Orientador: Alcides Hector Rodriguez Benoit / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-05T11:11:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_JoseLourencoPereirada_D.pdf: 11699289 bytes, checksum: 7207aef20ff785d66fb9060ffed958c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Resumo: Essa tese examina a ontologia platônica. A hipótese de trabalho é que Platão no Sofista revisa sua teoria das Formas. A influência da teoria do Ser de Parmênides levou Platão a uma teoria das Formas que era demasiadamente austera uma teoria que levou a metafísica de Platão a aporia. O Parmênides mostra essa vulnerabilidade da teoria de Platão. A fim de revisar sua teoria, Platão realiza uma espécie de terapia sobre sua ontologia, revendo uma de suas fontes principais: o eleatismo. Iniciando no Parmênides e continuando no Sofista, Platão critica sua herança eleática para salvar sua doutrina das Formas. É uma conseqüência da concepção eleática do 'ser' e do 'um' a impossibilidade de pensar o não-ser e a multiplicidade sem contradição. Criticando a concepção eleática, Platão revisa a teoria das Formas. Enquanto outrora cada Forma era um ser e uma unidade à maneira parmenideana, a crítica de Platão a Parmênides torna possível às Formas se misturarem - isto é, serem capazes de participação recíproca - em virtude do que cada Forma é una e múltipla ao mesmo tempo / Abstract: This thesis examines platonic ontology. The working hypothesis is that Plato in the Sophist revises his theory of Forms. The influence of Parmenides' theory of Being had led Plato to a theory of the Forms that was too austere, a theory that led Plato's metaphysics to aporia. The Parmenides shows this vulnerability in Plato's theory. In order to revise his theory, Plato perfoms a kind of therapy upon his ontology, by reviewing one of his main sources: the eleatism. Beginning in the Parmenides and continuing in the Sophist, Plato criticizes his eleatic legacy to save his doctrine of Forms. It is a consequence of the eleatic conception of 'being' and 'one' that it is impossible to think of not-being and multiplicity without contradiction. By criticizing the eleatic conception, Plato revises the theory of Forms. Whereas formerly each Form was a being and a unity in parmenidean manner, Plato's critique of Parmenides makes it possible for the Forms to mix-that is, to be capable of reciprocal Participation in virtue of which each Form at once is one and many / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: João Carlos Kfouri Quartim de Moraes / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T16:34:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Felicio_ThiagoHarrison_M.pdf: 1180811 bytes, checksum: 8ebcdcb1646c78cb4e7c018c801cc8fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: Investigamos o tema da primazia da phrónesis sobre a philosophía na Carta a Meneceu, em algumas Máximas e Sentenças de Epicuro e em alguns testemunhos tardios. No passo 132, de Carta a Meneceu, lemos que a phrónesis é mais preciosa do que a philosophía, sendo que a primeira é tida como uma sabedoria prática e contínua, indispensável à vida do sábio, e a segunda como um saber teórico e igualmente como um exercício, cujo principal objetivo é livrar o homem dos temores oriundos de vãs opiniões, atuando de maneira terapêutica, à semelhança de um remédio. Comparando as noções que a Carta nos revela com outras passagens que fazem referência a tais termos, podemos constatar que em nenhum momento Epicuro demonstra desprezo pela philosophía. Então, como podemos localizar e compreender os motivos que o levam a declarar a primazia de uma sabedoria sobre a outra? Para responder a essa pergunta, buscamos tanto os comentários de intérpretes já consagrados da tradição quanto os de intérpretes mais recentes. Além disso, traduzimos a Carta a Meneceu e algumas passagens do corpus epicurista / Abstract: We did an investigation of the theme of the primacy of the phrónesis over the philosophía in the Letter to Menoeceus, in some of the Maxims and Sentences of Epicurus and in some late testimonies. In the line 132 of the Letter to Menoeceus we read that the phrónesis is more precious than the philosophía. The phrónesis is taken as a practical and continuous wisdom, essential to the life of the sage, whereas the philosophía is taken as a theoretical wisdom and also as an "exercise", whose main goal is to free the man from the fears of vain opinions, acting in a therapeutic way, as a