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Departing From Frankfurt: moral responsibility and alternative possibilitiesPalmer, David William 26 August 2010 (has links)
One of the most significant questions in ethics is this: under what conditions are people morally responsible for what they do? Assuming that people can only be praised or blamed for actions they perform of their own free will, the particular question that interests me is how we should understand the nature of this freedom – with what kind of freedom must people act, if they are to be morally responsible for what they do?
A natural answer to this question – and the one I think is correct – is to point to the freedom to do otherwise. This is encapsulated in the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. PAP has led many to believe that the freedom required for moral responsibility must be incompatible with determinism or the existence of God because it is plausible to argue that if determinism is true or if God exists, then people would lack genuine freedom of choice and hence could not be morally responsible for their behavior.
In the light of two important articles by Harry Frankfurt almost four decades ago, which challenged the claim that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise, compatibilism – the opposing view that the freedom for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism – has experienced a resurgence. Inspired by Frankfurt’s work, those wanting to reject PAP – typically compatibilists – attack the principle on two main grounds: directly and indirectly. First, they have argued directly that PAP is false by developing alleged counterexamples to it. Second, they have challenged PAP indirectly by arguing that there are alternative conceptions of freedom from freedom of choice that, it is claimed, are not reliant on alternative possibilities but are sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral responsibility.
My dissertation evaluates these two lines of attack on PAP. In particular, I attempt to defend the truth of PAP against both kinds of challenge. / text
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T.H. Green's theories of human practice, morality and politics : a phenomenological perspectiveDimova-Cookson, Maria January 1998 (has links)
No description available.
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Connectionism, folk psychology and cognitive architectureHarrison, David J. January 1999 (has links)
No description available.
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Free-will, responsibility and punishmentHaksar, Vinit January 1968 (has links)
One of the purposes of this thesis is to try to examine the concepts of mental sickness and responsibility (and some other related concepts) and see whether or not they can be defended against some of the criticisms that have been made against them. It has, for instance, been argued that the concept mental sickness is culture relative in a bad sense. If this criticism is valid, then we cannot be justified in saying that mental sickness has impaired a person's responsibility. Another criticism that has been made is that arguments that use mental sickness to explain and excuse criminal behaviour are circular. Most of the criticisms that I have discussed are intended to be general, i.e. they are criticisms of the concept of mental disorder im general, not just of a particular kind of mental disorder. Thus though Lady Wootton says that arguments that try to explain the psychopath's anti-social behaviour are circular, she thinks (at least in her more radical moments) that the circular process prevails in other mental disorders as well (e.g. with mental defectives. See <u>Social Science and Social Pathology</u>, page 256 ff.). Similarly, the argument that different standards of mental defect prevail in different cultures, and that therefore there is something wrong with the concept of mental defect, is intended to be (at least in her more radical moments) a general one, i.e. it is intended to apply, <u>mutatis mutandis</u> against other kinds of mental disorders also.
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An investigation of the question of human agency and freedom in Thomas Reid's philosophy of actionAcikoz, Haci Mustafa January 1995 (has links)
In philosophy the 'free will question' viz., "do we have free will by which we can freely perform an action of our own?" has been the cause and interest of one of the oldest debates of philosophy. The historical background of the 'free will debate' and of its participants can be traced back to the philosophy of Hellenistic (era) that covers the Peripatetic, Epicurean and Stoics schools. Then, it is extended from the Medieval tradition (St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and so on) through the Modern (era) philosophy (the Cartesian, the Empiricists and the Common Sense Schools) to the Contemporary philosophy of action. Almost all philosophers of these schools have either directly or indirectly been involved in the debate. Today what we have inherited from this debate, which still continues, is three main doctrines. These are: 'libertarianism', 'determinism', 'compatibilism' (or 'soft determinism'). In fact all these doctrines give rise to the idea that today "there is no single philosophical problem that is the problem of free will. There are rather a great many philosophical problems about free will." (01). This thesis, in the historical frame that has been given above, shall undertake the evaluation of the free will question in "Thomas Reid's (1710-1796) philosophy of action' in the eighteenth century 'Scottish School of Common Sense'. Thus it aims to show the dimensions of Reid's contributions to the free will debate as regards his 'approach', 'method', 'suggestions', 'solutions', 'originality' and his 'influence' on other philosophers.
