The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of fatigue on force application and resulting movement patterns during the performance of consecutive chin-ups. Special attention was directed toward relating any fatigue effects to upper limb strength dominance. Twenty male adult subjects each performed one trial. Each trial consisted of consecutive chin-ups. Fatigue caused changes in the movement patterns, duration of movement and force applied through the supporting hands. Throughout the performance greater vertical forces were applied through the dominant upper limb segment with the application of these forces resulting in horizontal displacement of the total body center of gravity toward the dominant hand.

Algometers are devices that can be used to identify the pressure and/or force eliciting a pressure-pain threshold. It has been noted in pressure-pain threshold studies that the rate at which manual force is applied should be consistent to provide the greatest reliability. This study tested the reliability and construct validity of an algometer (1000-Hz sampling rate) by manually applying pressure on a force plate (500-Hz sampling rate): 10 sets of 5 applications to 80 N and 1 set of 5 applications to each force level: 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, and 110 N. The investigator had previously become familiar with and practiced with the algometer. The handheld algometer had a 1-cm2 round rubber application surface, and the maximum force reading was compared with maximum force readings by the force plate using SEM and t-tests. Force-time curves were analyzed for average slope representing rate of force application. Average Pearson (r) correlations between the maximum force reading of the algometer and force plate were excellent in both trials to 80 N (r = 0.990) and the incremental trials (r = 0.999). The application of force was reasonably constant, with slopes averaging 6.8 ± 0.932 N·s−1. The SEE was 0.323 N. In conclusion, with previous familiarization and practice, an investigator may have high reliability in the rate of force application. The device itself was also highly correlated with readings from a force plate and, therefore, may be considered valid.

The primary purpose of this study was to observe the relationship between muscle activation of the right hand with the force produced at the fingertips in an isometric precision pinch tracking task. Thirty right-handed subjects, 15 males and 15 females, with a mean age 23.5 (SD 3.5) years, free from any neurological disorder or physical ailment, had a pair of electromyography (EMG) electrodes placed over the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle, which acts on the index finger, while performing a pinch force tracking task scaled to 20% maximum voluntary contraction (MVC). The tracking task was chosen because it created a continuously increasing force application to 20% MVC and then decreasing force release from 20% MVC at a prescribed rate in both cases of 6.66% MVC force per second. In addition to showing increases in EMG activation of the FDI with increases in force, the results revealed that muscle activation for a given force level was generally greater for force application than for force release. This may be due dynamics of muscle contraction or to patterns of multiple muscle coordination. / text

Nitric oxide (NO) plays a role in regulating the rate of orthodontic tooth movement (OTM) in rat models; however, in humans this role remains less clear. In this study, samples of gingival crevicular fluid (GCF) were collected from each maxillary central incisor and first and second molar immediately before (T0), 1 hour after (T1), and 3-4 days after (T2) application of light orthodontic forces in thirteen male participants (ages 11-18 years) undergoing orthodontic therapy. NO levels were measured in each GCF sample, and significantly higher NO levels (p<0.05) were found at T1 at the buccal surfaces of the central incisors when compared to the posterior teeth. The results indicate a possible role for NO in OTM at the pressure sites of incisors at early time points. Further studies are required to determine whether NO levels in the PDL of human teeth are affected by the magnitude of an applied force.

Nitric oxide (NO) plays a role in regulating the rate of orthodontic tooth movement (OTM) in rat models; however, in humans this role remains less clear. In this study, samples of gingival crevicular fluid (GCF) were collected from each maxillary central incisor and first and second molar immediately before (T0), 1 hour after (T1), and 3-4 days after (T2) application of light orthodontic forces in thirteen male participants (ages 11-18 years) undergoing orthodontic therapy. NO levels were measured in each GCF sample, and significantly higher NO levels (p<0.05) were found at T1 at the buccal surfaces of the central incisors when compared to the posterior teeth. The results indicate a possible role for NO in OTM at the pressure sites of incisors at early time points. Further studies are required to determine whether NO levels in the PDL of human teeth are affected by the magnitude of an applied force.

