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M.A. (Politics) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

At the beginning of the present century, Anglo-Russian rivalry was perhaps the most important factor in the international situation of the day. At that time it seemed sound doctrine to believe that Britain and Russia were bound to remain implacable enemies for an indefinite period of time. Nevertheless, seven years after the century had begun, these two apparently irreconcilable rivals had reached an agreement, which, if not cordial, was none the less real, and which relegated their well-night century-old rivalry to the realms of history. The animosity which was characteristic of Anglo-Russian relations throughout this period had its origins in the Near East during the last part of the eighteenth century, as a result of Russian efforts to obtain control of the Straits of Bosphorous and of the Dardanelles from the Ottoman Turk. However, the rise of revolutionary France put an end temporarily to this newly-born rivalry, and forced the two countries into a partnership to meet a nation who was a vital threat to both, with the defeat of Napoleon, though, this partnership dissolved and the rivalry appeared in a more intense form than before. Throughout the nineteenth century it spread successively from the Near East to Central Asia, and finally to the Far East. However, shortly after the coming of the twentieth century, both countries discovered they had a common rival in Imperial Germany, whose growing power now made her the leading European power on the continent. As in the case of revolutionary France, the two countries resolved to forego their rivalry in order to meet a common peril. Hence the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, From the British side, the material for the study of Anglo-Russian relations throughout this period is on the whole adequate. The original British Documents for the years 1878 - I897 are not available, but those for the years 1898 - 1907 are contained in the general collection "British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898, - 1914". There is also much material available in the memoirs and biographies of the leading British statesmen. On the Russian side, however, there is much to be desired. A certain number of official documents have been published in a spasmodic and desultory manner in the "Krasny Archiv", but much which is pertinent has been withheld. Only a few documents are available in English translation. The memoirs of émigré Russian diplomats, while available in so far as they go, suffer from the fact that they were composed in exile, with little else save memory to serve as a guide. As a result, there is much on the Russian side which is, and likely will remain unknown. Nevertheless, there is enough Russian material extant which, taken in conjunction with the British material available, is sufficient to enable the determining of the course followed by Anglo- Russian relations with a reasonable degree of certainty. In summing up, it should be emphasized that Anglo-Russian rivalry flourished most vigorously when neither country was menaced by a strong European power. When a strong power emerged which threatened to dominate the continent of Europe, this rivalry temporarily ceased. Since both Great Britain and Russia had developed immense empires in Asia in close proximity the one to the other, it was perhaps only natural that they should be serious rivals. Nevertheless, they both remained powers whose major interests lay in Europe. Here, in Europe, if the Near East be excluded, the vital interests of the two countries did not conflict. Both countries were interested in maintaining the status quo in Europe, as they clearly recognized that a Europe organized under the hegemony of another single power was a mortal threat to both. It can therefore be said that both Great Britain and Imperial Russia considered the maintenance of the European balance of power as essential to their long-term interests, and were prepared to forego their mutual rivalry to maintain it. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

With the introduction of the people’s communes in the People’ s Republic of China in 1958, a far-reaching ideological dispute arose between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. In the years following the death of Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had embarked upon a domestic policy which largely ignored many of the directives laid down by the fathers of Communism, and which often subordinated ideological considerations to pragmatic economic considerations. The people's communes embodied an attempt by the Chinese communists to realize all the prerequisites to Communism which the Soviet Union had forsaken in their drive to increase production and thus constituted a challenge to the "revisionist" policies of the Soviet Union. This was especially true in the light of the specific rejection of communes by the Soviet leaders a few months before the Chinese communes were introduced. Moreover, because "anti-party" groups existed both within the Chinese and Soviet parties, and were given ideological support by the opposing party, the dispute over the principles involved in the communes was turned from a theoretical dispute into a concrete struggle with in the separate parties. Besides being an ideological dispute over the correct policies to follow during the transition to Communism, the commune controversy also related directly to the more predominant issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The military significance of the communes provided one such link; the detrimental effect of the communes on the world's image of Communism provided another such link, and the existence of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions within the two parties, provided the other link; the latter situation was especially significant in the commune controversy since the C.P.S.U.’s support for the anti-commune faction of Marshall Peng Teh-huai and Chang Wen-tian, was at the same time support for a faction more in sympathy with the "revisionist" foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In a broader perspective, the commune controversy also raised important issues concerning ideological authority, particularly over questions of domestic policy during the transition to Communism. Since the Chinese party remains determined to proceed with their commune program as soon as economic conditions allow, and since the C.P.S.U. continues to make a more and more liberal interpretation of Communist society, it can be expected that the issues embodied in the commune controversy will continue to be strongly contended by the two parties. Moreover, the fact that the commune issue is related to the more predominant issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute, suggests that the debate over the communes will continue as long as differences remain between the two giants of the Communist world. