There is no abstract available for this thesis.

The objective of this thesis is to show that after World War I, the National Bank of Persia emerged as an ideal accessory to Germany's desire to establish a foothold in Iran. It argues that the main motive behind Germany's involvement in the National Bank was to utilise the bank as a vehicle for extending German national interest into Iran. However, although Germany's main interest was to thereby gain economic influence in Iran, the National Bank provided Germany with a tool that furthered its desire for political participation and the establishing of authority within the spheres of interest of Britain and Russia. The objective of this thesis is not to establish a comprehensive and complete overview of German foreign policy toward Iran and its interactions with the National Bank of Persia. It aims rather at highlighting a number of events that are significant for an examination of Germany's policy toward Iran and its evolution up until the outset of World War II. In pursuit of this task, emphasis is given to the opinion expressed at the time, as reflected in German sources, rather than the historical reality behind those sources. German foreign policy towards Iran in the first half of the twentieth century can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase, which was initiated before Word War I, collapsed as a consequence of the war and the Versailles Treaty, achieving little success. The second, more significant, phase began around 1924, and was marked by the creation of the National Bank of Persia in 1927, the appointment of the German national Lindenblatt as its director, the appointment of his compatriot Schniewind as financial advisor to the Persian government, the contracts granted to German companies and consortiums for the construction of the Trans Iranian Railway, the reestablishment of trade relations between Germany and Iran, and the wide-ranging flight concessions granted by the Iranian government to the German company Junkers. The third phase of Germany's involvement with Iran came about with the achievements that resulted from the trade agreements of 1935. From a German perspective after 1933 diplomacy started to replace the role of the National Bank, as the prime agent of Germany's relations with Iran. This phase lasted until the British-Russian invasion of Iran in 1941, and saw Germany lose almost its entire influence over the National Bank, while its influence over trade with Iran had progressively increased. Germany's foreign political success during the inter-war period resulted in an expansion of its commercial relations, which elevated Germany from a country with almost no trade relations with Iran to its largest trading partner.

No description available.

But the central focus will be to explore the foreign policy transition by reflecting the theory that even though international and regional political developments had an impact on the foreign policy transition of the ANC, the internal and domestic political struggles that had evolved during the same time-frame as both the international and regional political developments also had major contributions to the foreign policy transition of the movement. Within this context, the study will also explore the preliminary contours of a post-apartheid foreign policy as perceived by the ANC as to how the country will be reintegrated into the political and economic world order.

[no abstract included] / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

This discussion argues that the United States-Pakistan alliance of 1954 emerged because American strategic concerns for the Middle East, arising in the aftermath of the Korean War and based upon a recognition of Britain's declining ability to defend the region, coincided with Pakistan's strategic needs as a newlyindependent nation. The United States believed that Pakistan-a moderate Islamic nation, situated on the eastern flank of the Middle East, and ideologically inclined toward the West-could assist Western efforts to protect the Middle East from Soviet influence, penetration, or attack. This discussion further argues that the United States only brought Pakistan into the Western strategic network when a series of events made it seem that Asia would be the next battleground for the Cold War and after it was clear that if containment were to be extended to South Asia, Pakistan was the only choice available. Pakistan's persistent and sophisticated courtship of the United States differed greatly from India's efforts to remain neutral in the Cold War. And this discussion argues that the alliance was consistent with the broader policies of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and that it stemmed not from American interests in South Asia but from Washington's global strategic efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States-Pakistan alliance was not the result of American attempts to "contain" or dominate India, of Anglo-American competition over the subcontinent and the Middle East, or of American efforts to establish economic hegemony over South Asia. Indeed, as the United States' fears for Middle Eastern security subsided, so did its commitment to the alliance with Pakistan. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Cuba's role in Africa in the 1970s has been the subject of numerous and diverse interpretations. Students of Cuban politics sometimes tend to take a general view of Cuban policy toward Angola, and so important differences between each issue or situation are overlooked. This study offers separate accounts of the role of Cuba in Africa and in Ethiopia since 1975, with the purpose of exploring the possibility of an influence relationship between Moscow and Havana. Influence analysis is an extremely subjective task. That is, it appears to be virtually impossible to document Soviet influence on Cuba. Nevertheless, it remains possible to examine available evidence with respect to each situation, and then to construct what appears to be the most coherent argument regarding the possibility of Soviet influence on Cuba. I shall conclude that the body of evidence suggests that Cuba did not intervene in Angola chiefly to conform to Soviet preferences or interests. In this sense then, Cuba probably was not influenced by the Soviets to any great degree with respect to the Angolan episode. In contrast, Cuba's role in each of the two Ethiopian incidents seems to exemplify the rather strong possibility of Soviet influence on Cuba. Further, it appears probable that the Soviets influenced Cuba through diplomatic persuasion with regard to the two Ethiopian incidents. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The aim of this dissertation is a comparative study of South Africa's strategic significance in two distinct periods, namely, from approximately the Second World War to 1989 and from 1990 to 1993. The research methodology followed was to firstly identify the theoretical framework to be utilised as regards the concept of strategic significance and then to highlight the relative variables to be compared. Particular emphasis is placed on the development of a new era following the end of the Cold War, which resulted in changes in the external environment and to the concept of strategic significance. In this study, this concept is based on three criteria, namely, a state's national capability; ego perceptions of strategic significance, based in part on the national capability noted above; and alter perceptions or perceptions of the external environment regarding a particular state's strategic significance. The study presents evidence of South Africa's relatively strong national capability in both periods under discussion, especially when compared to the rest of the African continent. The RSA's strategic significance was particularly strong during the pre-1990 period, primarily as a result of the Cold War conflict and the resultant superpower battle for the extension of influence. South Africa, with a wealth of vital strategic minerals, anti¬communist sentiment, relatively strong economy, and having possession of the Cape Sea Route, was thus awarded a certain degree of international importance. This was indicated by continuing international contacts and trade relations during a period when the RSA' s domestic apartheid policies were under constant international criticism. The end of the Cold War, however, resulted in a diminishing of strategic significance as regards the above¬mentioned aspects; while the value of South Africa's role on the African continent in general and in the Southern African region in particular, began to take precedence over previous concerns of communist expansionism in the Third World. This role was especially relevant in light of continuing marginalisation of Third World countries. As a result, both the developed North and the underdeveloped South began to perceive South Africa as a potential "saviour" and "engine of development" for the African continent. South Africa's role as an international economic partner and supplier of strategic minerals, however, continued. A comparative analysis is presented at the end of the study to assess similarities and differences in South Africa's strategic significance during the two periods, and it is concluded that the RSA was indeed considered to hold a certain degree of strategic importance throughout both periods under discussion, although the emphasis of such value was altered in response to changes in both the internal and external environments. / Dissertation (MA (International Politics))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

No description available.

No description available.