Thesis. 1978. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Includes bibliographical references. / Ph.D.

丘海雄. / 論文(哲學博士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院社會學學部, 1996. / 參考文献 : leaves 175-182. / Qiu Haixiong. / Chapter 第一篇 --- 理论和方法 --- p.1 / 导言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 相关的理论 --- p.2 / Chapter 第一节 --- 理性选择理论 --- p.2 / Chapter 第二节 --- 劳动力市场及雇佣关系的理论 --- p.9 / Chapter 第三节 --- 中国劳动力市场及雇佣制度的研究 --- p.16 / Chapter 第二章 --- 本文的理论和方法 --- p.22 / Chapter 第一节 --- 理论架构 --- p.23 / Chapter 第二节 --- 研究方法 --- p.25 / 第一篇 注释 --- p.27 / Chapter 第二篇 --- 制度 --- p.33 / 导言 --- p.33 / Chapter 第三章 --- 劳动用工 --- p.35 / Chapter 第一节 --- 招收工人 --- p.35 / Chapter 第二节 --- 用工形式 --- p.39 / Chapter 第三节 --- 劳动管理 --- p.45 / Chapter 第四节 --- 工人流动 --- p.50 / 小結 --- p.56 / Chapter 第四章 --- 工资分配 --- p.58 / Chapter 第一节 --- 工资分配制度改革综述 --- p.58 / Chapter 第二节 --- 企业之间的分化 --- p.61 / Chapter 第三节 --- 内部工资制度 --- p.65 / Chapter 第四节 --- 工资改革的效果 --- p.74 / 小結 --- p.78 / Chapter 第五章 --- 福利保险 --- p.81 / Chapter 第一节 --- 住房分配 --- p.81 / Chapter 第二节 --- 医疗照顾 --- p.87 / Chapter 第三节 --- 劳动保险 --- p.95 / 小結 --- p.108 / 第二篇 注释 --- p.110 / Chapter 第三篇 --- 行动 --- p.124 / 导言 --- p.124 / Chapter 第六章 --- 工作价值和态度 --- p.124 / Chapter 第一节 --- 工作价值和满足感 --- p.124 / Chapter 第二节 --- 对有关改革的评价 --- p.129 / Chapter 第三节 --- 转工和第二职业的意愿和取向 --- p.131 / Chapter 第四节 --- 对工人、工会和企业地位的评价 --- p.133 / Chapter 第五节 --- 对解决问题的途径的评价 --- p.137 / 小結 --- p.138 / Chapter 第七章 --- 工人的行动选择 --- p.139 / Chapter 第一节 --- 一家两制 --- p.139 / Chapter 第二节 --- 一人两制 --- p.146 / 小結 --- p.160 / 讨论和总结 --- p.175 / 第三篇 注释 --- p.175 / 参考文献 --- p.175 / 英文参考书目 --- p.175 / 中文参考书目 --- p.180

Xu Zhi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-62 (2nd gp.)). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 中文摘要 --- p.V / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.XI / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- VALUE OR GROWTH STOCK? --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Summary Statistics: Financial Ratios of h Shares --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Profitability analysis --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Debt Structure --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Operational Management --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Corporate Identity: Value or Growth Stock? --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Are H Shares Value Stocks? --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Are H Shares Growth Stocks? --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3 --- Summary --- p.13 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- THE METHODOLOGY OF EVENT STUDIES --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1 --- Brief Outline of an Event Study --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- Issues on Event Studies --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Unknown Event Dates --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Which is the best benchmark model for the normal return? --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Hypothesis testing and problems with heteroskedasticity and dependence --- p.21 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- A multivariate regression model (MVRM) employed in the event study --- p.24 / Chapter 3.2.5 --- Measuring long horizon security price performance --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2.6 --- Use daily return or monthly return in event study? --- p.27 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- ARE H SHARES WANTED: DEAD OR ALIVE? --- p.28 / Chapter 4.1 --- Definitions of Events --- p.28 / Chapter 4.2 --- Sample and Estimation Procedures --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Sample Selection --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Estimation Procedures --- p.30 / Chapter 4.3 --- Empirical Results of Good and Bad Earnings Announcements --- p.31 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Short Term Effects on Securities Prices --- p.31 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Long Term Post-Earnings-Announcement Drifts --- p.34 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Regression Analysis --- p.35 / Chapter 4.3.3.1 --- REGRESSION RESULTS FOR GOOD EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS --- p.37 / Chapter 4.3.3.2 --- REGRESSION RESULTS FOR BAD EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS --- p.38 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Summary --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4 --- Empirical Results of Good and Bad News --- p.40 / Chapter 4.5 --- "Empirical Results of SEO, M&A and New Projects" --- p.41 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Summary --- p.42 / Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- A PRACTICAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR H SHARES --- p.43 / Chapter 5.1 --- Problems Corporate Governance Deals with --- p.45 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- The Agency Problem --- p.45 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Management Discretion --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2 --- Solutions to the Problems --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Incentive Contracts --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Large Investors --- p.47 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Debt Choice --- p.49 / Chapter 5.3 --- Corporate Governance for H Shares: a Practical Framework --- p.50 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Essential Elements of Good Corporate Governance --- p.51 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Summary : A Practical Framework of Good Corporate Governance --- p.53 / Chapter CHAPTER 6 --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.58 / REFERENCE --- p.61 / APPENDIX OF TABLES --- p.63 / APPENDIX OF FIGURES --- p.64

