Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014. / Submitted by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza (jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2014-12-30T10:49:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JadsonAlvesdeFreitas.pdf: 1376905 bytes, checksum: 992a6d81a61086acacdd6595e8b309da (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2014-12-30T11:45:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JadsonAlvesdeFreitas.pdf: 1376905 bytes, checksum: 992a6d81a61086acacdd6595e8b309da (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-30T11:45:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JadsonAlvesdeFreitas.pdf: 1376905 bytes, checksum: 992a6d81a61086acacdd6595e8b309da (MD5) / A questão sobre o que torna um sistema filosófico uma monadologia é esclarecedora e importante, uma vez que ajuda a entender algumas ideias e abre caminhos para maneiras alternativas de pensar a substancialidade, distinta das rotas norteadoras do pensamento ocidental, oriundas de Aristóteles e Descartes. Essa é a proposta deste trabalho: analisar as bases da monadologia de Leibniz como intuição para a formação de uma ideia geral sobre sistemas compostos por mônadas. Nesse âmbito, a concepção leibniziana das mônadas expressa uma rota específica na qual relações são anteriores às substâncias e tudo está conectado em um mundo onde a modalidade fundamental é a compossibilidade. Leibniz pensa suas mônadas organizadas de modo que cada uma, de certa maneira, prefigura todas as outras. No contraste com ele, as ideias de pensadores como Tarde, Whitehead, Latour, Schaffer e Quine, provam reter importantes elementos de uma monadologia enquanto rejeitam algumas dessas assunções específicas a Leibniz. Desse modo, elas permitem um diálogo conceitual com Leibniz, ao mesmo tempo indicando um outro caminho para a articulação dos pressupostos centrais de uma monadologia. O que emerge é uma monadologia em um sentido amplo que seria independente da maneira específica que Leibniz entendia suas mônadas. Cinco características fundamentais para a ideia de uma monadologia em geral são apresentadas e discutidas. Essas podem ser usadas para comparar diferentes sistemas de mônadas e posteriormente, entender melhor as opções concebidas por Leibniz. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The issue concerning what makes a philosophical system a monadology is both enlightening and important, for it sheds new light into some ideas and paves the way for alternative ways to think of substantiality, different from the Western thought guiding ways of Aristotle and Descartes. That is the aim of this work: to analyze the foundations of Leibniz’s monadology as intuition for the development of a general idea about systems composed of monads. In that respect, the Leibnizian conception of monads show a specific way in which relations are prior to substances and everything is connected together in a world where the fundamental modality is that of compossibility. Leibniz thinks of his monads as concerted, in a way that each one somehow prefigures all the others. In contrast to Leibniz, the ideas of thinkers such as Tarde, Whitehead, Latour, Schaffer, and Quine prove to retain important elements of a monadology while rejecting some of these assumptions specific to Leibniz. As such, they allow a conceptual dialogue with Leibniz, at the same time indicating another way for the articulation of the central tenets of a monadology. What emerges is a monadology in a broad sense that would be independent from the specific manner Leibniz understood his monads. Five characteristics, imperative to the idea of a monadology in general, are presented and discussed. These characteristics can be used to compare different systems of monads and, in turn, to further understand the options devised by Leibniz.

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Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-17T15:25:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-03-02. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2015-09-17T15:48:42Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000846216.pdf: 3579467 bytes, checksum: 0b8621401bd0759772dcabb0fa312dd9 (MD5) / Durante sua vida, Leibniz persegue o objetivo de criar uma Linguagem universal que comunique perfeitamente o pensamento e assim permita o conhecimento de todas as coisas. Segundo ele, a viabilidade da construção de tal linguagem deriva da convicção de que todo o conhecimento tem por base um número finito de conceitos básicos ou ideias simples que podem ser identificadas e estruturadas hierarquicamente. Em sua concepção para a elaboração de tal linguagem, é necessário: chegar às ideias simples; estipular um sistema adequado de signos -o que ele denomina Característica universal; e estabelecer as regras lógicas para compor ideias complexas -o que ele denomina Gramática racional. Delineamos então como objetivo central deste trabalho apresentar uma pesquisa sobreLinguagem universal e, em especial, sobre a Característica universal e investigar os caminhos percorridos por Leibniz nesta busca. Deste propósito decorrem como objetivos complementares: verificar de que forma Leibniz desenvolve suas pesquisas na Aritmética binária, uma materialização da Característica universal; e expor brevemente seus estudos relativos à Gramática racional. Para dar suporte... / During his life, Leibniz pursues the goal to create a universal language that perfectly communicates the thought and thus allows the knowledge of allthings. According to him, the viability to the construction of a universal language accrues from the fact that all the knowledge sustains itself on a finite number of basic concepts or simple ideas which can be identified and hierarchically structured. Inhis conceiving for the preparation of such language is necessary: defining the simple ideas; setting a proper system of signs -what he calls universal characteristic; and establishing the logical rules in order to compose complex ideas -or, as he's defined, rational grammar. We have defined the main goal of this paper as to present a survey on a universal language, in particular about theuniversal characteristicand to investigate the paths taken by Leibniz in this pursuit. From this purpose it courses the following secondary objectives: to verify how Leibniz develops his research in Binary Arithmetic, that consists on materialization of the universal characteristic; and briefly to present his rational grammar. To support our goal, we introduce some....