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Doctrine of 1932. Some statistics are also given of the scope of U.S. economic interest in China up to Pearl Harbour. Chapter II delves into FDR's overall attitude toward China, the material help provided her to 1942, the logistics involved in its delivery, and the early American attempts to identify China with the three great powers. Chapter III follows American diplomatic moves to have China accepted by Britain and the U.S.S.R. into the U.N. Organization during its formative years at the Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences and the gradual relegation of China to a secondary role in the war in the Pacific. Chapter IV investigates the complexities of the Stilwell Mission, some Chinese reactions to it, the modest help provided China, and her relative neglect by the three great powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The Yalta concessions to foster the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war in the Pacific are also examined in the context of a planned invasion of the Japanese mainland. Chapter V assesses the relative value of four years of U.S. diplomacy toward China which concentrated on raising the Nationalists to great power status with a seat in the U.N. Security Council whilst ignoring the growing potential for power of the Chinese Communists. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate Finland's postwar relations with the Soviet Union from six different perspectives (systemic, strategic, domestic political, personality, economic and cultural) in order to (1) achieve a better general understanding of this unique situation in international relations, and (2) make a systematic analysis of the variables which are most salient in describing and explaining this relationship. The study is approached mainly from the Finnish point of view, although Soviet factors and perspectives must obviously be included, especially in discussing systemic and strategic variables. It is hypothesized that the critical phase in postwar Finnish-Soviet relations was the 1944-48 period. Once Finland's status as a sovereign and independent buffer-state was established, the development of her relations with the Soviet Union can be characterized by (1) her constant striving to widen her maneuverability in international relations, and (2) the Soviet Union's increasingly lenient attitude towards Finland as the international situation improved and as the Russians became more certain of Finland's intention to maintain friendly relations and a credible neutrality. These developments are discussed in the context of each of the six perspectives. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the relative importance of the perspectives in analyzing Finnish-Soviet relations and a discussion of the relevance of the Finnish model in studying small power-great power relationships and neutral buffer-state policies. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of this study is to examine the variables responsible for the fact that Southeast Asian Communist parties sided with Peking In the latter’s ideological dispute with Moscow. The analysis is to a large extent based upon a comparison of Communist journals, the most important being the Peking Review and the World Marxist Review. I have assumed that the latter, controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will print only those items reflecting its interpretation in the dispute. And the former, published by the Communist Party of China, will do likewise. In addition, the author has relied heavily on Western sources which specialize in translating Communist material relating to Sino-Sovlet polemics. The assumption of this paper has been that Southeast Asian Communists would realistically assess which protagonist in the dispute offered the best advice on the question of how to gain power and, consequently, would confer their loyalty to that side. However, after an analysis of differing Chinese and Russian opinions of the best way to obtain power and an examination of the domestic position of the individual Communist parties the above assumption had to be qualified. It was found that although all parties examined opted for the Chinese side, this was not so much a consequence of the greater utility of Chinese- advocated strategy but more a factor of domestic necessity for and Chinese organizational control of the Southeast Asian Communist parties. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The availability of new document sources in Britain and Brazil has made it possible to examine this crucial period in the development of relations between the two countries. After exerting considerable economic and political influence in Brazil during the nineteenth century, British supremacy began to be challenged by German and American interests. At the same time, the Brazilian economy was undergoing fundamental changes brought about by the collapse of rubber and coffee and the development of diversified industrial activity. The main effect of this process was to reduce Brazilian dependence on British capital and imports, and to foster her own growth as an international unit of some importance. British opinions regarding the state of Brazil during this period were generally pessimistic, and ran counter to the accepted view that she was passing through a phase of progress and prosperity. British diplomatic sources, not always well-informed, saw little hope for the country, and these thoughts were echoed by several leading Brazilian intellectuals. The British Minister in Rio de Janeiro, Sir William Haggard, was totally unconvinced about Brazil's future prospects, and was unsuccessful in developing fruitful relations with his counterparts. The policies of the Barão do Rio Branco brought Brazil closer to expanding American interests. The First World War was important in that it witnessed the eclipse of Germany from the international scene and produced a marked improvement in Anglo-Brazilian relations. The British Minister, Sir Arthur Peel, was more successful than his predecessor in his official dealings, and the common interests of the War established closer ties between the two countries. By the end of the War, however, Brazil had emerged as a prominent factor in the affairs of the hemisphere, and her own national and international development signalled the end of Anglo-Brazilian relations as they had existed before the turn of the century. / Arts, Faculty of / French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies, Department of / Graduate