medicine. Comparing the notions which the Letter reveals with other passages that make reference to such terms, we note that Epicurus doesn't show contempt for the philosophía. So how can we locate and understand the reasons why the philosopher declares the primacy of the phrónesis over the philosophía? To answer this question we researched both comments of interpreters already enshrined in the tradition as the comments of the latest interpreters. In addition we translated the Letter to Menoeceus and some passages of the Epicurean corpus. / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Alcides Hector Rodriguez Benoit / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T23:48:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabioneta_Robson_M.pdf: 1124612 bytes, checksum: 971a81a7a293022c6b5ee0a2be38ee78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Protágoras é considerado pela maior parte dos críticos como o primeiro e o maior sofista de todos os tempos. Por outro lado, Sócrates é qualificado como o filósofo de Platão. É senso comum da história da filosofia que os sofistas são adversários dos filósofos, desse modo, Protágoras seria o maior adversário de Sócrates. Porém, ao lermos os diálogos por eles mesmos, como nos ensinam os textos de Hector Benoit, veremos que o problema não é tão simples assim. Platão, com suas inversões, surpreende até mesmo o mais atento leitor. Uma delas, para nós a mais importante, a troca de posições entre Sócrates e Protágoras acerca da possibilidade ou não do ensino da virtude política, será discutida por nós quando analisarmos a relação entre os personagens no diálogo Protágoras. Portanto, neste momento discutiremos as posições políticas do sofista. Porém, Platão não fica apenas no pensamento político de Protágoras, ele, ou para ser mais preciso, Sócrates dá a palavra para o sofista dizer o que pensa acerca de sua própria tese: 'o homem é a medida de todas as coisas'. Platão investiga a famosa frase de Protágoras dando a ela um novo sentido que a história da filosofia jamais esqueceria, a saber: 'conhecimento é sensação'. Veremos como Sócrates, com a arte que emprestou de sua mãe, a maiêutica, secreta aos falsos sofistas, aproxima esta de outras teorias. Nossa hipótese acerca da maneira platônica de investigar a tese do homem medida será: 1) Platão isola esta teoria, procurando seus limites; 2) depois faz o mesmo com outras teorias, para logo em seguida juntar o que lhe parece semelhante e separar o que é dessemelhante; no primeiro procura o que é harmônico, no segundo cria o confronto; 3) por fim, Platão olha tudo de novo em busca do que pode ou não pode ser usado. Além dos diálogos Protágoras e Teeteto, Protágoras aparece nos seguintes diálogos: Hípias Maior, Menão, Livro X da República, Eutidemo, Fedro, Crátilo, Sofista e Leis. Procuraremos discutir o motivo que levou Protágoras a ser citado em 10 diálogos de Platão, quase metade dos seus diálogos. Além disso, aproveitando a classificação de Protágoras como sofista-mor, procuraremos nestes diálogos os atributos que este gênero recebe. Ao fazermos isto percebemos que o conceito sofista é vasto e significativo dentro dos diálogos, ao ponto do conceito ser digno de receber um diálogo inteiro, o Sofista. Por este diálogo notamos que o sofista possui uma relação íntima com seu suposto adversário, o filósofo. Pensamos que para Platão é responsabilidade do sofista a busca incansável pelo conhecimento, por este motivo o filósofo o ama. Já o filósofo tem a obrigação de purificar o sofista de sua incessante pesquisa, tornando-o ele também filósofo / Abstract: Protagoras is considered by most critics as the first and greatest sophist of all times. On the other hand, Socrates is described as Plato's philosopher. It's common sense of the history of philosophy that the sophists are opponents of philosophers thus Protagoras would be the greatest adversary of Socrates. However, when we read the dialogues for themselves, as we learn from the Hector Benoit texts, we see that the problem is not so simple. Plato, with his inversions, surprises even the most attentive reader. One of them, for us the most important, the exchange of positions between Socrates and Protagoras about whether or not the teaching of political virtue is possible, will be discussed by us when we analyze the relationship between the characters in the dialogue Protagoras. We will be discussing now the political positions of the sophist. But Plato does not stick only to