Whether Kant’s account of free will is coherent or not depends upon how we interpret him. On the one hand, if we understand Kant as providing some metaphysical solution to the problem of free will, which secures the reality of free will for agents, then his account seems to be incoherent. One the other hand, if we understand Kant’s account as merely providing a defense of the assumption, or idea of freedom for practical purposes, then his account seems to be useful and coherent. I will argue that the latter account of free will is the one that Kant provides in his works, and will illustrate how this account might shed light on to our epistemic limits and our nature as human beings.

This thesis argues that Luther’s reaction to Pelagianism within the Scotist tradition led to a decisive break with the scholastic theology of free will, merit and the Mass. However, by identifying the theological crux of Luther’s Reformation, this thesis discovers a rapprochement in the free will theology of early Lutheranism and Counter-Reformation scholasticism. The case is made that Luther’s theology of the passivity of the human will calls for a recovery of the Reformation significance of Luther’s relation to scholasticism and provides the means for recovery in ecumenical dialogue today. The thesis is presented in three parts. The first locates the origins of Luther’s Reformation reaction to Pelagianism in the Scotist developments of free will, merit and the Mass from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. Chapter One argues that Scotus’s view of free will as autonomous volition had Pelagian repercussions on his teaching on merit. Chapter Two finds that Luther’s charge of Pelagianism could similarly be applied to Scotus’s theology of Eucharistic sacrifice, because the human will rather than Christ’s cross is deemed by Scotus to be the source of merit in the Mass. Chapter Three examines the continued influence of Scotus’s free will theology on the fifteenth-century debates concerning predestination. Scotus’s free will legacy in these debates, gives historical justification for positing a connection between Scotus and Luther’s denunciation of the Mass as a Pelagian work. Part Two argues that Luther’s theology of the passivity of the human will and the Mass as a testament constitutes a Reformation break with scholastic understandings of the meritorious agency of the human will. Chapter Four locates Luther’s Reformation relation to the voluntarism of Ockham and Biel, the German mystical tradition, and his confessor Staupitz, in his denial that the human will attains a meritorious agency under grace. Chapter Five maintains that Luther’s theology of the Mass as a testament reflects his rejection of Pelagianism and his Reformation article of passivity. In consequence, Luther’s testament model is shown to be incompatible with Cajetan’s non-Pelagian theology of the merit of the sacrifice of the Mass. Part Three affirms that Luther’s belief in the passivity of the human will has Reformation significance, by examining the condemnations of Trent. However, by considering subsequent treatments on free will, it is possible to identify a convergence in late sixteenth-century Lutheran and Catholic theology. Chapter Six argues that Trent countered both the Scotist theory of merit and Luther’s theology of the passivity of the human will. Luther’s belief in passivity is shown to cause a Reformation rift in a way that the Scotist reformulation of free will does not, because it led Luther to renounce the meritorious offering of Masses. Chapter Seven shows that in the wake of the Majorist, Synergist and Flacian debates of early Lutheranism and the Catholic de auxiliis controversy, a parallel understanding of the free will to sin can be discerned. The Lutheran Formula of Concord (1577) relinquished Luther’s Reformation article of passivity and offered a position which was in unconscious agreement with Trent. The thesis concludes by applying the results of this historical study to key ecumenical documents on the Mass. It is suggested that the rediscovery of a historical consensus on free will, opens the door to a common understanding of merit as participation in Christ, and thus to a shared Lutheran and Catholic understanding of Eucharistic sacrifice.

This thesis seeks an answer to a question of whether social normative systems, particularly law and morality, are consistent with the most recent scientific and philosophical findings. Those in fact often conclude that the human will is not free and that the human decision- making is only a physiological process governed by the laws of physics. Such findings thus, at a first glance, collide mainly with the concept of responsibility, through which law and morality are implemented. Therefore, the paper begins with a brief introduction of the current state of knowledge concerning free will and presents mainly determinism and indeterminism. The conclusion of the first part called Free Will and Determinism introduces a view of the world, which best suits the current state of knowledge and is further referred to as Physicalism. The second part called Law, Morality, Physicalism, briefly presents law and morality as regulators of human behavior, for which the concept of free will is fundamental. The focus of the thesis then shifts towards the institutions of criminal and civil law, that seem to be threatened by Physicalism the most. However, general consistency of Physicalism and the examined normative concepts is concluded, while it is argued that within the physicalistic view of the world, law and morality...