The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency (COIN). Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently waging a third on its southern border. The lessons learned from Thailand’s COIN campaigns could result in modern irregular warfare techniques valuable not only to Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, but also to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are currently reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first set of COIN lessons comes from Thailand’s successful 1965-85 communist COIN. The second set comes from Bangkok’s understudied 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists. The third set comes from Thailand’s current war against ethnic Malay separatists and radical Islamic insurgents attempting to secede and form a separate state called “Patani Raya,” among other names. Counterinsurgency is a difficult type of warfare for four reasons: (1) it can take years to succeed; (2) the battle space is poorly defined; (3) insurgents are not easily identifiable; and (4) war typically takes place among a civilian population that the guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support. Successful COINs include not only precise force application operations based on quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, political empowerment of the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural realities. Background: In 1965, communist insurgents, backed by the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), began waging an insurgency against Thailand in order to overthrow its government and install a Marxist regime. The Thai government struggled, both politically and militarily, to contain the movement for years, but eventually, it prevailed. Its success was based on a combination of effective strategy and coordination, plus well-designed and run security, political, and economic programs, the latter nowadays called the “three pillars of COIN,” a phrase developed by David Kilcullen, a modern COIN theorist and practitioner. One of Bangkok’s most successful initiatives was the CPM program (civil-military-police), which used a linked chain of local forces, police, and the military to not only provide security for villages, but also economic aid and administrative training to rural peoples. State political programs that undercut communist political programs backed by masterful diplomacy and a constant barrage of rural works helped erode the communist position. The 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists followed similar lines. The far South’s four border provinces, comprised of 80 percent ethnic Malay Muslims, had been in revolt on and off for decades since Bangkok annexed the area in 1902. Bangkok had waged haphazard COIN campaigns against rebel groups there for decades with mixed results. But after the successful communist COIN was up and running in 1980, Bangkok decided to apply similar ways and means to tackle the southern issue. The government divided its COIN operations into two components: a security component run by a task force called CPM-43, and a political-economic component run by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, or SB-PAC. SB-PAC also had a Special Branch investigative capacity. Combined, the 80s-90s southern COIN strategy relied on extensive military intelligence networks to curb violence, civilian administrators to execute local political reforms, and local politicians to apply traditional Malay and Muslim problem solving techniques to keep the peace. These programs worked well against the multitude of southern insurgent groups that conducted sporadic attacks against government and civilian targets while also running organized criminal syndicates. By the end of the 1990s, with a dose of Thailand’s famed diplomacy and help from Malaysia’s Special Branch, Bangkok defeated the southern separatists. In January 2004, however, a new separatist movement in southern Thailand emerged – one based on ethnic Malay separatism and radical Islam. It is a well-coordinated movement with effective operational expertise that attacks at a higher tempo than past southern rebel groups. It moreover strikes civilian targets on a regular basis, thereby making it a terrorist group. Overall, it dwarfs past southern movements regarding motivation and scale of violence. Thai officials think the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate, or BRN-C, leads the current rebellion, but there are several other groups that claim to also lead the fight. Members of the insurgency are nearly exclusively ethnic Malays and Muslims. The movement demonstrates radical Islamic tendencies thought its propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and deeds. It is a takfiri group that kills other Muslims who do not share its religious beliefs, so it wrote in its spiritual rebel guidebook, Fight for the Liberation of Patani. BRN-C seeks to separate the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla from Thailand in order to establish an Islamic republic. The separatists base their revolt on perceived military, economic, cultural, and religious subjugation going back to the early 1900s. And they have a point. The central government has, at different times in the past, indeed treated southerners with tremendous disdain and sometimes violence – especially those considered insurgents. But Bangkok has also instituted scores of economic and social aid programs in the south – mosque building, college scholarships, and medical aid, for example – so it has not been a continual anti-Muslim “blood fest” as government detractors have painted it. Still the maltreatment, certainly many times less than yesteryear, has provided today’s insurgents with ideological fodder for a steady stream of recruits and supporters. Combined with radical Islam, it has bonded the insurgents to a significant degree. Statistically, in the 2005-07-time frame, insurgents assassinated 1.09 people a day, detonated 18.8 bombs a month, and staged 12.8 arson attacks a month. In 2005, they conducted 43 raids and 45 ambushes. The militants target security forces, government civilians, and the local population. They have killed fellow Muslims and beheaded numerous Buddhist villagers. The insurgents’ actions have crippled the South’s education system, justice system, and commerce, and also have maligned Buddhist-Muslim relations. Overall, the separatists pose a direct threat to Thailand’s south and an indirect threat to the rest of the country. Moreover, their radical Islamic overtones have potential regional and global terrorist implications. The Thai Government spent much of 2004 attempting to ascertain whether the high level of violence was, in fact, an insurgency. To begin with, the government, led by PM Thaksin Shinawatra, was puzzled by the fact that the separatists had not published a manifesto or approached Bangkok with a list of demands. By mid-2004, however, the insurgents had staged a failed, region-wide revolt, and their prolific leaflet and Internet propaganda campaign clearly demonstrated that a rebel movement was afoot. By fall 2005, the separatists had made political demands via the press, all of which centered on secession. By 2006, a coup against PM Thaksin succeeded and the military government that replaced him instituted a new COIN strategy for the south that by 2008 had reduced violence by about 40 percent. Some of the tenets of this new strategy were based on Thailand’s past successful COIN strategies. Whether or not the government has concocted a winning strategy for the future, however, remains to be seen. This paper analyses these COIN campaigns through the COIN Pantheon, a conceptual model the author developed as an analytical tool. It is based on David Kilcullen’s three pillars of COIN.

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