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This thesis uses the recently decided R v NS to assess the contours of the freedom to wear the niqab, as part of religious freedom, in Canada. By criticizing the majority and concurring opinions I argue that, properly understood, a witness’s religious freedom should protect her from an order to unveil when she is testifying in court. I show that the concurring opinion holds the witness to an illiberal, unfair standard of personal behaviour that fails to respect the witness’s religious freedom. I show that the majority’s decision, though following a justified liberal process of balancing rights, failed to protect NS’s meaningful choice to practice her religion, a standard set by the court in Hutterian Brethren. I then assess the broader implications of R v NS. I argue that in theoretical terms R v NS reaffirms Canada’s commitment to a liberal system of reciprocal rights and rejects a perfectionist approach according to which societal values can override rights. These theoretical lessons are then applied to other policies regulating the veil. I argue that despite its shortcomings, R v NS should generate optimism that perfectionist policies will be rejected and that the veil will only be limited minimally and only when the limit is necessary to uphold other legitimate aims. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-29 20:00:52.439

Freedom of speech in the Czech Republic This thesis deals with the freedom of speech in the Czech Republic especially with its limits and jurisprudence related to this key political right. It is composed of five chapters. The first chapter is The Introduction. It highlights the importance and necessity of the freedom of speech for an individual and the society. It also describes the main purpose of this work. The second chapter briefly summarizes the history and evolution of the freedom of speech in Bohemia particularly in the constitutional documents. The second chapter ends with adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (No. 2/1993 Coll.) which set the current constitutional state of the freedom of speech. The third chapter is named "Specification of the Freedom of Speech". At first it explores the guaranteeing of the freedom of speech in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and then in international treaties mainly International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and European Convention on Human Rights. There are also mentioned some constitutional rights associated with the freedom of speech. The subchapter 3.4 explicates the definition of "speech" in the czech law. The last part of chapter 3 pays attention to the specification of subjects of the freedom of speech...

This thesis concerns the current legislation and practical issues of the right to assemble in the Czech Republic. In the introduction is described the development of the right of assembly from the year 1948 until the adoption of the current law, the Right of Assembly Act. The present legislation is based on the notifying principle. An Assembly shall therefore not be subject to permission of public authority. The legal framework of the right to assemble at national level consists primarily of Article 19 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Act No. 84/1990 Coll., on the Right of Assembly. In the field of international law is the respective regulation included mainly in the article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The work describes the most important institutes of the right of assembly, such as the convening of the assembly and the convening person, the rights and obligations of the convener, participants and the authority, spontaneous gatherings, prohibition and dissolution of an assembly. More attention is paid to situations where there are conflicts between the convener and the authority, which strives to prevent some assemblies. This was also the question...

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In this dissertation, through three separately published articles, I interrogate the role of expert knowledge in First Amendment theory and doctrine. I argue that expert knowledge ought to play a prominent role in answering doctrinally relevant empirical questions, as in the case of incorporating a scientifically grounded understanding of visual perception into Establishment Clause inquiries concerning religious symbols. Moreover, the generation and dissemination of expert knowledge itself is worthy of First Amendment protection, for example in protecting professional speech. And expert knowledge should determine the scope of First Amendment protection for professional advice. There is, in other words, a close but often underappreciated connection between expert knowledge and the First Amendment. In Active Symbols, I challenge the assumption sometimes articulated in Establishment Clause case law involving religious symbols that visual representations of religious symbols are merely “passive” as compared to textual (spoken or written) religious references. Drawing on one relevant body of expert knowledge—cognitive neuroscience—I argue that images are at least as “active” as text. The lack of judicial expertise on the empirical question of how visual images, as opposed to spoken or written words, communicate has led to a distortion in the development of Establishment Clause doctrine. This distortion can be remedied by taking relevant expert knowledge into consideration where such knowledge can answer germane empirical questions that are doctrinally relevant but tend to be outside the realm of judicial expertise. Professional Speech argues that the First Amendment protects the communication of expert knowledge by a professional to a client-within a professional-client relationship for the purpose of giving professional advice. The First Amendment thus provides a shield against state interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of professional speech. The key to understanding professional speech, I suggest, lies in the concept of the learned professions as knowledge communities. First Amendment protection for professional speech can be justified on all traditional grounds: autonomy interests of the speaker and listener, marketplace interests, and democratic self-government. Unprofessional Advice provides a theory to identify the range of valid professional advice for First Amendment purposes. Building on the concept of the professions as knowledge communities, this article explores the range of professional advice that may be given consistent with the professional knowledge community’s common ways of knowing and reasoning and the respective profession’s agreed upon methodology. Because knowledge communities are not monolithic, there is a range of knowledge that is accepted as good professional advice. Advice falling within this range should receive robust First Amendment protection. Advice not within this range, however, is subject to malpractice liability, and the First Amendment provides no defense.