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / This research project makes a contribution to the discourse on the theodicy problem by examining the position adopted by Gregory Boyd known as open theism. Boyd would argue that an open view of God is in a better position to deal with the problem of evil because the traditional understanding of God’s attributes fails to vindicate God of guilt or responsibility for evil and should, therefore, be abandoned in favour of the attractive openness model. Boyd claims that God cannot be held responsible for evil and suffering because the future cannot be known to God. He articulates this perspective from the process thought position that the future is not a reality therefore, cannot be known. Thus, God took a risk when he/she created human being with free will because any free will future actions and thoughts cannot be known by God. God is therefore surprised by the actions and sufferings of human being and therefore has to change his/her plans to meet with the free will actions of human beings. Boyd in articulating his open theism theodicy does so by reconstructing the classical understanding of the attributes of God namely: God’s omniscience, immutability, and omnipotence to give an answer to the theodicy problem. Evangelicals understand the attributes of God to be part of God nature, therefore any changes in the attributes of God means changes to God him/herself. Because of Boyd’s claim to be an evangelical, this project examines the attributes of God as reflected in the works of the early church father to the reformers and influential evangelical scholars in contrast with the work of Boyd. In presenting an evangelical understanding on God and suffering this study concludes that the position adopted by Boyd is a radical departure from evangelicalism and orthodoxy faith and is more consonant of a deistic presentation of God in his/her relation to the world.

In this dissertation, I develop an interpretation of Leibniz on modality and free will. I do so for two reasons: first, I am attempting to revitalize the notion that Leibniz is the predecessor of contemporary modal semantics; second, I am using Leibniz's philosophical system to motivate responses to contemporary philosophical issues in modality and free will. In Chapter One, I argue that Leibniz's basic principles are plausible theoretical tools that ought to be used by contemporary philosophers in developing their philosophical systems. In Chapter Two, I develop Leibniz's views on the nature of individuals. I argue that possible individuals are actually of the same sort as individuals in the actual world--possible individuals and actual individuals are complete creatures that do not differ ontologically from each other. In Chapter Three, I argue that Leibniz's views on possible individuals make him a modal realist and compare his view with contemporary modal realism in order to support this claim. I also argue that counterparts avoid many of the problems set for them by contemporary thinkers; I end with the ways that Leibniz's view differs from contemporary accounts. In Chapter Four, I argue that Leibniz provides two different analyses of modality. The first is an infinite analysis account; the second is a possible worlds account. I argue that these two accounts are compatible and amount to two different descriptions of the same theory of modality. I address objections to each account in order to show this. In Chapter Five, I argue that Leibniz is a compatibilist about free will. Importantly, I argue that it is precisely Leibniz's account of modality that allows for this compatibilism, as against a necessitarian like Spinoza. I then use Leibniz's account to challenge contemporary libertarians about free will on the basis of the principle of sufficient reason. I also show how Leibniz can help semicompatibilism avoid a worry concerning necessitarianism. At the end of the day, I claim that adopting elements of Leibniz's system can help us better understand modality and the freedom of the will and can be an aid in furthering contemporary philosophical theory.

Bibliography: leaves 180-181.