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The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind. We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing. In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism. In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke's causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke's position suffers from the omission of concepts.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2007-07-27Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:27:02Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 vagna_r_me_mar.pdf: 434719 bytes, checksum: a428d91e5b541767ee3e4a6a8500c5a9 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Partindo do sistema leibniziano e tomando como fio condutor a questão da geração da vida, pretendemos indicar os motivos filosóficos que levaram Leibniz a apoiar os biólogos pré-formacionistas do século XVII. A idéia de embutimento (ou encaixamento) de um novo ser dentro do seu progenitor, defendida pela teoria pré-formacionista, traz como que um exemplo do mundo monádico leibniziano, no qual todos os acontecimentos futuros, inclusive a geração de novos seres, foram já estabelecidos por Deus no momento da criação. As investigações microscópicas desenvolvidas por biólogos da época, especialmente por Leeuwenhoeck, descrevem um mundo até então desconhecido e trazem uma comprovação experimental da concepção teórica leibniziana. / Coming from the Leibniz`s system and taking as thread the question of the generation of the life, we intend to indicate the philosophical reasons that had taken Leibniz to support the preformationist biologists from the 17th century. The idea of inlaying (or fitting) of a new being into its ancestor, defended by the preformationist theory, brings an example about Leibniz`s monads world, in which all the future events, also the generation of new beings, already had been established by God at the moment of the creation. Microscopic researches developed by biologists at this time, especially by Leeuwenhoek, describe an unknown world until then, and bring an experimental evidence of Leibniz`s theoretical conception.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Letras, Departamento de Línguas Estrangeiras e Tradução, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos da Tradução, 2014 / Submitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2014-11-28T18:19:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JulianaCecciSilva.pdf: 966858 bytes, checksum: 43d1c20b5a3fc31c972dff9469fb4555 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2014-12-01T15:25:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JulianaCecciSilva.pdf: 966858 bytes, checksum: 43d1c20b5a3fc31c972dff9469fb4555 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-01T15:25:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JulianaCecciSilva.pdf: 966858 bytes, checksum: 43d1c20b5a3fc31c972dff9469fb4555 (MD5) / À luz do pensamento do rastro de Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), da desconstrução, e de nossa experiência com a leitura e a tradução de textos da Filosofia da Linguagem, sobretudo os do alemão Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), pretendemos apresentar algumas teses filosóficas (etimológicas e filológicas) de Leibniz sobre a questão da natureza da linguagem que contribuíram para a formação da Linguística Histórico-Comparativa e, do ponto de vista de Derrida, das teorias logocêntricas da Tradução. Teorias fundadas na busca pelo "sentido", isso é, em uma metafísica da linguagem. Para ilustrar tais considerações, apoiados nos fundamentos teóricos e metodológicos do tradutor Antoine Berman (1942-1991), em particular nos desenvolvidos em seu La Traduction et la Lettre ou l'alberge du lointain (2007), em primeiro lugar, faremos a "analítica" de alguns trechos da primeira tradução brasileira da obra Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain, par l'auteur du système de l'harmonie préetablie ( (1765) - do primeiro capítulo do livro III, o Des Mots, para sermos mais específicos - a fim de explicitar o "sistema de deformação" da "letra" que aí opera; em seguida, proporemos uma segunda tradução dos três capítulos iniciais, ou melhor, uma "retradução". Trata-se de capítulos em que Leibniz tece importantes considerações sobre os aspectos "materiais" da natureza da linguagem. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / In light of the thought of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) trace, of the deconstruction, and of our experience with the reading and the translating texts of the philosophy of the language, especially those of the German Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), we intend to presente some philosophical (etymological and philological) theses of Leibniz on the subject of the language’s nature that contributed to the formation of the Historical-comparative Linguistics and, from the Derrida’s point of view, to the logocentric theories of translation. Theories founded on the search for “the signification”, i.e., on a metaphysics of the language. To illustrate such considerations, supported by the theoretical and methodological foundations of the translator Antoine Berman (1942-1991), particularly in those developed in his La Traduction et la Lettre ou l’Alberge du lointain (2007), first, in order to explain the “letter’s system of deformation” that operates there, we will make the “analytical” of some passages of the first Brazilian translation of the work Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, par l’auteur du système de l’harmonie préétablie (1765) – the first chapter of the book III, Des Mots, to be more specific –; after that, we will propose a second translation of the three initials chapters, or better, a “retranslation”. These are chapters in which Leibniz weaves important considerations about the “material” aspects of the nature of language.