Protagoras' political thought, he, or to be more precise, Socrates gives the word to the sophist so he can say what he thinks about his own thesis: ' Man is the measure of all things '. Plato investigates Protagoras' famous phrase by giving it a new meaning the history of philosophy would never forget, namely: ' knowledge is sensation.' We'll see how Socrates with the art borrowed from his mother, maieutic, secret to false sophists, approaches this to other theories. Our hypothesis about the platonic way to investigate the Man-measure theory will be: 1) Plato isolates this theory, searching for its limits, 2) then he does the same to other theories, right after that he gathers together what looks alike to him and separates what is dissimilar, in the first he searches for what is harmonic, in the second he creates the confrontation and 3) finally, Plato looks everything all over again in search of what may or may not be used. Besides the dialogues Protagoras and Teeteto, Protagoras appears in the following dialogues: Hippias Major, Meno, Book X of the Republic, Euthydemus, Phaedo, Cratylus, Sophist and Laws. We will seek to discuss the reason that led Protagoras to be mentioned in 10 dialogues of Plato, almost half of his dialogues. Moreover, taking advantage of the classification of Protagoras as chief-sophist, we seek in these dialogues the attributes received by this genus. By doing this we realize that the sophist is vast and significant concept within the dialogs to the point of the concept being worthy of receiving an entire dialogue, the Sophist. Through this dialogue we note that the Sophist has an intimate relationship with his supposed adversary, the Philosopher. We think that for Plato it is the Sophist's responsibility the tireless search for knowledge, for this reason the Philosopher loves him. But the Philosopher is obliged to purify the Sophist of his relentless research, turning him too into the philosopher / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Flávio Ribeiro de Oliveira / Texto em grego com tradução paralela em português / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T10:13:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CunhaNeto_Osvaldo_M.pdf: 3009102 bytes, checksum: f1b68930b9355d7996311fd5770d44e6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: O diálogo Protágoras coloca frente a frente Sócrates e Protágoras...Observação: O resumo, na íntegra, poderá ser visualizado no texto completo da tese digital / Abstract: The dialogue Protagoras puts face to face Socrates and Protagoras...Note: The complete abstract is available with the full electronic document / Mestrado / Linguistica / Mestre em Linguística

[pt] A dissertação tem por objetivo mostrar a importância e a significação da referência à filosofia grega no pensamento de Werner Heisenberg, um dos principais fundadores da mecânica quântica. A referência aos gregos, constante em seus escritos, deve ser primeiramente situada no contexto da crítica à modernidade, uma das diretrizes herdadas de Niels Bohr e uma das características mais fundamentais da filosofia de Heisenberg. Isto é, o pensamento grego é, para Heisenberg, um contraponto aos fundamentos da filosofia moderna, cujos limites são intransponíveis no que diz respeito à compreensão dos problemas apresentados pela física moderna. Acreditamos, no entanto, ser possível afirmar que as constantes referências, sobretudo a Platão e Aristóteles, têm também um papel fundamental no que diz respeito à caracterização do nível de realidade próprio à mecânica quântica. / [en] This dissertation has for objective to show the importance and signification of the reference to the greek philosophy in the thought of Werner Heisenberg, one of the main founders of quantum mechanics. The reference to the greek philosophy, constant in his writings, must first be situated in the context of the critics to modernity, one of the inherited lines of direction of Niels Bohr and one of the most basic characteristics of Heisenberg`s philosophy. That is, the greek thought is, for Heisenberg, a counterpoint to the beddings of the modern philosophy, whose limits are insurmountable with respect to the understanding of the problems presented for the modern physics. We believe, however, that is possible to affirm that the constant references, especially to Plato and Aristotle, have also a fundamental role with respect to the characterization of the level of reality proper to the quantum mechanics.

