Spelling suggestions: "subject:"forms off abstention"" "subject:"forms oof abstention""
1 |
Electoral systems and forms of abstentionTroumpounis, Orestis 20 June 2011 (has links)
Esta tesis es de carácter interdisciplinario, entre economía y ciencias políticas. Usando métodos bien
explotados en economía explico como las instituciones electorales afectan las decisiones de los
individuos en varios contextos políticos.
El capítulo 2 es normativo y propone dos modificaciones en los sistemas electorales. Ambos resultan en
una participación más alta y dan incentivos a los partidos políticos a que sean de mejor calidad.
Primero, analizo un sistema electoral donde el número de los candidatos que obtienen representación
en el parlamento es endógeno y depende del nivel de la participación. Segundo, analizo el efecto de un
quorum de participación en elecciones parlamentarias. Según mis resultados, las dos modificaciones
implican beneficios más bajos para los partidos, y bienestar más alto para los ciudadanos. Dichos
resultados explican porqué los partidos usan otros tipos de medidas para incrementar la participación en
las elecciones. Además, mis resultados explican la evolución del uso de un quorum en algunos países.
El capítulo 3 es un trabajo junto con Sabine Flamand. Estudiamos el efecto de un quorum de
participación en reuniones de pocos miembros. Usando un modelo de reuniones repetitivas,
demostramos que la decisión se retrasa cuando el quorum es alto, y que los miembros no pierden
utilidad por el hecho de retrasar la decisión. Finalmente, la presencia de un quorum puede tanto
aumentar como reducir el número de miembros tomando la decisión final.
El capítulo 4 ofrece un análisis empírico de las decisiones de votar en blanco y votar nulo. El análisis es
innovador porque por primera vez se tratan las dos decisiones por separado. Demuestro que el voto
blanco contiene un mensaje de insatisfacción contra los partidos políticos, mientras que el voto nulo
contiene insatisfacción contra las instituciones y los niveles de democracia. / The present thesis lies at the intersection of economics and political science. Using methods, well
developed in economics, I try to understand how electoral institutions shape individuals' behavior in
different political contexts.
Chapter 2 has a normative flavor. Focusing on the interplay between low quality parties and citizens'
apathy, I try to break the vicious cycle that links the two, by proposing two electoral rules that increase
turnout in PR elections, and at the same time give incentives to parties to be of better quality. First, I
propose an electoral rule where the number of candidates elected depends on the level of participation.
Second, I propose the introduction of a participation quorum that has to be met in order for the election
to be valid. The common feature and innovation of these rules is that turnout affects the electoral
outcome, and as a consequence these rules incentivize parties to care about the level of turnout. I show
that both rules, while they increase turnout they imply lower profits for parties. My results explain why
parties target to increase turnout through a certain type of measures that do not necessary improve the
quality of the vote. Moreover, I also explain the evolution of the use of the participation quorum in
certain countries.
Chapter 3 is coauthored with Sabine Flamand, and tries to understand the effect of such a participation
requirement on individuals' behavior and the decision outcome. To this end, we model a setup of
repeated meetings, where a small group of individuals has to take a decision. We show that the decision
is delayed when the quorum requirement is high and members are not harmed by postponing the
decision. Surprisingly, the presence of the quorum may decrease the number of attendees taking the
decision, while we show that in order to avoid policy distortions, the required number of participants
must be even.
Apart from abstaining, voters that are not willing to support any of the candidates in most
parliamentary elections, are given the choice to participate in the election and cast a blank or a null
vote. A blank vote is a disapproval vote of all competing candidates, while a null vote is a vote cast
erroneously or deliberately in a way not conforming with the legal voting procedure. Political scientists
were treating blank and null votes in an identical way. My attempt in chapter 4 is to study these two
protest actions on a separate basis, in order to understand, why in some elections blank votes are many
more than null votes and vice versa. After constructing a database considering the percentages of blank
and null votes separately, I show that the amount of blank and null votes cast in an election are not
affected by the same factors. Null votes convey dissatisfaction towards the electoral and democratic
institutions, while blank votes convey dissatisfaction towards the parties. More important, my results
go against one of the prevailing criticisms of compulsory voting. The latter has no significant effect on
the amount of uninformative votes since it has no significant effect on the amount of null votes. On the
contrary, it increases only the amount of blank votes, which by definition disclose information, and in
particular voters' disapproval of all competing parties.
Although abstention is one of the most studied issues both by political scientists and economists, the
current thesis extends our knowledge, by giving insight into some of abstention's unexplored but
widely observed aspects.
|
Page generated in 0.1187 seconds