The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) on the employment relationship. The Charter has long been praised for its inclusion of socio-economic rights alongside traditional civil and political rights. It might have been thought, therefore, that the Charter would be a particularly potent tool in the employment context, characterised as it is, by the continuous interaction between economic and social rights. However, to draw an analogy from George Orwell's Animal Farm, although 'all rights are equal, some rights are more equal than others'. Not only does the Charter distinguish between 'rights' and 'principles', but the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) seems actively to prioritise the Charter's economic freedoms over the social rights. This thesis focuses on the consequences of this variable geometry for the regulation of the employment relationship. In particular, it examines the widening gap between contractual autonomy/business freedom as a fundamental right found in article 16 of the Charter and the employment rights contained in the Solidarity Title. Of particular concern from an employee's perspective is the decision of the CJEU in the case of Alemo-Herron and its progeny. In a series of highly deregulatory judgments, the CJEU has found that the employee-protective aim of the relevant legislation was incompatible with the employer's freedom to conduct a business. At the same time, the CJEU has been reluctant to invoke the Charter's employment rights to give an employee-friendly reading to legislation. The effect of this divergence for the employment relationship is explored in two ways. On a micro level, the thesis looks to the very practical or 'day to day' influence of fundamental rights at various stages in the life cycle of the employment contract. It addresses the relationship between individually agreed employment terms and fundamental rights sources. The macro level considers the broader question of the effect of fundamental rights on the EU's (or the State's) ability to regulate the employment relationship more generally. It is demonstrated that there may be a systemic problem with fundamental economic freedoms being prioritised over social rights, namely the employment provisions of the Charter.

OF DISSERTATION IN ENGLISH Doctoral Student: JUDr. Kateřina Juřicová Topic of Dissertation: Limitations on Freedom of Contract in the Civil Law Supervisor of Dissertation: Prof. JUDr. Jan Dvořák, CSc. Doctoral Programme of Study: Theoretical Legal Sciences - Civil Law, Univerzita Karlova, Právnická fakulta, katedra občanského práva Date of Closing of Dissertation: 31.12.2019 The dissertation covers the limitations on freedom of contract in civil law and provides with the summary and following analysis of both general and specific limitations on freedom of contract in civil law. The general limitations consist of mandatory rules and stipulations prohibited by law. As part of the analysis of the general limitations both character and distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory rules are analyzed, as well as the criteria for the provisions to be designated as mandatory such as statutory prohibition, stipulations contrary to good morals, public order or the law concerning the status of persons, including the right to protection of personality rights. Similarly, the list of specific limitations on self-authorship describes legal relationships between landlord and tenant, employer and employee or consumer and entrepreneur, various cases in the community property of spouses or contracts with minors,...

Esta tese propõe a investigação sobre as origens doutrinárias da função social dos contratos e, a partir delas, apresenta os instrumentos para a interpretação da cláusula geral do art. 421 do Código Civil. A tese encontra na doutrina italiana e no pensamento de Miguel Reale a base doutrinária da clláusula geral. A principal proposição dessa incursão é de que o juiz, ao aplicar a cláusula geral, deve usar os parâmetros doutrinários construídos pela tradição. A tradição e os dispositivos constitucionais que disciplinam a liberdade de contratar são os principais instrumentos para o controle das decisões judiciais, o que é indispensável que se preserve as regras do regime constritucional democrático e princípio da dignidade da pessoa. / The thesis proposes to survey the doctrinary origins of the social function of contracts and, from them, to present the instruments to interpret the general clause contained on the Civil Code’s article 421. The thesis sets the general clause doctrinary base on the Italian doctrine and also on Miguel Reale’s thought. The approach’s main proposition is that the judge, on applying the general clause, must use the doctrinary parameters built by tradition. Tradition and constitutional prescriptions that discipline the freedom to establish a contract are the main instruments to carry out the control of judicial decisions, what is fundamental to preserve the rules of the democratic constitutional regime and the person’s dignity principle.