Thesis (MPA.) --University of Limpopo, 2016. / Refer to document

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Management specialising in Entrepreneurship and New Venture Creation March 2016 / The purpose of this research is to investigate how organisational factors such as management support, reward/reinforcement and work discretion fosters corporate entrepreneurship at State Owned Entities (SOE) in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Several studies have been conducted on corporate entrepreneurship in the private sector with limited research on the same factors in the public sector, especially in Africa. The Corporate Entrepreneurship Assessment Instrument (CEAI) was used in measuring managers’ perception on management support, reward and reinforcement and work discretion. Four hundred on-line questionnaires were distributed, with a response rate of 169 managers from South African and Zimbabwean state owned entities. An hierarchical multiple regression model was used to analyse the results, which showed that there was a positive and significant relationship between management support, reward/reinforcement and work discretion with innovation, confirming results from previous studies. Occupational level was found to moderate the relationship between management support and innovation and the relationship was found to be strongest at junior management level. No moderation effect was found when reward/reinforcement and work discretion was tested with innovation. Further evidence from the survey results also indicated that Zimbabwean SOEs had higher levels of reward /reinforcement and work discretion than South Africa, but both countries had the same level for management support and innovation. However Zimbabwe had implemented more projects than South Africa, indicating that its SOEs were more entrepreneurial. Finally, when occupational levels were considered, Zimbabwe had higher scores for all the three independent variables, except for innovation, which South Africa was leading at junior management levels. However, the levels at middle and senior management was the same for both countries / GR2018

Zhang, Yaling. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 226-242). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

by Yao Fang. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 51-55). / ABSTRACT --- p.3 / CHAPTERS / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.4 / Chapter II. --- CHINA'S STATE ENTERPRISES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1. --- The operation of the state enterprise system --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2. --- Agent problems in the management of state enterprises --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Managers as agents of the government --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3. --- Soft budget constraints --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.1. --- Implication --- p.14 / Chapter III. --- PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ORIGIN OF THE INEFFICIENCY --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1. --- Enterprises and government apparatus --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2. --- Specification of property rights --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3. --- Institutional arrangement --- p.21 / Chapter IV. --- A REVIEW ON PRC'S ENTERPRISE REFORM --- p.24 / Chapter 4.1. --- The reconstruction of labour ownership --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2. --- The manager reform --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3. --- Some outcomes of the delegation --- p.27 / Chapter V. --- SHARE SYSTEM : A PROSPECT FUTURE --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1. --- To liberalize the economic foundation --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2. --- Share ownership system --- p.30 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Purposes of share system reform --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- Important factors in the application --- p.33 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- Some steps of share system reform --- p.34 / Chapter VI. --- CASE STUDY : SHANGHAI FEILO COMPANY LIMITED --- p.38 / Chapter 6.1. --- Introduction --- p.38 / Chapter 6.2. --- The process of transforming the share system --- p.40 / Chapter 6.3. --- Financial outcomes of the company --- p.43 / Chapter 6.4. --- Problems of the new system --- p.43 / Chapter VII. --- CONCLUSION --- p.46 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.51

