This thesis investigates reflexivity in ancient Greek literature and philosophy from Homer to Plato. It contends that ancient Greek culture developed a notion of personhood that was characteristically reflexive, and that this was linked to a linguistic development of specialized reflexive pronouns, which are the words for 'self'.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Political Science, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on June 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 403-405). Also issued in print.

Diss.

Thesis (doctoral)--Sorbonne, 1840. / Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

M.A. (Latin) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Thesis advisor: Marina B. McCoy / This dissertation investigates the role that eros in general, and philosophical eros in particular, plays in the search for the eidos of the beautiful in Plato’s Hippias Major. It defends the claim that noesis of the eidos of the beautiful can only be accomplished within the life of philosophical eros, that is, within the life of eros which is directed toward the good. As such this dissertation aims both to provide an interpretive key to the Hippias Major, allowing us to read the dialogue in a rich and novel way, and also to make the claim that the Hippias Major presents us with a picture of the interrelation between eros, philosophy, and beauty, and about how these three elements manifest themselves in human life. As such, some continuities and parallels can be found between it and the other two dialogues which deal most explicitly with beauty and eros, the Phaedrus and Symposium. The first five chapters interpret a particular section of the Hippias Major according to role the eros plays within it, attempting to show that eros, both in general and in its unique manifestation as philosophical eros, is a crucial mediating term for any comprehensive understanding of any section of the dialogue, and therefore of the dialogue as a whole. In each of these five chapters, I will articulate the role that eros plays within the search for obtaining a noetic glance at the eidos of the beautiful. The first chapter demonstrates how Socrates’s philosophical eros gives birth to the question about the beautiful itself within the context of a discussion about sophistry and money. The second chapter shows how Socrates’s philosophical engagement with Hippias’s definitions of the eidos of the beautiful generates a dialectic of ascent, allowing Hippias to expand his understanding of what counts as beautiful in a trajectory that mirrors Diotima’s ascent in the Symposium. The third chapter articulates the erotic significance of Socrates’s claim that the eidos of the beautiful inheres in being and not appearances. The fourth chapter gauges the erotic significance of Socrates’s and Hippias’s claim that the beautiful is good, and the good beautiful. The fifth chapter interprets the comic and tragic aspects of the dialogue in terms of philosophical eros, its rejection and fulfillment. The sixth chapter will take stock of the overall interpretation of the Hippias Major developed in the first five chapters, and will present the overarching view about the relationship between the contemplation of beauty, on the one hand, and desire for possession of beauty and moral concern, on the other, which one can glean from the character and action of Socrates in Hippias Major. It will bring this view into a conversation with the notion of “liking devoid of interest” which is found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The conclusion of this dissertation will underscore the principle claim, that the philosophical search for the eidos of the beautiful can neither be separated from the eros which beauty inspires in a human being, nor can it be accomplished without one’s eros benig directed toward the good, and that this philosophical search is marked by suffering and possible tragedy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Esta dissertação tem dois objetivos principais: (i) apresentar um estudo introdutório e (ii) uma tradução integral do Eutífron de Platão. O Eutífron é um diálogo de definição. Nesta obra, Sócrates quer saber o que é o piedoso. Enquanto pergunta, examina e refuta as respostas de seu interlocutor, o filósofo também fornece um conjunto de instruções sobre como entender e responder a sua pergunta. Essas instruções podem ser entendidas como exigências ou requerimentos socráticos. O nosso estudo tentará identificar, prioritariamente, (i) o conjunto de exigências que acompanham a pergunta o que é o piedoso? e (ii) algum procedimento socrático específico que visa definir o piedoso. Quanto à tradução, utilizaremos a edição recente de E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), que substitui a edição canônica de John Burnet na mesma coleção (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903). / This dissertation has two main objectives: (i) present an introductory study and (ii) an integral translation of Platos Eutífron. The Eutífron is a dialogue of definition. In this work, Socrates wants to know what the pious is. While asks, examines and refutes the answers of his interlocutor, the philosopher also provides a set of instructions about how to understand and to answer his question. These instructions may be understood as socratic exigencies or requirements. Our study aims to try to identify, prioritarily, (i) the set of exigencies that follows the question what is the pious? and (ii) any specific socratic procedure that intends to define the pious. Concerning the translation, we will use the recent edition of E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), that replaces the canonic edition of John Burnet of the same collection (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903).

