Thesis (Honors)--College of William and Mary, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-51). Also available via the World Wide Web.

No description available.

The governance of the commons is an elusive task. For one thing, the overexploitation of natural resources and the deterioration of environment have posed severe threats to human society. For another, most of the threats result from social dilemmas such as problems of cooperation, coordination and trust. These collective action problems all entail |a| paradox in which rational individual behavior leads to irrational collective outcomes. In previous literature, answers for coping with “the tragedy of the commons” range from the imposition of government to the establishment of market and endogenous rules. However, this institutional perspective has overlooked the social and ecological characteristics embedded in common-pool resources(CPR) systems. Furthermore, few studies have taken a formal game theoretic approach to examine how embeddedness might affect collective action problems in complex social-ecological systems. This thesis uses formal game theoretic models to investigate the dynamics of collective action problems in water sharing interactions. Three types of innovative game theoretic models are developed; namely, the asymmetric N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the asymmetric N-person Stag-hunt game and the two-level Trust game. Various elements of social and ecological embeddedness, including but not limited to direct and indirect reciprocity, heterogeneous utilities, varied utility functions for public good production and multi-level interactions, are incorporated into models to examine conditions under which collective action problems are more likely to be alleviated. Moreover, this study associates implications of the formal models with practice of water governance in contemporary China and provides insights into the strengths and weaknesses of several empirical cases including decision-making processes, water allocation schemes, payments for ecosystem services programs and multi-level governance. Major findings of this study are: 1) Collective cooperation between different upstream and downstream actors is subject to joint effects of reciprocity and asymmetric payoff mechanisms. Downstream actors require a strong prospect of long-term interactions whereas upstream actors are more sensitive to the level asymmetries. 2) The problem of coordination can be addressed through settings of asymmetric cost-benefit ratios and varied total utility functions. Actors’ heterogeneous contribution to public good may alter the number of cooperators and the production of public good. 3) The imposition of an overarching authority can be a “double-edged sword” in terms of its impacts on trust construction. A trustworthy authority may relax conditions for placing and honoring trust. The conditions become more restrictive when the authority is untrustworthy. 4) Information transparency and availability, “the shadow of the future,” regional heterogeneities, institutional fit and trustworthiness of overarching authorities are critical factors that affect the performance of water governance in China. This study contributes to the existing literature in three main aspects. Firstly, it introduces the effects of embeddedness into CPR studies which conventionally focus on the institutional aspect of CPR governance. Secondly, it brings the perspective of collective action into water resources management studies which traditionally concentrate on hydrological processes and policies designs. Lastly, it enriches formal game theoretic modeling by including various social-ecological characteristics which play a significant role in water sharing interactions and yet have not been adequately examined. / published_or_final_version / Geography / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

No description available.

Thesis (Honors)--College of William and Mary, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-85). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Proefschrift Universiteit Maastricht. / Met index, lit. opg.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2007. / Adviser: Charles Rowley. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2007. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 59-60).

Proefschrift Universiteit Maastricht. / Met index, lit. opg. - Met een samenvatting in het Nederlands.

Currently, the argument that markets cannot provide public goods underlies the justification of political authority most widely accepted by political theorists. Yet, as theorists usually depict the problem, public goods could be voluntarily produced at levels of efficiency comparable to those attainable by coercion. Once we allow that the real problem is much more messy than its theoretical models led us to believe, we have to admit that coercion may be necessary after all. At the same time, we have to admit that the moral problem of justifying coercion is also more messy than we thought, and for precisely the same reason. I discuss contractual mechanisms for voluntary public goods provision, arguing that with such a mechanism, voluntary contribution levels might be much higher than conventional theories predict. My theory is borne out in laboratory experiments. Still, it remains an open question whether it would be worth the trouble to switch from the coercive methods presently employed to noncoercive (or less coercive) methods of public goods provision. A strictly efficient method is not among our options. We have to assess the efficiency of various methods in a relative sense. Should we find cases in which public goods cannot be provided by contract, or should we decide that in some cases we do not even want to risk trying voluntary methods, we are forced to face the moral issue squarely. I offer a traditional analysis of justice, although I employ it in a somewhat unorthodox way in drawing conclusions about the moral status of private property in a well-ordered society. I then use this analysis to develop a foundation for property rights, exploring its implications for questions concerning what people are morally obliged to do, and what they can legitimately be forced to do, for the sake of public goods production.