This thesis applies the 'government from the centre' thesis, as put forth by Donald Savoie in his book Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics, to the creation of foreign policy during the Chretien government. Savoie argues that the centre of Canadian government, meaning the Prime Minister and his advisors, dominated government policy and have forced other bodies, formerly involved in policy creation, into an advisory role. The thesis starts with an examination of the central theory as well as the views of its opponents; followed by a brief history of the department and its relation to the centre of government over the years. This is followed in chapters two and three by a study of Chretien himself as well as an examination of other actors in the foreign policy process. By determining the roles of each individual, and how much power each carried to formulate and initiate policy, the 'government from the centre' model is tested. Finally, the international landmine ban created during the late 1990's is used as a case study to show exactly how the centre dominated foreign policy creation when Chretien was Prime Minister. This case initially suggests that the Foreign Affairs Minister is the dominant player in foreign policy creation. Upon further study however, it is determined that the centre controlled the process. 'Governing from the centre' is alive and well in Canadian politics, and is the rule rather than the exception in foreign policy. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

On July 21, 1954, Canada was asked to assume, with Poland and India, the supervision of the Cease Fire Agreements (CFA) in what had been French Indochina. The CFA marked the end of French rule in Indochina, a rule that had never been unquestioned, and that, since December of 1946, had involved France in a bitter and costly war. At the end of 1953 a series of events led to a decision to seek a negotiated peace in Indochina. After eight years of fighting that had drained away manpower and resources, France had lost control of large areas of Vietnam. The death of Stalin in Russia brought new leaders to power who were anxious to secure a lessening of international tensions so that they could turn their attention to improving the lot of the average Russian. The Chinese were about to embark on their first Five Year Plan, and wished to be free of the heavy burden that supplying the Vietminh war machine entailed. The Vietminh and the Americans, on the other hand, seem to have come to the conference table only on the insistence of their allies. The Vietminh considered that final victory was within their grasp and did not wish to stop short of their objective - control over the whole of Vietnam. The new Republican administration in the U.S. was committed to "rolling back" Communism, and foresaw another victory for Communism in the proposed peace conference. Proceedings at the Geneva Conference soon showed the diversity and conflict of aims among the participants. The U.S. soon retired for all practical purposes from active participation, and for quite long periods there was not even an official head of the U.S. Delegation present in Geneva. The Laniel Government fell in France during the negotiations, and Laniel was replaced by Mendès France, largely on the strength of his promise to conclude a peace within thirty days. Britain and the USSR acted as co-chairmen of the Conference and were active in moving their allies closer together; they share the responsibility for the eventual successful outcome of the Conference. Of the differences that developed between the two sides at Geneva, the most significant was the difference of opinion over the composition of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the Cease Fire. A compromise was finally reached on India, Poland and Canada. During the first two years of the Commission's existence it supervised the withdrawal and regroupment of forces provided for in the Geneva Agreement. Particularly in the evacuation of Haiphong and Hanoi the ICC was able to render valuable service. By the end of this two year period, however, the French Union Forces (FUF) had left Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese to continue to enforce the Cease Fire Agreement, and the RVN had of course refused to consider itself bound by the Agreements. The Diem Government refused to contemplate the holding of elections that would have re-unified the country and brought to an end the ICC's task in Vietnam. Of all the members of the ICC, it was India's foreign policy that most affected the decisions and the work of the Commission. Indian policy was non-aligned, and must even more importantly be clearly seen to be non-aligned. At the same time India had an almost instinctive dislike of Communism, a dislike that appeared in India's lukewarm support for anti-colonial struggles in Asia that were dominated by Communists. Although the Indian Delegation sided with the Poles more often than with the Canadians during the life of the Commission, on important decisions that affected the South's ability to maintain its security, India sided with the Canadians. After 1956, the Commission became increasingly ineffective. Its freedom to investigate was eroded, financial support was lacking, and eventually the increasing tempo of the war in Vietnam swept the ICC aside as largely irrelevant. The ICC is only one of many peacekeeping operations in which Canada has been involved. UN missions have tended to be popular within Canada, while service on the ICC has not been generally approved. In fact Canada has not been as neutral or as partisan as public opinion has assumed. Certain conditions tend to ineffectiveness in peacekeeping missions, and these conditions have been present in other missions as well as in the ICC. In recent years, Canada has been increasingly reluctant to take on peacekeeping duties where it is judged the chance for effective action has not been great. But Canada has not been involved in peacekeeping simply because it has suited her to be involved. In future dangerous and difficult situations the pressures on us to participate might well be too strong to resist. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate