The thesis is an ex-post assessment of two horizontal mergers motivated by the dearth in post-merger analyses in the South African context. The objective is to examine whether market dynamics have changed as stated by the Competition Tribunal. The main theories tested are whether the merged firm post-merger was able to exert market power unilaterally or in coordinated manner. These constructs are examined against the ability of customers to restrain market power, barriers to entry, the effect of the remedies imposed and the financial performance.The results reveal that the Tribunal leans towards the SCP doctrine and demonstrates the need for a dynamic approach in competitive assessments informed by understanding how competitors and customers may react to a merger. The research findings indicate that the Tribunal’s conclusions on both the Nampak/Burcap and Scaw/Ozz transactions were unproven, post-merger. The research also demonstrates the need and importance of ex-post evaluations to improve future decisions on mergers. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

Zhang, Yaling. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 226-242). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

The aim of the research reported here is to answer the following primary research questions: Is the relationship between CAM, the medical profession and the State changing in Portugal? If there has been a change, how and why has such a change occurred? Two CAM therapies, acupuncture and homeopathy, have been chosen as case studies. The main sources of data were in-depth individual interviews and documents. The research sample (n=41) was made of three groups of interviewees: (1) 20 traditional CAM practitioners, (2) 10 orthodox medical doctors not committed to CAM and (3) 11 orthodox medical doctors committed to CAM. This research draws on a neo-Weberian perspective of professions which emphasises the power relations between related occupational groups who seek to gain or maintain power and status in their field of work. This research also makes extensive use of the concept of ‘countervailing powers' (Light, 2010), as it attempts to illuminate the influence of CAM practitioners on Portuguese healthcare, as well as the influence of other powerful players, such as the State, and major corporations, such as pharmaceutical and health insurance companies, on CAM's relationship with the medical profession. On the basis of this research, I argue that the relationship between CAM, the medical profession and the State has changed in Portugal over the last 16 years. I suggest a concept that helps to explain CAM practitioners' recent countervailing actions within the Portuguese mainstream healthcare. This concept is ‘camisation', a process through which everyday human problems are transformed into health problems which are treated in CAM terms and within a CAM framework. Although the main drivers of camisation have been CAM practitioners, I also show how the Portuguese State, the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry have all been active collaborators in this process, whilst maintaining different interests and constantly bargaining and negotiating to maximise their power and status within the field of healthcare.

行銷通路經過幾年來的變革已成為產業成功的一項關鍵。誰能掌握通路，誰就能掌握產業的命脈。因此國內廠商紛紛投入通路的經營，如統一企業創立統一超商，泰山企業設立福客多超商，味全的安賓及康國行銷等，莫不以掌握通路為要務。而萬客隆量販店的設立更是對傳統通路造成極大的衝擊，亦更顯現出通路的重要性。 　　飲料業的產品特性為產品生命週期短、週轉快，先期進入往往成為領導品牌、通路是成功關鍵及流行跟隨日本腳步等。由於飲料業的這些特性，可知通路是飲料成功的命脈。往往誰有良好的通路，誰就能脫穎而出，成為優秀的製造商。故如何維持與通路良好的關係，實是飲料業界應重視的課題。 　　本論文主要研究的主題在探討通路間製造商權力、權力來源及經銷商對製造商之依賴與經銷商抗衡權與通路衝突間之關係。以了解通路間之關係並進而提出相關建議供業界參考。 　　本文重要之研究結果約如下述： 　　1.就製造商權力來源與通路衝突言，大製造商通常採用非強制權力來源，因而與經銷商的衝突會較少。反之，小製造商則採用強制權力來源則會增加通路間之衝突。故建議，若在資源許可的情況下，小製造商應盡量少運用強制權力以減少通路間的衝突，以使與經銷商間的關係衝突減少，關係更為良好。 　　2.就製造商權力與通路衝突之研究，大製造商在此向關係上不顯著，小製造商則達顯著水準。顯示出小製造商運用其權力時，易招致經銷商的負面反應，而導致通路關係之不良。故小製造商在運用其權力時，應多加考慮經銷商可能之反應，以免破壞彼此之關係。 　　3.就製造商權力與經銷商對製造商依賴言，經銷商對大製造商有較高之依賴。而對小製造商則關係不顯著。而相對應於通路衝突來分析，可發現經銷商對製造商依賴大的話，製造商應用影響力較不致引起經銷商的反抗。故對小製造商而言，如何結合有限的資源，以使經銷商能更加的依賴製造商是值得探討的關鍵所在。 　　4.在經銷商抗衡權與通路衝突方面，由研究可發現，無論大小製造商，經銷商的抗衡權都會導致通路衝突的增加。此意味製造商對於經銷商本身所具備的各項資源與條件應做適當的評估，在制定通路決策時，應考慮到經銷商抗衡能力的大小，則決策方可有效的推行。