Esta tese propõe a investigação sobre as origens doutrinárias da função social dos contratos e, a partir delas, apresenta os instrumentos para a interpretação da cláusula geral do art. 421 do Código Civil. A tese encontra na doutrina italiana e no pensamento de Miguel Reale a base doutrinária da clláusula geral. A principal proposição dessa incursão é de que o juiz, ao aplicar a cláusula geral, deve usar os parâmetros doutrinários construídos pela tradição. A tradição e os dispositivos constitucionais que disciplinam a liberdade de contratar são os principais instrumentos para o controle das decisões judiciais, o que é indispensável que se preserve as regras do regime constritucional democrático e princípio da dignidade da pessoa. / The thesis proposes to survey the doctrinary origins of the social function of contracts and, from them, to present the instruments to interpret the general clause contained on the Civil Code’s article 421. The thesis sets the general clause doctrinary base on the Italian doctrine and also on Miguel Reale’s thought. The approach’s main proposition is that the judge, on applying the general clause, must use the doctrinary parameters built by tradition. Tradition and constitutional prescriptions that discipline the freedom to establish a contract are the main instruments to carry out the control of judicial decisions, what is fundamental to preserve the rules of the democratic constitutional regime and the person’s dignity principle.

Esta tese propõe a investigação sobre as origens doutrinárias da função social dos contratos e, a partir delas, apresenta os instrumentos para a interpretação da cláusula geral do art. 421 do Código Civil. A tese encontra na doutrina italiana e no pensamento de Miguel Reale a base doutrinária da clláusula geral. A principal proposição dessa incursão é de que o juiz, ao aplicar a cláusula geral, deve usar os parâmetros doutrinários construídos pela tradição. A tradição e os dispositivos constitucionais que disciplinam a liberdade de contratar são os principais instrumentos para o controle das decisões judiciais, o que é indispensável que se preserve as regras do regime constritucional democrático e princípio da dignidade da pessoa. / The thesis proposes to survey the doctrinary origins of the social function of contracts and, from them, to present the instruments to interpret the general clause contained on the Civil Code’s article 421. The thesis sets the general clause doctrinary base on the Italian doctrine and also on Miguel Reale’s thought. The approach’s main proposition is that the judge, on applying the general clause, must use the doctrinary parameters built by tradition. Tradition and constitutional prescriptions that discipline the freedom to establish a contract are the main instruments to carry out the control of judicial decisions, what is fundamental to preserve the rules of the democratic constitutional regime and the person’s dignity principle.

Modern law of contract in South-Africa can be seen as a dynamic field of law. It encompasses key principles such as freedom of contract, autonomy, good faith and public policy. These principles are seen as important concepts that underlie the substantive law of contract. The Consumer Protection Act, introduced in 2008 and operational since 31 March 2011, has contributed to this dynamic field of law. Unfortunately the uncertainties regarding the application of widely articulated definitions associated with the act remain a concern. Many legal academics have tried to alleviate the possible difficulties posed by the application of the CPA by means of constructive criticism, in-depth analysis of practical aspects and submissions to the legislator during the past three years. The exceptio doligeneralis has offered similar protection for consumers in circumstances where it seemed as if no remedy would provide a similar equitable outcome. This defence was available when a plaintiff wanted to enforce legal action in circumstances that are unconscionable. The defendant could raise these circumstances as a defence to the action of enforcement. The potential difficulties associated with the CPA are not entirely similar to the uncertainties created by the application of the exceptio doli in the past. The widely articulated definitions present a bigger problem of uncertainty. This may in certain circumstances be to the detriment of the consumer. Consumers are afforded rights in terms of the CPA but it does not necessarily mean that the enforcement of these afforded rights is in place. There are technical difficulties regarding the interpretation of terms such as “agreement”, “unfair tactics” or “pressure” to name but a few. There are still no guidelines provided to assist consumer tribunals to adhere to the purpose of the act in a fair and organised manner. The question that arises is whether these afforded rights seem better than what it actually is; leaving us to believe that the common law regarding consumer protection can be codified. This study is an attempt to demonstrate that the CPA might not have the desired outcome as initially anticipated. The CPA unfortunately, in my opinion, represents an April fool’s day. Sections 40, 48 and 51 of the CPA will perhaps have a similar effect than the exceptio doligeneralis. These sections offer protection to a consumer if there are unfair, unreasonable or unjust circumstances. The widely articulated sections create an inclusive protecting mechanism rather than excluding. Any contract, term or clause thereof will be interpreted in such a way to benefit a consumer. It is submitted that it will not be possible to attach precise meanings to concepts such as good faith, public interest or fairness. There will always be a different understanding in a particular language and within a variation of context. The main goal to be achieved, the rules of the law of contract should reflect attempts to achieve a balance between fundamental principles such as fairness and good faith, and economic policies such as economic efficiency and the facilitation of honest market participation. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