Thesis--LLM--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1983. / Vita. Bibliography: leaves [193]-205.

The Charter grants to everyone, in s.2(a), the “fundamental …freedom of conscience and religion.” Yet the interaction between the two operative terms, “religion” and “conscience” remains largely unexplored. What, for example, is meant by “conscience”? By conscience in contradistinction to religion? Does s. 2(a) make a distinction between the state’s respect for religion and that of conscience? Can freedom of conscience be elevated to a freestanding right? Can conduct motivated by conscience be exempted from general laws in the way that some religious conduct has? Should the state take action to ensure conscience is protected? After more than 25 years of Charter commentary and jurisprudence, these remain deep questions, only partially answered. This project considers the possibility of building a case for an independent and robust “conscience” branch of s. 2(a), which will protect a broader range of freedoms, at the same time as allowing other disputes to be cast in more neutral tones (by taking them out of religious-based language, where possible) and allowing still others more room to develop in a more analytical and principled basis (as purely “religious” disputes more commonly associated with religious norms). In my view, there is, despite some opposition, sufficient justification in history, theory and doctrine to establish a separate and independent concept of freedom of conscience. At the same time, freedom of religion will always remain relevant as an acknowledgement of the distinct communal aspects of religion. Thus, a broad approach to freedom of conscience could include individual religious claims where the religious belief is based on a matter of conscience, and those conscience-based claims that lack a communal dimension, such as the prisoner who cannot eat meat or the whistleblower who feels compelled to report a supervisor. By exploring the origins of conscience and religious freedom, the basis behind the inclusion of conscience in many human rights documents, and the need for a theory that encompasses both as equal and complementary aspects of liberty, the dissertation sets out some possible ways in which freedom of conscience could be invoked and present a potential framework for assessing constitutional freedom of conscience claims.

The Charter grants to everyone, in s.2(a), the “fundamental …freedom of conscience and religion.” Yet the interaction between the two operative terms, “religion” and “conscience” remains largely unexplored. What, for example, is meant by “conscience”? By conscience in contradistinction to religion? Does s. 2(a) make a distinction between the state’s respect for religion and that of conscience? Can freedom of conscience be elevated to a freestanding right? Can conduct motivated by conscience be exempted from general laws in the way that some religious conduct has? Should the state take action to ensure conscience is protected? After more than 25 years of Charter commentary and jurisprudence, these remain deep questions, only partially answered. This project considers the possibility of building a case for an independent and robust “conscience” branch of s. 2(a), which will protect a broader range of freedoms, at the same time as allowing other disputes to be cast in more neutral tones (by taking them out of religious-based language, where possible) and allowing still others more room to develop in a more analytical and principled basis (as purely “religious” disputes more commonly associated with religious norms). In my view, there is, despite some opposition, sufficient justification in history, theory and doctrine to establish a separate and independent concept of freedom of conscience. At the same time, freedom of religion will always remain relevant as an acknowledgement of the distinct communal aspects of religion. Thus, a broad approach to freedom of conscience could include individual religious claims where the religious belief is based on a matter of conscience, and those conscience-based claims that lack a communal dimension, such as the prisoner who cannot eat meat or the whistleblower who feels compelled to report a supervisor. By exploring the origins of conscience and religious freedom, the basis behind the inclusion of conscience in many human rights documents, and the need for a theory that encompasses both as equal and complementary aspects of liberty, the dissertation sets out some possible ways in which freedom of conscience could be invoked and present a potential framework for assessing constitutional freedom of conscience claims.