苏省南京市 --- p.127 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- 内蒙古自治区兴安盟 --- p.129 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- 浙江省绍兴市 --- p.131 / Chapter 6.3 --- 本地籍贯的约束机制 --- p.133 / Chapter 第7章 --- 结论 --- p.137 / Chapter 7.1 --- 研究发现 --- p.137 / Chapter 7.2 --- 本文贡献 --- p.139 / 附录 --- p.142 / Chapter 附录一： --- 《党政领导干部任职回避暂行规定》 --- p.142 / Chapter 附录二： --- 石军简历 --- p.144 / Chapter 附录三： --- 陈宝生简历 --- p.145 / 参考文献 --- p.146 / 英文文献 --- p.146 / 中文文献 --- p.151 / 史书典籍 --- p.153 / 法律法规 --- p.153 / 媒体资源 --- p.154

Tung Yan Wah. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-87). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.ii / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.iv / List of Tables --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- History of education financing --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Fiscal system and the financing of rural education --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- Purpose of this study --- p.8 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1 --- Problems and issues --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Disparity in education provision --- p.14 / Chapter 2.3 --- Factors explaining variations in education expenditure: regression analysis --- p.19 / Chapter 2.4 --- Financing arrangement --- p.21 / Chapter 2.5 --- Concluding remarks --- p.26 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Methodology --- p.28 / Chapter 3.1 --- Estimation of degree of provision --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2 --- Regression analysis --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3 --- Education transfer mechanism --- p.39 / Chapter 3.4 --- Concluding remarks --- p.42 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Results and Discussion --- p.43 / Chapter 4.1 --- Degree of provision --- p.43 / Chapter 4.2 --- Regression results --- p.47 / Chapter 4.3 --- Education transfer mechanism --- p.49 / Chapter 4.4 --- Concluding remarks --- p.53 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.55 / Appendix 1 Box 1 --- p.59 / Appendix 2 Tables --- p.60 / References --- p.83

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / China Area Studies / Master / Master of Arts

No description available.

No description available.

Duan, Haiyan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-83). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.vi / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vii / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Question --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Approach and Methods --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- Structure of the Thesis --- p.7 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1 --- Provision of Public Goods as a Governmental Function --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Design and Practice of Fiscal Transfer --- p.11 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- China´ةs Fiscal Institution --- p.20 / Chapter 3.1 --- "The Drop of “Two Ratios"", and 1994 Fiscal Reform" --- p.20 / Chapter 3.2 --- Post-1994 System and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation --- p.23 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Finance of Public Goods Provision --- p.37 / Chapter 3.4 --- Fiscal Institution below Province --- p.45 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Impact of Fiscal Transfer on Public Goods Provision: Cross-county Analysis of Shanxi --- p.52 / Chapter 4.1 --- The Equalization Effect of Fiscal Transfer --- p.54 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Impact of Fiscal Transfer on County Governments´ة Preference of Expenditure --- p.58 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.75 / REFRENCES --- p.79

published_or_final_version / China Area Studies / Master / Master of Arts

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Economic & Business Sciences, 2017. / The present thesis considers the state as a public organization, namely a complex structure that individuals use to accomplish collectively their individual interests mainly through exchange. By placing greater emphasis on exchange, the thesis is able to suggest novel insights about the organization of the public sector. [Abbreviated abstract. Open document to view full version] / GR2018

A thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand / This thesis investigates the problem of the economic organisation of the public sector. It begins by establishing context by considering the two related issues central to it: the boundary of the state and the internal organisation of government (Chapter 1). There is a growing literature that explores the boundary of the state in political economy terms. Moreover, the boundary of the state can be viewed in a similar light to the boundary of the firm. The Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism explores the internal organisation of government through the lens of the theory of the firm. Second Generation Theory assumes that governments are subject to the same problems that firms face: for example, just like firms require institutions to align the incentives of managers and shareholders (e.g., better defined contracts), governments require institutions to align the incentives of politicians and citizens (e.g., better defined constitutions). In order to improve our understanding of economic performance over time, the state should be considered as a complex organisation held together by a series of public choice compromises. Chapter 2 considers one aspect of the state as an organisation: when a boundary change of an existing state generates a new state. It tries to economically capture the birth of a new state through boundary change by taking a cue from the theory of internal exit: the secession of a group of people from an existing state who will then go on to form a new state. Internal exit predicts an internal exit-proof tax rate, i.e., a state will set the tax rate so that internal exit will not occur (e.g., Quebec in Canada). However, in precolonial southern Africa (ca. 1600-1910), internal exit occurred. A well-known example of this is that of Mzilikazi who in the 19th century left the Zulu with his followers and formed his own, new state: the Ndebele. Why is it that in Africa internal exit as a threat failed and internal exit still took place? With the aid of a simple, historically informed model, this chapter offers a political economy explanation of why internal exit took place in precolonial southern Africa. The model shows how internal exit results from the payoff calculation of an elite member’s (e.g., Mzilikazi) desire to maximise his share of public revenue surplus. Chapter 3 considers the internal organisation of government through the role of intergovernmental grants in the context of laboratory federalism. The Public Economics literature on intergovernmental grants is extensive. In this extensive literature, grants are usually analysed according to consumer behaviour theory where income and substitution effects determine community spending (and ultimately community welfare). However, these effects shed little light on how local governments can use grants to experiment with policy (laboratory federalism) in order to develop new, successful policies. In fact, even casual empiricism shows that local governments routinely experiment with policy and achieve varying degrees of success. One recent example is Mayor Bloomberg’s range of anti-poverty experiments in New York City. Very little theory has been produced that ties policy experimentation with the role of grants, however. Chapter 3 takes an organisational view of grants, namely it likens them to incomplete contracts to show how certain grants can be policy instruments for the creation and discovery of new knowledge in the public sector. More precisely, the chapter develops an evolutionary learning model that captures the knowledge gains that different types of grants (e.g., lump-sum grants compared to matching grants) can engender. It shows that a lump-sum grant can bring about greater learning at the local government level than a closed matching grant. Chapter 4 concludes by summarizing and suggesting areas for future research. / MT2017