Thèse de doctorat : Etudes germaniques : Metz : 2006. / Thèse soutenue sur ensemble de travaux. Bibliogr. p. 292-302. Résumé en français p. 303-341.

Thèse de doctorat : Philosophie : Metz : 1997. / 1997METZ005L. 200 ref.

Zugl.: Klagenfurt, Univ., Diss., 2009

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 358-363). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2001. Graduate Programme in Social & Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-323). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ66341.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 358-363). Also available on the Internet.

In the works of Weber, Freud, and Foucault we find a distinct depiction of the relation between the self and modern civilization. This thesis describes that relation as "entrapment": the self has become mired in the life orders of modernity and is unable to reign over them. The primary hazard of these orders is their imposition of subjectivities that are highly circumscribed, subjectivities more responsive to external functions and imperatives than to the expression of individuality. Underlying this outlook is a new consciousness of time; in lieu of evolutionary and progressive theories of history, a tragic view emerges. History is seen as devoid of any deterministic necessity, yet its collective products have become too weighty and entrenched to allow for radical, over-arching political transformations. The thesis examines how, beginning with these shared presuppositions, Weber, Freud, and Foucault develop very different understandings of entrapment, understandings that pose fundamental challenges to one another.

No description available.

This mini-thesis attempts to understand what it means to fear death. It does this by first investigating how Heidegger and then Freud explain fear of death. Heidegger believes that the relationship Dasein has towards its own death allows it the possibility of 'authenticity'. Death presents to Dasein its ownmost potentiality for being. Heidegger explains that this means that in facing death Dasein has the possibility of completeness and absolute individuality. Dasein is called to this possibility of authenticity by the anxiety it experiences in the face of its own death. However, Dasein does not necessarily respond to this call. By reducing anxiety to a fear it is possible for Dasein to disregard its fear of death and correspondingly not respond to the call of authenticity. Thus, for Heidegger, fear of death is symptomatic of inauthentic Dasein's relationship towards its own death. For Freud, on the other hand, death cannot be conceptualised without reference to the social world. Freud believes that the relationship we have towards our own death is learnt through living in this world. Furthermore, Freud argues that it is impossible for the human being to ever understand that death can be an annihilation. When the human being dreads, fears or even desires death, Freud believes it does so symbolically. In this regard Freud explains, by way of the death instinct, that the psyche understands death as a return to before birth. One of Freud's explanations of fear of death is that this fear is actually for the loss of Eros. This fear, however, is in conflict with the phantasy to return to before birth. One of the results of this conflict is the arousal of anxiety. The differences and similarities between Freud's and Heidegger's explanations are detailed in the final chapter. Examining these details leads to a closer investigation of Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety. On this issue this mini-thesis finds that Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety are in conflict with each other. After attempting to avoid placing Freud and Heidegger against each other, this mini-thesis demonstrates that Heidegger's explanation of anxiety is lacking in detail. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sci.)-University of Natal, 1999.

Even if they rely on apparently quite different investigation domains and ideologies, both Freud and Bakhtin participate to that current which in the XXth century would upset the foundation of the positivist thought and would modify profoundly the traditional conception of science, language and the cartesian vision of the conscience and of the human subject. The thought of one as of the other, therefore, surpasses largely the principal reason of their research: If Freud applies the principles of the interpretation of dreams to the study of literary works, Bakhtin expands on the novel theory and questions polyphony and dialogism of all language. In conception of the literary speech of Bakhtin and of the dreams of Freud, the signs, the speeches and the multiple intentions or affects that animate them are constantly in dynamic interaction and obey it seems, to mechanism of similar transformation. The problem of interpretation is at the center of their works. The two authors are at the same time theoreticians and analysts of whom the theory of literature, of speeches, of work and dreams, pass necessarily by an act of interpretation. We are aware of the role played by the novels of Dostoievski on the theoretical work of Bakhtin. For Freud also, the principles of the work on dreams, according to his own affirmation develop with the interpretation process. We have to think that for him as for the Russian researcher, the theory is always in a link of active complicity with the interpretation; that one and the other are constantly mutually reflected and determined. A compared analysis of their texts can put in evidence the proximity of the thought processes of the thinkers, but can reveal also the differences, with their consequences from the point of view of ideology, ontology, even ethics.