Esta dissertação tem dois objetivos principais: (i) apresentar um estudo introdutório e (ii) uma tradução integral do Eutífron de Platão. O Eutífron é um diálogo de definição. Nesta obra, Sócrates quer saber o que é o piedoso. Enquanto pergunta, examina e refuta as respostas de seu interlocutor, o filósofo também fornece um conjunto de instruções sobre como entender e responder a sua pergunta. Essas instruções podem ser entendidas como exigências ou requerimentos socráticos. O nosso estudo tentará identificar, prioritariamente, (i) o conjunto de exigências que acompanham a pergunta o que é o piedoso? e (ii) algum procedimento socrático específico que visa definir o piedoso. Quanto à tradução, utilizaremos a edição recente de E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), que substitui a edição canônica de John Burnet na mesma coleção (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903). / This dissertation has two main objectives: (i) present an introductory study and (ii) an integral translation of Platos Eutífron. The Eutífron is a dialogue of definition. In this work, Socrates wants to know what the pious is. While asks, examines and refutes the answers of his interlocutor, the philosopher also provides a set of instructions about how to understand and to answer his question. These instructions may be understood as socratic exigencies or requirements. Our study aims to try to identify, prioritarily, (i) the set of exigencies that follows the question what is the pious? and (ii) any specific socratic procedure that intends to define the pious. Concerning the translation, we will use the recent edition of E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson e J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford Classical Texts, 1995), that replaces the canonic edition of John Burnet of the same collection (Oxford Classical Texts, 1903).

The aim of the present study is to examine how Hellenism and Greek philosophy were received and used in arguments in the writings of John Chrysostom. The thesis is divided into five chapters of varying lengths, with the fifth chapter being the conclusion of the thesis. Chapter 1 is divided into two major parts. Part A is the story of certain major scholarly works on the topic of Hellenism and Christianity, particularly in late antiquity. Part B turns to previous scholarship on John Chrysostom and Hellenism specifically. We discuss three particular aspects of John’s reception, rhetoric, philosophy, and religious identity while also looking in interpretations from modern scholarship. This part and the chapter conclude with a general overview of the argument and an identification of research gaps. Chapter 2 is divided into five parts. After a discussion of the identity of those called Greeks in John’s corpus we proceed to analyse his extensive criticism of several aspects of Hellenism: philosophy, religion, public attitudes, and the binding power of tradition. The third part goes into the opposite direction and examines instances of John’s positive references to Hellenes and Greek history. In part four we see the reception moving on from the binary of praise and criticism and we discuss examples of both praise and criticism combined, along with indifferent references to Hellenes and John’s practical suggestions on how the Christians should treat the Greeks. In Chapter 3 we examine John’s embodiments of Hellenism and Christianity respectively through his comparisons of individuals. The first three parts consist of major comparisons, which are the most frequent ones in terms of the individuals compared, and minor comparisons, which are smaller treatments and usually group individuals together instead of treating them separately. The fourth part is a close analysis of Chrysostom’s Discourse on Babylas, a treatise that includes a major comparison between Babylas and Diogenes but also provides an opportunity for John to launch a full-scale attack against Hellenism. Finally, in Chapter 4 we will be looking into John’s reception of a specific philosophical school: the Cynics. After situating John’s own texts within previous Christian tradition and assessing differences and similarities, we complete the chapter by a comparison between John and the Cynics and their respective conception of a specific philosophical concept, that of autarkeia.