This PAR project used applied communications to get and use power to influence public policy. Informed by social and policy network theories, the method used Facebook as an organizing tool to create and position a recreation issue network in tension with an environmental policy community, exploring the concepts of layering, conversion, exhaustion, policy image, and venue change in an effort to influence policy. The introduction of a new-media social network as a competing influence in a policy network was an innovation, and demonstrated that the “strength of weak ties” may have implications for policy-making. The study concluded that a Facebook group was an efficient and effective organizing tool, capable of organizing an issue network and disrupting the status quo; however, the tightly coupled nature of a policy community makes it highly resilient to outside influence and an issue network may not gain sufficient influence to change policy. Keywords: Facebook, new-media social network, policy community, issue network, policy image, venue manipulation, layering, conversion, exhaustion

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:56:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 4 Silvia_Faga_Almeida_2009.pdf.jpg: 18779 bytes, checksum: 09429a3a8b21ba7df6970f3efeaf4c0d (MD5) Silvia_Faga_Almeida_2009.pdf.txt: 456765 bytes, checksum: d318ffa211f89087addc37ff72a1c2ca (MD5) license.txt: 4810 bytes, checksum: 2b426b5b9b8dca2a2b29bce9bbfdf1e7 (MD5) Silvia_Faga_Almeida_2009.pdf: 924518 bytes, checksum: 0e7f42f351c72b0058e834d33c38eae0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-19T00:00:00Z / The countervailing power created by those damaged in an asymmetrical power relationship may be beneficial in terms of welfare. The analysis based on the framework proposed by Dobson et al. (1998) drove to the conclusion that such conditions are restrictive and are directly related to the interdependence recognition and cooperation among stakeholders. It was also observed that, differently from the outcomes of Dobson et al. (1998) analysis, the creation of countervailing power may have a positive welfare effect even though parties do not recognize their interdependency and do not cooperate with each other – what depends on the relationship of price-elasticity of demand and supply. Despite the possibility of positive effects, the antitrust doctrine in Brazil and in other jurisdictions such as USA and European Community apply the countervailing power concept mistakenly or completely ignore its existence. However, the goal of antitrust policy and the creation of compensatory power are aligned: the balance of power asymmetries in relations between agents, preventing the abuse of power in the transaction. Thus, there is an incongruity between court decisions and economic theory. The conflict in applying the countervailing power concept by antitrust doctrine can be clearly observed in the Brazilian health care sector. Physicians often coordinate themselves into cooperatives in order to counteract the exercise of buying power by health insurance firms. However, this agreement among physicians, presumably competitors, has been condemned by antitrust authorities based on the interpretation that such collective bargain is a cartel – an antitrust offence. This study investigates – using panel data econometric method – if collective bargain enables physicians to exercise countervailing power and increases social welfare. The empiric analysis corroborates theoretical propositions: in the healthcare sector, at least in the price dimension, there is a possibility of positive effects related to countervailing power. However, it must be noted that such a result would be related to cooperatives condemned by CADE, which should represent the group of associations that would effectively deter economic power to counterbalance the power asymmetry in negotiations with healthcare service providers. Given that fact, it is important to reassess CADE’s decisions regarding physicians’ cooperatives as a public policy aiming to increase social welfare. / A criação de poder compensatório decorrente da ação concertada daqueles prejudicados em uma relação de poder assimétrica pode gerar aumento de bem-estar social. O desenvolvimento analítico a partir da estrutura proposta por Dobson et al. (1998) permite constatar que as condições para que sejam verificados os efeitos positivos são restritivas e estão diretamente relacionadas ao reconhecimento da interdependência e à cooperação entre os agentes envolvidos. Foi possível observar também que, diferentemente do que previu a análise de Dobson et al. (1998), a criação de poder compensatório pode ter efeitos positivos em termos de bem-estar, ainda que as partes não reconheçam sua interdependência e não cooperem entre si – o que depende da relação das elasticidades-preço da demanda e da oferta. A despeito da possibilidade de efeitos benéficos, as doutrinas de defesa da concorrência brasileira e nas demais jurisdições, como EUA e Comunidade Européia, aplicam de maneira equivocada o conceito de poder compensatório ou ignoram por completo sua existência. Há que se considerar, contudo, que o objetivo da política antitruste e o da criação de poder compensatório estão alinhados: equilíbrio de assimetrias de poder nas relações entre os agentes, coibindo o exercício abusivo do poder de uma das partes na transação. Verifica-se, portanto, uma incongruência entre a jurisprudência e a teoria econômica. O conflito na aplicação do conceito de poder compensatório pela doutrina antitruste pode ser nitidamente observado no mercado de saúde suplementar brasileiro. Um fenômeno verificado nesse setor é a coordenação de médicos em cooperativas para fazer frente ao exercício de poder de compra por parte das operadoras de planos de saúde. Essa ação concertada tem sido condenada pelas autoridades de defesa da concorrência com base na interpretação de que a coordenação entre médicos constitui formação de cartel, passível de condenação pelas autoridades antitruste. A análise empírica corrobora as proposições teóricas: no setor de saúde suplementar, pelo menos na dimensão preço, existe a possibilidade de efeitos positivos associados ao poder compensatório. Destaca-se, contudo, que esse resultado estaria associado às cooperativas condenadas pelo CADE, que devem representar o grupo de associações que efetivamente deteriam poder econômico para equilibrar a assimetria de poder na negociação com as operadoras de planos de saúde. Diante dessa constatação, é importante reavaliar as decisões do CADE acerca das cooperativas médicas enquanto política pública que visa aumentar o bem-estar social.