This doctoral dissertation aims to give a comprehensive and contextual account of Aristotle’s theory of metaphor. The dissertation is organized around the central claim that Aristotle’s definition of metaphor in Chapter 22 of the Poetics, as well as his discussion of it in Book III of the Rhetoric, commit him to what I call a vertical theory of metaphor, rather than to a horizontal one. Horizontal theories of metaphor assert that ‘metaphor’ is a word that has been transferred from a literal to a figurative sense; vertical theories of metaphor, on the other hand, assert that ‘metaphor’ is the transference of a word from one thing to another thing. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the dissertation itself has five chapters. The first chapter sketches out the historical context within which the vertical character of Aristotle’s theory of metaphor becomes meaningful, both by (a) giving a rough outline of Plato’s critical appraisal of rhetoric and poetry in the Gorgias, Phaedrus, Ion, and Republic, and then (b) showing how Aristotle’s own Rhetoric and Poetics should be read as a faithful attempt to reform both activities in accordance with the criteria laid down by Plato in these dialogues. The second and third chapters elaborate the main thesis and show how Aristotle’s texts support it, by painstakingly reconstructing the relevant passages of the Poetics, Rhetoric, On Interpretation, Categories and On Sophistical Refutations, and resolving a number of interpretive disputes that these passages raise in the secondary literature. Finally, the fourth and fifth chapters together pursue the philosophical implications of the thesis that I elaborate in the first three, and resolve some perceived contradictions between Aristotle’s theory of metaphor in the Poetics and Rhetoric, his prohibition against the use of metaphors in the Posterior Analytics, and his own use of similes and analogical comparisons in the dialectical discussions found in the former text, the De Anima and the later stages of his argument in the Metaphysics. In many ways, the most philosophically noteworthy insight uncovered by my dissertation is the basic consideration that, for Aristotle, all metaphors involve a statement of similarity between two or more things – specifically, they involve a statement of what I call secondary resemblance, which inheres to different degrees of imperfection among things that are presumed to be substantially different, as opposed to the primary and perfect similarities that inhere among things of the same kind. The major, hitherto unnoticed consequence I draw from this insight is that it is ultimately the philosopher, as the one who best knows these secondary similarities, who is implicitly singled out in Aristotle’s treatises on rhetoric and poetry as being both the ideal poet and the ideal orator, at least to the extent that Aristotle holds the use of metaphor to be a necessary condition for the mastery of both pursuits. This further underscores what I argue in the first chapter is the inherently philosophical character of the Poetics and the Rhetoric, and shows the extent to which they demand to be read in connection with, rather than in isolation from, the more ‘central’ themes of Aristotle’s philosophical system.

This essay tries to demarcate and analyse Artificial Intelligence ethics. Going away from the traditional distinction in normative, meta, and applied ethics, a different split is executed, inspired by the three most prominent schools of thought: deontology, consequentialism, and Aristotelian virtue ethics. The reason behind this alternative approach is to connect all three schools back to ancient Greek philosophy. Having proven that the majority of arguments derive from some ancient Greek scholars (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle), a new voice is initiated into the discussion, Protagoras the Sophist. A big advocate of -the later conceived- humanism and relativism, Protagoras is used as a prism to examine a new ethical model that is based on the personalization of agents. In other words, even though theories of objectivity have overflown contemporary discussions of finding a robust ethical model for Artificial Intelligence agents, there is potential in a subjective model, personalised after each and every user.

