This dissertation examines the failure to achieve a final agreement for the Free Trade Area of the Americas(FTAA)at the 2005 Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas. The predominant explanation for this outcome highlights the economic asymmetries and the lack of economic interdependence between the participating states. In view of these structural impediments, based on original field interviews and extensive document analysis, the author goes a step further and argues that these factors were exacerbated by an ideological shift that took place during the decade that the FTAA was negotiated. Specifically, it is argued that the emerging consensus in the hemisphere that was in place at the launching of the FTAA negotiations in 1994 centered on the desirability of economic liberalization; this began to unravel in view of growing political challenges to neo-liberalism in many of the Americas’ social formations. This particular political challenge of economic liberalization emerged against the background of the failure of neo-liberal reforms to achieve their promised results, and the resultant socio-economic polarization. In many social formations, this polarization led to crises of authority, which sometimes opened the political arena to social forces that articulated, to different degrees, alternatives to neo-liberalism. In two countries of import for the FTAA, Venezuela and Brazil, governments were elected which challenged the United States’ leadership within the FTAA negotiations, based on a discourse of state sovereignty. In broader terms, the growing de-legitimization of neo-liberalism in the Americas engendered crises of authority in certain countries, notably in Venezuela and Brazil. This in turn brought forth political dynamics that constrained the United States’ hegemony in the hemisphere, which would have been consolidated by the FTAA. As such, this dissertation draws upon a Gramscian analysis to examine the manner in which crises of authority, rooted in the social formations of the hemisphere, came to be manifested within the institutional framework of the FTAA. Consequently, this work further demonstrates that global governance structures are not only mechanisms through which hegemony is disseminated and counter-hegemony is absorbed, but that they can serve as spaces where hegemony can be confronted and counter-hegemony articulated. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2012-01-24 10:01:37.746

This dissertation explores the role of cognition—the elements, structures and processes of individual and collective thought—in finding effective, cooperative solutions to climate change. It makes three contributions—theoretical, empirical, and methodological—to international relations scholarship. First, it explores cognition as a significant variable in international political life, developing an analytical framework that not only links a cognitive framework of analysis to major IR theories but bridges current theoretical divides between rationalism and constructivism. Second, by identifying and visualizing current belief systems of participants in global climate negotiations, the thesis offers insights regarding cognitive obstacles to multilateral cooperation. The most important obstacle is a clash of substantively and emotionally different belief systems. Depending on the specific constellation of a person’s beliefs about collective identity, perceptions of climate-change threat, and associated emotions, some belief systems contain normative beliefs about justice (i.e., a dominant logic of appropriateness), while others do not. The latter belief systems reflect the national-interest logic of consequences. Focusing in particular on the “wicked” characteristics of climate change, the analysis further reveals a neglect of scientific knowledge (in particular knowledge of the possibility of climate tipping points), a serious under-valuation of the distant future, and perceptions of a number of constraints on agency, some of which cannot be resolved within the negotiations. The study also identifies six distinct belief systems among climate negotiators, which I label The International Community, A Minilateral Club, The Market, Individuals, The Developed World, and The Irresponsible West. The key element distinguishing these belief systems is actor type, which affects problem definitions, proposed solutions, political strategies, and more generally an actor’s role in global climate governance. Third, this dissertation expands the methodological toolbox available to IR scholars by demonstrating the value and synergistic power of cognitive-affective mapping and Q Method. These are powerful tools to reveal individual and collective belief systems respectively.

Emerging infectious disease has become a paradigmatic way of thinking about disease in recent years. In response to the widely-held view that an emerging pandemic is an imminent, albeit uncertain, event linked to global interconnectedness, pandemic preparedness has been the target of considerable political concern and economic investment. To date, there has been relatively little critical research questioning the broader social and political implications of this seemingly natural undertaking. My research addresses this knowledge gap by exploring pandemic influenza planning as a global approach to the regulation of emerging infectious disease. I investigate how pandemic is framed and the ways in which these framings link to broader political and economic contexts. I undertake a Foucauldian-informed, critical discourse analysis of four key pandemic planning documents produced by the World Health Organization between 1999 and 2009. I ask how infectious disease is constructed in particular ways, and how these constructions can be interpreted in relation to broader global contexts. My findings, which describe a range of discursive strategies in governing pandemic, are four-fold. First, I examine the characterizations of the influenza virus, and their effect of rendering normal and pandemic circumstances as indistinct. I describe how these constructions are implicated in the framing of preparedness as a continuous engagement with the process of emergence. Next, I explore how the delineation and regulation of boundaries simultaneously constitutes bodies and territories as distinct. Third, I describe the discursive construction of a particular kind of global geopolitics which represents vulnerability according to the interconnectedness of states. Finally, the pandemic virus acquires a form of utility that portrays preparedness as having the potential for securing society against a broad range of potential threats. Anticipating the exceptional features of pandemic is to be achieved through the integration of contingency mechanisms into existing systems of preparedness whose objective is continued economic and social functioning. The regulation of circulation central to pandemic preparedness establishes an ongoing engagement in decisions about freedom and constraint in relation to different forms of mobility or circulation. My findings are interpreted in light of their implications for understanding the global regulation of, and intervention into, molecular life.

Zugl.: Kassel, Univ., Diss., 2007

Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2007

Zugl.: Speyer, Dt. Hochsch. für Verwaltungswiss., Diss., 2007 u.d.T.: Aulbach, Christian: Global governance der Kernenergiesicherheit

Zugl.: Hagen, Fernuniv., Diss., 2008

Diss. Univ. Kassel, 2007.

Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2007.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2004--Münster (Westfalen). / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 2003.