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A Scriptural Appraisal of the Necessary Connection between Progressive Sanctification and Compatibilist FreedomBossom, Christopher 05 1900 (has links)
This dissertation proposes that a necessary connection exists between a
progressive model of sanctification and a compatibilist model of human freedom.
Chapter 1 presents the thesis, background, and methodology for the dissertation, giving
special interest to the way that compatibilism is uniquely qualified to accommodate the
necessary link between one's character and conduct intrinsic to a progressive model of
sanctification.
Chapter 2 defines and examines the two most widely held models of human
freedom: libertarianism and compatibilism. Compatibilism is shown to comport more
closely with Scripture and to solve many of the nagging philosophical problems
associated with a libertarian model of freedom.
Chapter 3 continues to build a foundation for the remaining chapters by
defining the three most widely held models of sanctification: Wesleyan perfectionism,
Keswick, and Augustinian or progressive sanctification. Here it is argued that Wesleyan
perfectionism and Keswick require a concomitant libertarian freedom, whereas an
Augustinian model of sanctification requires compatibilism.
Chapter 4 offers scriptural support for the connection between progressive
sanctification and compatibilist freedom. The central focus is on determining the biblical
author's intent and on laying the exegetical groundwork for the final chapter.
Chapter 5 argues for the necessary connection between progressive
sanctification and compatibilist freedom by questioning libertarian interpretations of the
texts examined in the previous chapter. Since it potentially bifurcates the scriptural
connection between one's character and conduct, libertarian freedom is shown to be a
poor candidate for the type of freedom necessitated by a progressive model of
sanctification.
I close, in Chapter 6, by calling Evangelicals to return to a common sense
understanding of the bounds of logic, scriptural fidelity to both God's gracious
sovereignty and man's genuine freedom, and a greater sense of mystery concerning the
nature of God.
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Cause and contextKaiserman, Alexander January 2016 (has links)
This thesis comprises an introduction and six papers on causation, freedom and responsibility. Though mostly self-standing, the papers are unified by two common goals - to recognise and analyse the role of context in the semantics of causal claims and ascriptions of freedom; and to put metaphysical approaches to causation into closer contact with actual causal reasoning in science and the law. Chapter One defends a contextualist semantics of causal language that combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer's semantics of modality. Chapter Two extends this approach to ascriptions of freedom, by combining Kratzer's account with the principle that an agent acts freely only if she could have acted otherwise. Chapter Three explores a neglected view which combines David Lewis's counterfactual account of causation with his counterpart-theoretic approach to de re modality. Chapter Four proposes an amendment to the interventionist account of causation in response to a worry raised by John Campbell about causation in psychology. Chapter Five motivates the idea that causation is a relation to which multiple events can contribute to different degrees, and defends a novel account of an event's degree of contribution to a causing of an effect. Chapter Six then argues, from a conception of tort law as a system of corrective justice, that a defendant should be held liable for a claimant's losses only to the degree to which the defendant's wrongdoing contributed to the causing of the claimant's harm.
