by Kwok-man Lui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1989. / Bibliography: leaves 167-172.

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2009. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56).

Thesis (M.Env.St.)--University of Adelaide, Mawson Graduate Centre for Environmental Studies, 2000. / Bibliography: leaves 121-138.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, June 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Mason University, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-220).

Thesis (doctoral)--Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, 1987. / Summary in Dutch. Includes bibliographical references (p. 315-321).

In this paper, I investigated the influence of the existing political power on the economical and social development of the state. The paper went deeper into positive and negative effects, state of economy within the years since the establishment of the Republic of Belarus, dominating social tendencies and the ways of improving the existing situation. The last part of the thesis presented analysis of whether Belarus is ready to enter European Union, as some of its members have already done ( Poland, Lithuania), why/why not. I assess that my own ideas contribute by approximately 30 % to the presented text.

從雙加工的角度來看，個人在社會困境中的決策是自動加工和控制加工相互作用的結果。基於對不同方向的研究結論的回顧，我們提出兩個不同的親社會行為模型，自我控制者模型和社會直覺者模型。這兩個模型在對人性有不同的假設，且對自動加工和控制加工在親社會行為中所扮演的角色有不同的分配。具體來說，自我控制者模型假定個人的親社會性是表面的，人們的親社會行為主要來自控制加工--監測並調整以使人們的行為更符合社會規範。社會直覺者模型假定個人的親社會性是天生的，人們的親社會行為主要來自自動加工--社會交換啟發式把人們的行為錨定在教高的親社會水平上。我們在三個實驗中比較並探討了兩個模型在描述人們在資源困境中的親社會行為的適用性，以及自動加工和控制加工在決策過程中所扮演的角色。我們使用了通常用於分離兩種加工模式的範式，包括操控個人的自我調節的資源（實驗1），認知資源（實驗2），加工目標（實驗3）。三個實驗的結果一致地支持自我控制者型，即人類的親社會行為是控制加工的結果。在考慮到社會偏好的個體差異之後，我們發現，親自我個體的行為非常符合自我控制者模型。研究3和探索性分析結果也支持作為理性思考者的親自我個體，他們的親社會行為在很大程度上依賴於控制加工--通過計算和透徹思考來控制自私本能。親社會個體的合作行為沒有符合自我控制者模型的預測。探索性分析表明， 作為直覺思考者的親社會個體， 他們的親社會行為取決於利用啓發式和直覺的自動加工。我們認為，儘管三項研究的證據都支持自我控制者模型，它只反映到故事的一部分。我們需要考慮到社會偏好的個體差異並檢驗社會交換啓發式對親社會個體的合作行為的中介作用以深入對人類親社會性的了解。 / From a dual-processing perspective, individuals’ decision-making in social dilemmas is the result of interplay between automatic processing and controlled processing. Based on review on different lines of research, a self-controller model and an social intuitionist model of decision-making in social dilemmas are proposed with opposing assumptions about nature of human prosociality as well as roles assigned to the automatic processing and controlled processing. Specifically, the self-controller model assumes individuals’ prosociality is skin-deep, and major contribution of one’s prosociality comes from controlled processing, through monitoring and regulating one’s behavior to confirm to social norms; while the social intuitionist model assumes individuals’ prosociality is innate, and major contribution of one’s prosociality comes from the automatic processing through utilizing social exchange heuristics and intuitions that anchor individuals’ behavior on a cooperative end. In three studies, we compared applicability of the two models in depicting prosocial behavior in a resource dilemma with different paradigms that are typically used to dissociate two modes of processing. These include manipulations on individuals’ self-regulatory resources (Experiment 1), cognitive resources (Experiment 2), and processing goals (Experiment 3). Results from three experiments consistently advocated the self-controller model indicating that human’s prosociality is the result of controlled processing. Taking individual differences concerning social preferences into the analyses, we found that proselfs’ behavior was best described by the self-controller model. Results from study 3 and exploratory analysis also support that prosociality of proselfs depend heavily on controlled processing, in which people control their selfish instinct with calculation and deliberation. Prosocials’ cooperative behavior did not follow prediction of the self-controller model. Instead, result from exploratory analyses suggests that prosociality of prosocials, as intuitive thinkers, depend more on automatic processing, in which people express their prosociality through utilizing heuristics and intuitions. We conclude that, although evidence from three studies favors the self-controller model, it only reflects part of the story. We need to take individual difference in social preferences in to consideration in order to deepen our understanding of the human prosociality and more effort should be done in testing mediating role of the social exchange heuristics for prosocials’ cooperativeness. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Lu, Su. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 43-52). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter CHAPTER ONE: --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Dual-processing of Prosocial Decision-making --- p.3 / A Self-controller Model --- p.4 / A Social Intuitionist Model --- p.6 / Comparison of Two Models --- p.7 / Potential Moderator: Individual Differences in Social Preferences --- p.10 / Differences in Automatic Processing? --- p.11 / Differences in Controlled Processing? --- p.12 / Dissociation of the Two Modes of Processing --- p.13 / Cognitive Load --- p.14 / Ego-depletion --- p.14 / Instruction Induction of the Two Modes of Processing --- p.15 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO: --- OVERVIEW OF CURRENT RESAERCH --- p.16 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE: --- EXPERIMENT ONE --- p.17 / Method --- p.17 / Results --- p.20 / Discussion --- p.22 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR: --- EXPERIMENT TWO --- p.23 / Method --- p.23 / Results --- p.25 / Discussion --- p.27 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR: --- EXPERIMENT THREE --- p.27 / Method --- p.28 / Results --- p.29 / Discussion --- p.31 / Chapter CHAPTER FIVE: --- EXPLORATORY ANALYSES --- p.32 / Differences in Self-control Capacity/motivation? --- p.32 / Differences in Reliance on Intuitive Thinking? --- p.33 / Chapter CHAPTER SIX: --- GENERAL DISCUSSION --- p.35 / Proselfs as Self-controllers vs. Prosocials as Social Intuitionists --- p.36 / Measuring Social Preferences as the Result of Controlled Processing --- p.37 / Limitations and Future Directions --- p.38 / Implicit vs. Explicit Measure of Social Preferences --- p.40 / Further Issues about Social Exchange Heuristics --- p.41 / REFERENCES --- p.43