Many of Gilles Deleuze’s most celebrated arguments are developed in conversation with Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus and Epicurus. This thesis argues that ancient Stoic conceptions of causality and language and Epicurean contributions to geometry and physics are especially important to Deleuze because they significantly undergird the concepts of “event” and “problem” that characterize Deleuze’s alternative image of thought and philosophy of nature. The role of Hellenistic influences on Deleuze has been underappreciated, probably because his references are often allusive and oblique. My dissertation reconstructs and supplements Deleuze’s interpretations of these ancient Greek philosophers. I offer critical analysis and discussion of the uses to which Deleuze is trying to put them, as well as evaluations of Deleuze’s readings in light of contemporary scholarship on Greek philosophy. Specifically, I defend Deleuze’s claim that the theory of events in The Logic of Sense is derived in large part from the ancient Stoics. Despite being supplemented by a healthy dose of twentieth-century structuralism, Deleuze’s reading of the Stoics is not indefensible, especially his interpretation of incorporeal lekta as events linked by relationships of compatibility and incompatibility independent of conceptual entailment or physical causality. I also offer an entirely new evaluation of Deleuze's polemic with Aristotle’s conception of difference. The correct understanding of Deleuze’s position has been obscured by his apparent conflation of the Aristotelian concepts of homonymy and analogy. What might otherwise seem to be a misreading of Aristotle should be read as part of an incompletely realized argument to the effect that Aristotle’s account of the core-dependent homonymy of being fails. Finally I explicate Deleuze's contention that Epicurean atomism is a “problematic Idea,” which is derived from a careful but almost entirely implicit reading of both Epicurus and Lucretius. Deleuze reads the Epicurean “swerve” as a mechanism for the self-determination of physical systems, which models the capacity of problematic ideas to provoke new lines of reasoning and alternative forms of thought. The influence of Epicureanism and Stoicism on Deleuze’s late work on meta-philosophy in What is Philosophy? accounts for the way it treats the images of nature and of thought as inextricably linked. Deleuze understands the ambition to give a joint account of nature and thought to be typical of Hellenistic philosophy. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

[pt] Esta dissertação explora alguns aspectos da homoiosis theoi, o ideal de assimilação a deus defendido por Platão em vários dos seus diálogos, em especial no Teeteto e no Timeu. No Teeteto, Sócrates afirma: Daqui nasce para nós o dever de procurar fugir o quanto antes daqui para o alto. Ora, fugir dessa maneira é tornar-se o mais possível semelhante a Deus; e tal semelhança consiste em ficar alguém justo e santo com sabedoria. A assimilação a deus é então claramente apresentada como uma rota de fuga, mas também como um guia para a transformação moral. Ambos os aspectos são considerados no presente trabalho, que articula a noção da homoiosis theoi com a narrativa evolucionária associada ao mito da criação do Timeu. Segundo a nossa leitura, o retorno das almas justas às suas estrelas nativas, com cuja possibilidade o Timeu nos acena, poderia identificar-se à homoiosis theoi, configurando uma das transições admissíveis do processo evolucionário descrito no diálogo. A assimilação de cada alma individual a deus, equiparando-se à sua ascensão para a contemplação do Bem, estaria associada ao imperativo do seu retorno para a educação moral da sociedade. Em se provando bem-sucedido, este esforço educativo conduziria à consumação coletiva da homoiosis theoi: a elevação de toda a humanidade à comunhão com as estrelas. Assim incorporada a um plano de fundo evolucionário, a noção platônica da assimilação a deus mostra-se significativamente consistente com especulações contemporâneas sobre o papel e o destino cósmicos da humanidade, em particular com o chamado princípio antrópico final. Abre-se também a possibilidade de uma comparação com sistemas de perfectibilidade humana fundados sobre a teoria da evolução darwiniana. / [en] This dissertation explores some aspects of homoiosis theoi, the ideal of assimilation to god propounded by Plato in several of his dialogues, particularly in the Theaetetus and in the Timaeus. In the Theaetetus, Socrates states: That is why a man should make all haste to escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a man becomes like God when he becomes just and pious with understanding. The assimilation to god is thus clearly presented as an escape route, but also as a guide for moral transformation. Both aspects are considered in our work, which articulates the idea of homoiosis theoi with the evolutionary account associated with the creation myth of Timaeus. Our reading suggests that the return of the just souls to their native stars, whose possibility is affirmed by the Timaeus, could be identified as homoiosis theoi, thus constituting one of the admissible transitions in the evolutionary process described in the dialogue. The assimilation of each individual soul to god, being equivalent to its ascension for contemplating the Good, would be associated to the imperative of its descent for the moral education of society. Proving itself successful, such educational effort would lead to a collective fulfillment of homoiosis theoi: the elevation of all humankind to a communion with the stars. Thus incorporated into an evolutionary backdrop, the platonic assimilation to god proves significantly consistent with modern speculations about humankind’s cosmic role and destiny, especially with the so-called final anthropic principle. The possibility also presents itself of a comparison with human perfectibility systems based on Darwin’s evolutionary theory.

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.