by Chak Hoi Kee, Clara, Lee Chi Chung, Jonathan. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-72). / ABSTRACT --- p.II / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.III / INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / METHODOLOGY --- p.3 / LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.4 / PRIVATIZATION --- p.7 / Chapter 4.1 --- Definition --- p.7 / Chapter 4.2 --- Privatization and Economic Theory --- p.8 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Principal Agent Problem --- p.8 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Non-Profit Maximizing Objectives --- p.9 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Access to Information --- p.9 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Alternate Suggestions --- p.9 / Chapter 4.3 --- Motivations for Privatization --- p.10 / SOE REFORMS IN CHINA --- p.11 / Chapter 5.1 --- Inadequacy of Previous SOE Reforms --- p.11 / Chapter 5.2 --- Development of the Shareholding System Reform - Early Attempts --- p.12 / Chapter 5.3 --- Setback (1989-1991) --- p.12 / Chapter 5.4 --- Rapid Expansion and Standardization --- p.13 / Chapter 5.5 --- A Step Closer to Privatization --- p.14 / Chapter 5.6 --- Shrinking State Ownership --- p.15 / Chapter 5.7 --- """Let Go of the Small""" --- p.17 / Chapter 5.8 --- Take a Firm Grip on the Large --- p.18 / Chapter 5.9 --- Current Situation --- p.18 / DEVEOPMENT OF THE CHINESE CAPITAL MARKET --- p.20 / Chapter 6.1 --- The Chinese Stock Market --- p.20 / Chapter 6.2 --- Types of Shares --- p.21 / "TSINGTAO BREWERY COMPANY LIMITED (""TSINGTAO"")" --- p.23 / Chapter 7.1 --- Background --- p.23 / Chapter 7.2 --- Ownership --- p.24 / Chapter 7.3 --- Group Structure --- p.25 / LEGAL PERSONS --- p.25 / PRC INVESTORS --- p.25 / THE COMPANY --- p.25 / Chapter 7.4 --- Board of Directors (as of 1998) --- p.26 / Chapter 7.5 --- The Brewery Industry --- p.27 / Chapter 7.6 --- Initial Public Offering --- p.28 / Chapter 7.6.1 --- Business Performance Prior to IPO --- p.28 / Chapter 7.6.2 --- Restructuring of the Group --- p.29 / BOARD OF DIRECTORS --- p.30 / GENERAL MANAGER --- p.30 / Chapter 7.7 --- IPO in Hong Kong and Shanghai --- p.30 / Chapter 7.8 --- Business Downturn 1993-1996 --- p.32 / Chapter 7.8.1 --- Deny Reporting the First Interim Result --- p.32 / Chapter 7.8.2 --- Misuse of the IPO Proceeds --- p.33 / Chapter 7.8.3 --- Disappointing 1994 Results --- p.33 / Chapter 7.8.4 --- Unsuccessful Acquisition Attempts --- p.34 / Chapter 7.8.5 --- Loss of the Leading Position --- p.35 / Chapter 7.8.6 --- Change in Management --- p.36 / Chapter 7.9 --- Turnaround 1996-Present --- p.37 / Chapter 7.9.1 --- Second Restructuring in 1997 --- p.37 / Chapter 7.9.2 --- Refocus Efforts in Marketing Activities --- p.38 / Chapter 7.9.3 --- Expansion to the Low-Middle Market --- p.39 / Chapter 7.9.4 --- Further Acquisition Via Low Cost Expansion --- p.39 / Chapter 7.9.5 --- Enhancing Shareholders Value --- p.40 / Chapter 7.9.6 --- Outstanding First Half 1999 Results --- p.40 / Chapter 7.10 --- Financial Performance --- p.41 / CHINA TELECOM (HONG KONG) LIMITED --- p.43 / Chapter 8.1 --- Introduction --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2 --- Privatization --- p.43 / Chapter 8.3 --- Board of Directors --- p.45 / Chapter 8.3.1 --- Executive Directors --- p.46 / Chapter 8.3.2 --- Non-Executive Directors --- p.47 / Chapter 8.3.3 --- Independent Non-Executive Directors --- p.47 / Chapter 8.4 --- Government Regulations --- p.48 / Chapter 8.5 --- Telecommunication Industry in China --- p.48 / Chapter 8.6 --- Acquisition (1997-1999) --- p.49 / Chapter 8.7 --- Sales Analysis --- p.50 / Chapter 8.8 --- Profitability Analysis --- p.52 / Chapter 8.9 --- Financial Positions --- p.53 / Chapter 8.10 --- Overall Performance --- p.54 / Chapter 8.11 --- Future Prospects --- p.55 / IMPLICATIONS --- p.56 / Chapter 9.1 --- Agency Problem Remained --- p.56 / Chapter 9.2 --- Corporate Governance Weakened --- p.58 / Chapter 9.3 --- Corporate Disclosure --- p.58 / Chapter 9.4 --- Disappointing Results --- p.58 / Chapter 9.5 --- Turnaround --- p.59 / Chapter 9.6 --- Competition --- p.59 / Chapter 9.7 --- Scrutiny from the Capital Market --- p.60 / Chapter 9.8 --- "Is Privatization Necessary or is it a ""Red Herring""?" --- p.61 / RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.62 / Chapter 10.1 --- Corporate Governance Incentives --- p.62 / Chapter 10.2 --- Diversified Representation of Board Members --- p.63 / Chapter 10.3 --- Create a market for corporate control --- p.63 / Chapter 10.4 --- Modernize financial accounting and auditing practices --- p.64 / Chapter 10.5 --- Establishing the Rule of Law --- p.65 / SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION --- p.66 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.69

Shi Hui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 31-34). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Contents / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.4 / Chapter 3 --- Theoretical Model and Predictions --- p.7 / Chapter 4 --- Hypotheses Development / Chapter 5 --- Research Methodology / Chapter 5.1 --- Data --- p.15 / Chapter 5.2 --- Variables --- p.16 / Chapter 5.3 --- Regression Models --- p.18 / Chapter 6 --- Empirical Results --- p.21 / Chapter 6.1 --- Individual Housework Time / Chapter 6.2 --- Housework Allocation Within a Family / Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.27 / References --- p.31 / Tables --- p.35