Si l'histoire de la construction européenne a été marquée, à partir des années 1970, par les tensions entre la Communauté puis l'Union, d'une part, imposant la primauté absolue de son droit, et les États membres, d'autre part, revendiquant la suprématie de leur droit constitutionnel, cette problématique tend à se cristalliser depuis quelques années autour d'une notion : celle d'identité constitutionnelle de l'État membre. Pourtant la vertu fédératrice qu'on pourrait lui prêter contraste avec la polysémie de la notion. C'est précisément l'objet de cette étude de droit constitutionnel européen que de tenter de dégager des données du droit positif des États membres et de l'Union un concept empirique viable de la notion d'identité constitutionnelle de l'État membre, inspiré par une grille d'analyse issue des sciences sociales.La fondamentalité, dont l'objectivation passe par la référence à l'histoire de l'État, constitue un critère de définition nécessaire, quoiqu'insuffisant, de l'identité constitutionnelle, quelle que soit la façon dont celle-ci est conçue. Ecartées les formes contingentes de l'identité constitutionnelle qui conduisent à terme au dépérissement de la notion, selon des processus variables, que l'identité soit envisagée à partir de ce qu'il y a d'identique entre les États membres ou de spécifique à chaque État membre vis-à-vis de l'Union (et en dernière analyse vis-à-vis de ses pairs), c'est une conception de l'identité constitutionnelle inhérente à l'État membre qui s'imposera finalement. Ainsi conçue à partir de ce qui est ontologiquement commun aux États membres et irréductiblement spécifique vis-à-vis de l'Union, l'identité constitutionnelle assure en définitive la pérennité de l'étaticité des membres de l'Union et de l'origine stato-nationale de toute puissance publique, étatique ou européenne, en Europe. / If the history of European integration has been marked, from the 1970s, by the tensions between, on one hand, the Community and the Union, imposing the absolute primacy of its law and, on the other hand, the Member States, claiming the supremacy of their constitutional right, this problem aims to crystallize in recent years around the notion of the constitutional identity of the Member State. Yet, the unifying virtue which we could lend it contrasts with the polysemy of the notion. This is precisely the purpose of this study of European constitutional law to try to extract from the data of the positive law of the Member States and the Union an empirically viable concept of the notion of constitutional identity of the Member State, inspired by an analytical framework from the social sciences. The fundamentality, objectified by reference to the history of the state, is a necessary but insufficient defining criterion of constitutional identity, regardless of how it is conceived. Put apart the contingent forms of constitutional identity that lead ultimately to the decline of the notion, according to variable processes – that identity is seen as identical between Member States or as specific to each Member States towards the Union (and ultimately toward its peers) – it's a conception of inherent constitutional identity to the Member State which will finally be stand out. Based on what is ontologically common to the Member States and irreducibly specific towards the Union, the constitutional identity ultimately ensures the continuity of the statehood of the Members of the Union and the nation-state origin of any public authority, state or European, in Europe.

Submitted by admin tede (tede@pucgoias.edu.br) on 2017-10-09T14:17:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 LILIANA CUNHA PRUDENTE.pdf: 947586 bytes, checksum: 63523b8efbb539eb8c114c5129e1dff5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-09T14:17:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 LILIANA CUNHA PRUDENTE.pdf: 947586 bytes, checksum: 63523b8efbb539eb8c114c5129e1dff5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-01 / The scope or this dissertation is the analysis of the environmental crisis we experience imposed by the globalized capitalist way of production that, disregarding the dependence of human beings to the environment, caused an imbalance in natural resources. To do so, it will be done, initially, a study of instituted state models, characterizing their bases and their respective overcoming driven by social demands. Next, there will be a fundamental rights approach, as a limiter of the state powers, attaining thereby the constitutionalization of the right to the environment, which gives it greater effectiveness and protection in the legal system. It will be shown the dependence of the human beings in relation to the environment and the reflections made worldwide in search of a development that balances the development with a healthy quality of life. Finally, taken that the right to environment has the status of fundamental right, due to the dependence of the human beings to the environment, it requires a new attitude of society and state. It should therefore be based on a new ethic that advocates for the rupture of the paradigm, which was previously based on a predominantly economic aspect for the recognition of human values consistent with environmental preservation. / Esta dissertação tem por escopo a análise da crise ambiental que vivenciamos imposta pelo modo de produção capitalista globalizado que, desconsiderando a dependência do homem ao meio, provocou um desequilíbrio nos recursos naturais. Para tanto, será feito, inicialmente, um estudo dos modelos estatais instituídos, caracterizando suas bases, e as respectivas superações impulsionadas pelas reivindicações advindas do seio social. Em seguida, será realizada uma abordagem dos direitos fundamentais, enquanto limitador dos poderes estatais, alcançando, esta análise, a constitucionalização do direito ao meio ambiente, o que lhe outorga maior carga de efetividade e proteção no ordenamento jurídico. Será evidenciada a dependência do homem em relação ao meio ambiente e as reflexões realizadas, mundialmente, em busca de um desenvolvimento que equacione o progresso com a sadia qualidade de vida. Por fim, constatado que o direito ao meio ambiente tem status de direito fundamental, requer-se uma nova postura da sociedade e do Estado. Este deverá, pois, pautar-se numa nova ética que propugna pela ruptura do paradigma, que, anteriormente, era fundado numa vertente eminentemente econômica para o reconhecimento de valores humanos consentâneos com a preservação ambiental.