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This work seeks both to modify and challenge the prevailing view of an ideologically-driven Army intent on realizing Hitler's racist goals in the Soviet Union. One way of measuring the ideological commitment of the Army's soldiers is through an examination of the divisional level. Each of the three divisions under examination was recruited from a geographically and culturally distinct area, allowing the soldiers of the 121st, 123rd and 126th Infantry Divisions to recreate the sense of community unique to their home region: East Prussia, Berlin and Rhineland-Westphalia, respectively. The differences between social classes, traditional political allegiances and confessions found in these regions was thus transferred to these divisions and these distinctions allow for a more precise investigation of what types of men were more or less likely to subscribe to the German war of annihilation in the Soviet Union. Unlike much of the literature which examines the ideological nature of the war and the military conflict separately, this study looks at combat and occupation in tandem. Through the use of official military records, ranging from the Army down to the regimental level, as well as previously unused diaries and letters written by the men of these three divisions, a complex and varied picture of the German Army's activities and motivations arises. Firstly, while ideological concerns certainly played a role in determining the actions of these divisions, other more tangible problems, such as food and clothing shortages and numerical weakness, were more important issues in determining the Army's frequent savage interactions with civilians. Second, instead of the war serving to increasingly radicalize the behavior of the troops, the German Army began to significantly modify its conduct in hopes of winning the cooperation of Soviet civilians in late 1942 and 1943 before reverting to Scorched Earth policy in 1944. Internal mechanisms within the Army led to these changes in behavior: when a conciliatory policy was viewed as necessary to win the war, it was implemented; when the Army believed unadulterated violence was the means to victory, radical policies were carried out its forces. / text

Throughout the Second Reich’s short life, military affairs were synonymous with those of the state. Indeed, it was the zeal and blood of Prussian soldiers that allowed the creation of a unified German empire. After solidifying itself as a major power, things grew more complicated as the Reich found itself increasingly surrounded by hostile rivals. To the west, French humiliation over their catastrophic defeat in 1870-71 continued to fester while, in the east, Russian sympathies for the new empire waned. The finalization of a Franco-Russian alliance in 1894 meant Germany faced formidable adversaries along her eastern and western borders. That unsettling realization dictated the empire’s military policy until its downfall in 1918. Drawing from the writings and speeches of Wilhelmine Germany’s military and political leaders, this work seeks to examine and analyze the Second Reich’s military policies and decision-making processes over the three decades preceding the First World War.

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Title: Forgotten Apocalypse - The Czech Reflection of the Retreat of the German Heeresgruppe Mitte Author: Mgr. Tomáš Jakl Abstract: There are war campaigns that can be described simply, others more difficult to describe, and some cannot be reconstructed by a continuous narrative at all. The events in the Czech Lands in the first two weeks of May 1945 belong to the most difficult to describe. The fact that there was the largest of last German fighting groups of armies is well known. It is also commonly known that it was the Central Army Group commanded by Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner. Significantly less is known that as a result of the outbreak of the Czech Uprising, this group of armies retreated across the rebellious territory to the demarcation line between the US and the Red Army The last desperate illusion of German soldiers was that they would contact the Americans and jointly drive the Russians out of Europe. Allied Commander-in-Chief in the West, General Dwight David Eisenhower, did not intend to do anything after the death of US President Roosevelt, which the Soviet dictator could even interpret as a similar development. Not only did he forbid General Patton from crossing the agreed line in advance with the Soviets, visually accommodating the retreating Germans, but the US troops also released...