Cuando los miembros de una sociedad tienen que tomar una decisión sobre un conjunto de alternativas suelen usar ciertas reglas que tratan de alcanzar un acuerdo entre sus diferentes intereses. Estas reglas se suelen denominar mecanismos de votación, procedimientos de elección social o, simplemente, elecciones. Las reglas de votación definen escenarios en los que los miembros de la sociedad interaccionan y tratan de obtener el mejor resultado de acuerdo con sus preferencias. Esta tesis doctoral está dedicada al estudio de los incentivos estratégicos de los participantes (votantes y candidatos) en procesos de elección social.Nuestro análisis se centra en modelos generales en los que se admite que el resultado de la elección consista en un conjunto de alternativas. Aunque resulta natural suponer que sólo una alternativa será finalmente elegida, existen múltiples situaciones en las que este supuesto es sumamente restrictivo. Por ejemplo, podríamos considerar la elección como una etapa intermedia en el proceso de decisión. El objeto del proceso electoral sería reducir el número de alternativas entre las que la sociedad tendría que escoger. Con esta interpretación, nos centraríamos en situaciones en los que existe cierto grado de incertidumbre sobre la resolución final de la elección social.En esta tesis seguimos dos importantes ramas de la literatura de la teoría de la elección social, el estudio de reglas decisión social no manipulables y el análisis de los problemas de candidatura estratégica.En primer lugar, siguiendo el trabajo seminal de Dutta, Jackson y Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) estudiamos los incentivos de los candidatos para entrar o abandonar la lucha electoral con la intención de afectar al resultado de la elección. Si los candidatos comparan conjuntos de candidatos de forma consistente con los postulados de la teoría de la utilidad esperada, cualquier regla de decisión unánime y no dictatorial provee a algún candidato con incentivos a abandonar su candidatura. Sin embargo, si los candidatos comparan los resultados de la elección de acuerdo con métodos menos sofisticados, sí que se pueden obtener resultados positivos.Seguidamente, pasamos a analizar los incentivos estratégicos de los candidatos en un entorno complementario: en el que el resultado de la elección es explícitamente probabilístico. En esta situación podemos caracterizar la familia de reglas de votación que nunca incentivan la salida de ningún candidato. Sorprendentemente, aunque la familia de dictadores aleatorios juega un papel central dentro de la caracterización, podemos probar que reglas de decisión más flexibles también satisfacen los requerimientos de estabilidad en las candidaturas.Finalmente, nos centramos en la posibilidad de construir reglas de decisión no manipulables cuando los votantes comparan conjuntos de alternativas de acuerdo con actitudes extremas ante el riesgo. En este contexto, analizamos la compatibilidad entre la condición de no manipulabilidad y otras condiciones de regularidad que han sido propuestas en la literatura como por ejemplo, Resolución Residual. Además, también presentamos los requerimientos en las preferencias de los votantes sobre conjuntos de alternativas que reducen la posibilidad de reglas de decisión no manipulables a reglas dictatoriales. / When a society has to make a choice from an array of alternatives, it usually relies on certain rules that try to reconcile the opposite interest of the members of the society. These rules define environments in which the agents interact and try to obtain the best outcome according to their preferences. This work is devoted to the study of the strategic incentives of the participants in the social decision processes.We analyse general frameworks in which the outcome of the social choice process can be multivalued. Even when it seems natural to assume that the result of an election as a singleton, there are many situation in which our assumption should not be precluded. For instance, we can consider the social decision process as an interim stage that narrows the social agenda. Another possibility is to consider the set of the possible equilibria that could eventually arise in the voting procedure as the outcome of the election.Our study focuses on two important branches of the literature, the study of strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the analysis of strategic candidacy in multivalued voting procedures.First, we study the possibility of constructing non-manipulable social choice correspondences when the voters have strict attitudes towards risk. We analyse the trade-off between strategy-proofness and some regularity conditions proposed in the literature like Residual Resoluteness. Moreover, we introduce necessary conditions for strategy-proof and onto social choice correspondences. We also present the requirements in voters' preferences over sets of alternatives that reduce the possibility of strategy-proof correspondences to dictatorial ones.Second, we study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to affect strategically the outcome of a voting correspondence. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian Updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability, at least a candidate has incentives to leave the ballot at one profile of preferences. We also analyse the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.Finally, we analyse the strategic incentives of the candidates to withdraw the election in probabilistic environments. We characterise the family of unanimous and candidate stable probabilistic voting procedures when the candidates are expected utility maximisers. Surprisingly, we show that there are rules that are not probabilistic combinations of single-valued candidate stable voting procedures (random dictatorships) that do not provide incentives to the candidates to withdraw the election.