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The extent of the atonement in the thought of John Davenant (1572-1641) in the context of the early modern eraKang Hyo Ju January 2018 (has links)
This thesis is a study on the theology of an Anglican bishop, John Davenant (1572-1641), in the context of the early modern era. In particular it focuses on his understanding of the extent and intent of the atoning death of Christ. Davenant played an important role in the development of early orthodox Reformed theology, especially on this controversial doctrine. Some scholars have claimed that Davenant's position was a forerunner of Amyraldianism in the seventeenth century. Others have argued that his view was different from Amyraldianism. However, no scholar has substantiated the latter argument based on Davenant's extensive writings as to how far Davenant's view on the extent of the atonement was distinct from the position of John Cameron, the Father of Amyraldianism. The contention of this thesis is that Davenant's views of predestination, the atonement and free-will were the main factors that affected his twofoldintention view, and they differed from the positions of John Cameron. The exposition of those doctrines by John Davenant both in his various writings and in his testimony at the Synod of Dort serve as the object of the investigation. Cameron's writings are also selectively investigated and his views on those doctrines are compared with Davenant's positions. The Canons of Dort are analysed in order to examine whether Davenant's doctrinal position is situated within the confessional orthodoxy in the early seventeenth century. Davenant's position on the universal aspect of the atonement was based on the universal proclamation of the Gospel. Davenant stressed the immutability of God's will for the elect. Cameron's view on the universal aspect of the atonement depended on the divine will for the salvation of every individual which could be frustrated due to human free choice. Since the decree of sending Christ preceded the decree of election according to Cameron's view on the order of the divine decrees, Cameron's view was different from Davenant's. Cameron held to a distinction between moral and physical ability and intellectual persuasion of the Holy Spirit upon the human mind. These things were not shared by Davenant. The conclusion arrived at is that Davenant's twofold-intention view was distinct from Cameron's hypothetical universalism. Thus this study substantiates the claim that Davenant was not a forerunner of Amyraldianism and his view was situated within the boundary of confessional orthodoxy codified in the Canons of Dort.
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The compatibility of guidance control and reformed theologyPreciado, Michael Patrick January 2017 (has links)
In this thesis, I ask whether reformed theology is compatible with guidance control. I conclude that they are compatible. The main areas of compatibility are fourfold. First, both deny the sourcehood condition. Second, both deny the alternative possibilities condition. Third, both are types of reasons-responsive theories. Finally, both have a similar subjectivist condition. This conclusion implies that the resources of guidance control can be constructively used, developed and applied by reformed theologians and philosophers. Guidance control can be applied to the debates on free will and moral responsibility as well as to ethics and other related fields.
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The Fate of Kantian Freedom: the Kant-Reinhold ControversyWalsh, John 05 July 2018 (has links)
This dissertation examines the relation of Kant’s theory of free will to that of K.L. Reinhold. I argue that Reinhold’s theory addresses several problems raised in the reception of Kant’s practical philosophy, particularly the problem of accounting for free immoral acts. Focusing on Reinhold’s account of free will as a condition for the conceivability of the moral law shows that the historical focus on Reinhold’s break from Kant’s own account and his alleged reliance on facts of consciousness obscures Reinhold’s decidedly ‘Kantian’ argument. This approach provides a new foundation for free will and demonstrates the significance of Reinhold’s practical philosophy as an attempted corrective to Kant.
Chapter 1 examines the influence of Rehberg, Ulrich, and Schmid on Kant’s and Reinhold’s respective theories of free will. Chapter 2 investigates the epistemic foundation of Reinhold’s theory of free will and, contrary to the dominant view in scholarship, argues that his account is not based merely on facts of consciousness. Chapter 3 illuminates a tension between the phenomenology of moral agency and Kant’s account of free agency. It is argued that while Kant talks about overcoming inclinations and adopting maxims by virtue of their lawful form, which would seemingly have to take place at the phenomenal level and be available to consciousness, Kant’s account of free agency is restricted to the noumenal, which precludes availability to consciousness. Reinhold’s theory of free will avoids this tension by positing consciousness of possible courses of action as a necessary condition for self-determination to one such action. Chapter 4 discusses the relation of Reinhold’s theory of free will to Kant’s Religion, a text that Reinhold uses as a basis for his charge that Kant’s theory is either “unintelligible” or “untenable.” I argue that although Reinhold fundamentally misunderstands Kant’s doctrine of supreme maxim adoption, Reinhold is correct in his assertion that Kant is committed to the thesis that the free spontaneity of the power of choice is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Chapter 5 explicates the Kant-Reinhold Controversy to argue that given Kant’s own commitment to the conditions for moral responsibility, Reinhold was ultimately correct that free will ought to be defined as choosing for or against the moral law.
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