This thesis studies the interaction between new and used durable goods without physical depreciation. In product categories such as CDs/DVDs and video games, the competition from used goods markets has been viewed as a serious problem by producers. These products physically depreciate negligibly, but owners' consumption values could depreciate quickly due to satiation. Consequently, used goods that are almost identical to new goods may become available immediately after a new product release. However, the existence of used goods markets also provides consumers with a selling opportunity. If consumers are forward-looking and account for the future resale value of a product in their buying decision, used goods markets could increase the sales of new goods. Thus, whether used good markets are harmful or beneficial to new-good producers is an empirical question. To tackle this question, I extend the previous literature in three ways. First, I assemble a new data set from the Japanese video game market. This unique data set includes not only the sales and prices of new and used goods, but also the resale value of used copies, the quantity of used copies retailers purchased from consumers, and the inventory level of used copies at retailers. Second, I develop a structural model of forward-looking consumers that incorporates (i) new and used goods buying decisions, (ii) used goods selling decisions, (iii) consumer expectations about future prices of new and used goods as well as resale values of used goods, and (iv) the depreciation of both owners' and potential buyers' consumption values. Third, I develop a new Bayesian estimation method to estimate my model. In particular, my method can alleviate the computational burden of estimating non-stationary discrete choice dynamic programming models with continuous state variables that evolve stochastically over time. The estimation results suggest that consumers are forward-looking in the Japanese video game market and the substitutability between new and used video games is quite low. Using the estimates, I quantify the impact of eliminating the used video game market on new-game revenues. I find that the elimination of used video game market could reduce the revenue for a new game.

This thesis studies the interaction between new and used durable goods without physical depreciation. In product categories such as CDs/DVDs and video games, the competition from used goods markets has been viewed as a serious problem by producers. These products physically depreciate negligibly, but owners' consumption values could depreciate quickly due to satiation. Consequently, used goods that are almost identical to new goods may become available immediately after a new product release. However, the existence of used goods markets also provides consumers with a selling opportunity. If consumers are forward-looking and account for the future resale value of a product in their buying decision, used goods markets could increase the sales of new goods. Thus, whether used good markets are harmful or beneficial to new-good producers is an empirical question. To tackle this question, I extend the previous literature in three ways. First, I assemble a new data set from the Japanese video game market. This unique data set includes not only the sales and prices of new and used goods, but also the resale value of used copies, the quantity of used copies retailers purchased from consumers, and the inventory level of used copies at retailers. Second, I develop a structural model of forward-looking consumers that incorporates (i) new and used goods buying decisions, (ii) used goods selling decisions, (iii) consumer expectations about future prices of new and used goods as well as resale values of used goods, and (iv) the depreciation of both owners' and potential buyers' consumption values. Third, I develop a new Bayesian estimation method to estimate my model. In particular, my method can alleviate the computational burden of estimating non-stationary discrete choice dynamic programming models with continuous state variables that evolve stochastically over time. The estimation results suggest that consumers are forward-looking in the Japanese video game market and the substitutability between new and used video games is quite low. Using the estimates, I quantify the impact of eliminating the used video game market on new-game revenues. I find that the elimination of used video game market could reduce the revenue for a new game.

L’aléa moral est une source de distorsion économique. La prédiction classique dans un cadre simple est qu’une meilleure couverture conduit à un effort moindre. Cette thèse étudie dans quelle mesure cette prédiction est ou non vérifiée empiriquement dans des cadres plus complexes. Le premier chapitre s’intéresse aux absences pour raison de santé. La politique étudiée est le jour de carence pour arrêt maladie dans la fonction publique de l’Etat en France. Cette politique de remboursement moins généreuse a notamment pour but de réduire l’absentéisme. Elle conduit à une baisse de la prévalence des absences de courte durée. Mais elle conduit aussi à une hausse de la prévalence des absences de longue durée. En conséquence, la prévalence de l’ensemble des absences pour raison de santé reste inchangée. Les deux chapitres suivants s’intéressent aux systèmes de bonus-malus d’un assureur automobile irlandais. Le deuxième chapitre s’intéresse à l’introduction d’un état très protecteur : la protection à vie du bonus. Cette protection est octroyée automatiquement et gratuitement aux assurés sous des conditions restrictives d’historique de sinistre et d’ancienneté. Comparé à la situation dans laquelle cet état protecteur n’existe pas, le taux de sinistre des assurés protégés augmente, tandis que le taux de sinistre des agents non protégés diminue, dans l’espoir d’être récompensés par la protection. L’existence de la protection est à l’origine d’un transfert intertemporel. Les assurés renoncent à de l’utilité présente en exerçant un effort supérieur, afin d’être récompensés par la protection et de profiter d’une utilité future plus élevée due à un effort moindre. Le troisième chapitre étudie la réaction juste après que l’assuré est récompensé par la protection à vie du bonus. Le taux de sinistre augmente immédiatement, mais seulement quand la protection existe depuis quelque temps. Cela suggère que l'effet d'un changement incitatif dépend de sa nature, mais aussi de son contexte. / Moral hazard is a source of economic distortion. The classical prediction in a simple framework is that a better coverage leads to a lower effort. This thesis studies the extent to which this prediction is empirically verified in more complex settings. The first chapter focuses on health-related absences. The policy under study is the one-day waiting period for sick leave in the French central civil service. This less generous reimbursement policy notably aims at reducing absenteeism. It leads to a decrease in the prevalence of short-term absences. But it also leads to an increase in the prevalence of long-term absences. As a result, the prevalence of all health-related absences stay unchanged. The two following chapters focus on bonus-malus systems used by an Irish car insurer. The second chapter focuses of the introduction on a highly protecting state: the lifetime bonus protection. This protection is granted automatically and freely to insurees under restrictive conditions on past claims and seniority. Compared to the situation in which this protecting state does not exist, the claims rate of protected insurees increases, but the claims rate of unprotected insurees decreases, in the hope of being rewarded with the protection. The existence of the protection induces an intertemporal transfer. Insurees waive present utility by exerting more effort, so as to be rewarded with the protection and to enjoy more future utility due to lower future effort. The third chapter studies the reaction just after the insuree is rewarded with the lifetime bonus protection. The claims rate increases immediately, but only when the protection exists for some time. This suggests that the effect of an incentive change depends on its nature, but also on its context.