Um die Auswirkung der Liberalisierung der EU-Erdgasmärkte auf die Macht der Marktteilnehmer zu studieren, entwickeln wir ein disaggregiertes Modell der eurasischen Erdgasversorgung. Wir modellieren die Abhängigkeiten zwischen den Spielern als kooperatives Spiel und berücksichtigen verschiedene Lösungen: den Shapley-Wert, den Nukleolus und den Kern. Im Kapitel 1 untersuchen wir die regionalen Auswirkungen der Liberalisierung des Zugangs zu den Übertragungsnetzen, sowie die Anreize für Fusionen und Kartelle. Im Kapitel 2 untersuchen wir die Auswirkung der Liberalisierung auf die Machtbalance zwischen den lokalen Champions, den Kunden und den Produzenten außerhalb EU. Wir unterscheiden zwischen zwei Schritten der Reform: 1.die Öffnung des Zugangs zu den Übertragungsnetzen und 2.die Öffnung des Zugangs zu den Vertriebssystemen. Für den Shapley-Wert finden wir geringe und heterogene Effekte des ersten Schritts. Die Auswirkungen des zweiten Schritts sind viel größer und ergeben ein klares Muster: alle lokalen Champions verlieren, während alle Kunden und alle externen Produzenten gewinnen. Da ein Drittel der Verluste der Champions innerhalb EU zu den Spielern im Ausland abfließt, können die aktuellen Reformen die Dominanz der bereits starken externen Produzenten verbessern. Wenn wir den Nukleolus heranziehen, profitieren die Produzenten außerhalb EU von der vollen Liberalisierung hingegen nicht. Im Kapitel 3 untersuchen wir die Beziehungen zwischen Shapley-Wert, Nukleolus und Kern. Für unser Modell ist der Shapley-Wert nie im Kern. Um ein Maß der Instabilität von Auszahlungen, die nicht im Kern liegen, zu erhalten, schlagen wir eine Erweiterung des starken epsilon-Kerns vor und betrachten 3 Metriken. Wir finden, daß die Liberalisierung die Instabilität des Shapley-Werts erhöht. Wir zeigen, daß die Liberalisierung den Kern komprimiert. Die Auswirkung auf den Nukleolus korrespondiert jedoch nicht immer mit der Verschiebung von Minimal- und Maximalwerten der Spieler im Kern. / To study the impact of the liberalization of EU natural gas markets on the power of market players we develop a disaggregated model of the Eurasian natural gas supply system. We model interdependenices among the players as a cooperative game for which we consider various solutions: the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the core. In the first paper we study regional impact of liberalization of access to transmission networks, incentives for mergers and cartels. In the second paper we study the impact of liberalization on the balance of power between ''local champions'', customers, and outside producers, such as Russian Gazprom. We distinguish between two steps of the reform: 1. opening access to transit pipes and 2. opening access to distribution systems, hence customers. Using the Shapley value, we find a modest and rather heterogeneous impact from the first step. The impact of the second step is much larger and yields a clear pattern: all local champions lose, while all customers and all outside producers gain. As one third of the losses of champions within EU leaks to players abroad, current reforms might enhance the dominance of already powerful outside producers. When we apply the nucleolus, in contrast, full liberalization does not benefit outside producers at all. In the third paper we focus on the relation of the Shapley value and the nucleolus to the core. For our model the Shapley value is never in the core. To evaluate the degree of instability of a payoff allocation which is not in the core, we propose an extension of the strong epsilon-core and consider three metrics. We find that liberalization increases the degree of instability of the Shapley value for all metrics. We show that liberalization compresses the core, but not always the nucleolus corresponds well to the shifts in the minimal and maximal values of players in the core.