Freedom to contract and its restriction in business obligations (Summary) This thesis deals with freedom to contract and its limitations in the field of business obligations. It introduces the possibilities that parties have when entering into contracts as well as it outlines the boundaries which they cannot cross. It aspires to clarify the topic by referring to a wide scope of related judicial decisions which have evolved throughout the years. The first chapter briefly describes and classifies business obligations; hence it specifies cases in which freedom to contract and its restriction apply. The second chapter then characterizes freedom to contract and sets it to the context of other fundamental principles governing private law. It also clarifies the normative roots of this freedom and describes the nature of legal rules that can be freely deviated from in a contract. The following chapter reviews particular manifestations of freedom to contract with special focus on free determination of contract's content. The last chapter looks into various kinds of restrictions that limit contracting parties entering into business obligations. It deals with certain issues regarding mandatory rules and mentions some formal requirements regarding legal acts. Then the analysis of restriction of freedom to contract set...

Freedom of contract is one of the fundamental principles of private law. Most pronounced is the principle of contractual freedom in business contractual relationships, in which is admitted the highest degree of contractual freedom. Contractual freedom is often generally associated with the rule that what is not forbidden is allowed, ie. if the legal regulation does not prohibit any contractual arrangement, is such an arrangement allowed. This understanding of freedom of contract is very simplistic and misleading and thus in many cases incorrect. Given that freedom of contract is seen as a rule or principle, approach to it is fairly spontaneously and in search of answers to the question of legality or illegality of certain contractual arrangements, the progress is often intuitively and based on ad hoc reasoning the contractual freedom is in individual cases either accepted or rejected. One reason for this approach is the fact that there have been no more precise rules for a differentiation of non- mandatory and mandatory legal rules. Their differentiation is for the recipients of legal rules crucial because it gives an answer to the question, how far reaches their liberal sphere, in particular, if the contractual freedom is in the particular legal issue enabled or not. A lack of structure and...

68 Abstract The principle of autonomy of will is a fundamental principle of private law. It is impossible to imagine the functioning of private law without it. The principle is primarily based on the principles of equality and freedom, the key principles on which the foundations of a democratic legal system and free society are built. The aim of my thesis is to define the autonomy of will, compare the principle of autonomy of will with other fundamental doctrines and principles from which it arises and/or principles which are closely related to. I believe that most of the legal relationships based on private law are founded on the principle of autonomy of will, therefore, I decided to describe some of these institutes in more detail in my dissertation as well. The thesis is divided into a general part and a specific part. In the general part I deal predominantly with the inclusion of the principle of autonomy of will into the principles of private law. This part also contains some theoretical concepts and is closely linked to constitutional law, the Bill of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the principles on which the Civil Code is built. I further deal with the interpretation of certain terms, then the principle of autonomy of will itself and how it is perceived by several authors. In addition to that, I...

The aim of this study is to make a comparison between Rousseau&rsquo / s and Kant&rsquo / s theory of justice. This thesis defends the arguments of Rousseau&rsquo / s democratic political theory against the claims raised by Kant. Rousseau and Kant formulate how to relieve the tension between individual and society. This tension is the one between individual and political freedom. Rousseau calls it the tension between moral and political freedom and Kant terms it as internal and external freedom. However, Rousseau ensures continuity between two concepts of freedom, whereas Kant seems inconsistent. The main argument of this thesis is that the critical potential of Rousseau&rsquo / s notion of the social contract is jeopardized by Kant&rsquo / s Idea of original contract in which the sovereign authority is taken away from people since Rousseau&rsquo / s notion of the social contract turns into Idea of original contract in Kant&rsquo / s theory of justice. In this regard, this thesis particularly seeks to answer the question of what constitutes the legitimacy of the contract in their theory of justice.