<p>The aim of this study is to elucidate the process in which psychology was separated from philosophy and established itself as a distinct academic discipline in Sweden. I argue that the concept of <em>will</em>, as well as the concepts of <em>thinking </em>and <em>emotion</em>, have a lot to tell us about the rise of academic psychology in Sweden. This is done through an analysis of psychology textbooks, encyclopaedia-articles and academic texts on the themes <em>will </em>and <em>psychology</em>, from around 1800 till 1950.</p><p>Prior to the establishment of the first chair of psychology in Uppsala 1948, the discipline was above all a part of the philosophical discipline. For psychology to become a science of its own, it was crucial to obtain a position among the empirical sciences. It thus had to distance itself from philosophy, and in particular from metaphysics. In that respect the concept of will, thinking and emotion posed a problem. On the one hand, these concepts seamed necessary for a science of the psyche but on the other, they were traditionally associated with philosophy and especially with metaphysics.</p><p>From around 1900, the concept of will underwent an empirisation process in which it distanced itself from the metaphysical content of meaning. The idea of thinking, emotion and will as <em>faculties </em>was criticised and replaced by a way of speaking of them in terms of single <em>acts</em>, able to be analysed in a more empirical manner. This change was in accordance with the new demand on empiricism. Within psychology, however, practicians of the trade still spoke in terms of will, thinking and emotion, as well as of classical philosophical problems such as that of the <em>free will</em>, albeit in a more empirical manner.</p><p>A second, more profound change, occurred in the 1940s when the concepts of thinking, emotion and will, as well as the problem of the free will were sorted out from the psychological discourse. In light of their long time as an integral part of the psychological discourse it was a significant change that the human psyche was no longer to be discussed in terms of will, thinking and emotion. The most likely explanation of this change is that the institutional split between psychology and philosophy after 1948 also signified a separation between philosophical and empirical-psychological questions. After 1948 it was possible to pursue scientific studies in psychology without any knowledge of philosophy and hence, without an urge to pose philosophical questions.</p>

Thesis (M.A.)--Kutztown State College. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2831. Typescript. Abstract precedes thesis as preliminary leaves. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-120).

The aim of this study is to elucidate the process in which psychology was separated from philosophy and established itself as a distinct academic discipline in Sweden. I argue that the concept of will, as well as the concepts of thinking and emotion, have a lot to tell us about the rise of academic psychology in Sweden. This is done through an analysis of psychology textbooks, encyclopaedia-articles and academic texts on the themes will and psychology, from around 1800 till 1950. Prior to the establishment of the first chair of psychology in Uppsala 1948, the discipline was above all a part of the philosophical discipline. For psychology to become a science of its own, it was crucial to obtain a position among the empirical sciences. It thus had to distance itself from philosophy, and in particular from metaphysics. In that respect the concept of will, thinking and emotion posed a problem. On the one hand, these concepts seamed necessary for a science of the psyche but on the other, they were traditionally associated with philosophy and especially with metaphysics. From around 1900, the concept of will underwent an empirisation process in which it distanced itself from the metaphysical content of meaning. The idea of thinking, emotion and will as faculties was criticised and replaced by a way of speaking of them in terms of single acts, able to be analysed in a more empirical manner. This change was in accordance with the new demand on empiricism. Within psychology, however, practicians of the trade still spoke in terms of will, thinking and emotion, as well as of classical philosophical problems such as that of the free will, albeit in a more empirical manner. A second, more profound change, occurred in the 1940s when the concepts of thinking, emotion and will, as well as the problem of the free will were sorted out from the psychological discourse. In light of their long time as an integral part of the psychological discourse it was a significant change that the human psyche was no longer to be discussed in terms of will, thinking and emotion. The most likely explanation of this change is that the institutional split between psychology and philosophy after 1948 also signified a separation between philosophical and empirical-psychological questions. After 1948 it was possible to pursue scientific studies in psychology without any knowledge of philosophy and hence, without an urge to pose philosophical questions.

Through evaluating Hilary Bok’s argument from her essay Freedom and Practical Reason, I hope to shed light on the overall question of whether we can have free will if determinism is true. In the first two chapters I will fully explain and break down Bok’s argument for genuine epistemic alternatives. In chapter three I will evaluate the success of Bok’s arguments. Specifically, I will offer a variety of intuitive examples to show that epistemic unpredictability is not enough to make our alternatives genuine. I will then use more examples to consider the relative importance of unpredictability and endorsement to free will.