No description available.

This paper is a study of the pre-Socratic, Milesian philosopher Anaximander, in light of the question concerning the rise of philosophy and its relation to myth in the sixth century B.C. We are restricting our inquiry to Anaximander to make our consideration of the myth/philosophy relation more manageable. Thus we will assume that Anaximander's thought is indicative of the general status of this relationship in his time and milieu. We chose Anaximander also because of the great diversity of interpretations of his thought in current pre-Socratic scholarship. Differences in approach to Anaximander reflect differences concerning the nature of pre-Socratic thought in general. Differences with regard to the pre-Socratics in turn reflect ultimate assumptions as to the nature of philosophy and the historical circumstances in which it arose. Therefore, a considerable part of our study will concern itself with the major Anaximander-interpretations in the literature, their key assumptions and their relationships to existing traditions in pre-Socratic research. This part of the study will be carried out in preparation for our own interpretation of Anaximander and the relation between myth and philosophy visible in his thought. The latter will be conducted in dialogue with the other interpretations and with a conscious awareness of its own hermeneutical assumptions.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This research explores the possibility of a phenomenology of religion that is ontological, founded on Martin Heidegger’s philosophical thought. The research attempts to utilise Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as ontology while also engaging in a critical relation with his path of thinking; as a barrier to the phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of Religion. This research formulates Religion as an ontological problem wherein the primary question becomes: how are humans, in our being, able to be religious and thus also able to understand the meaning of ‘religion’ or something like ‘religion’? This study focuses on the problem of foundation; of whether it is possible to provide an adequate foundation for the study of religion(s) via the notion ‘Religion’. Further, this study also aims to explore the problem of methodological foundation; of how preconceptions of the meaning of Religion predetermine how religion(s) and religious phenomena are studied. Finally, this research moves toward the possibility of founding a regional ontological basis for the study of religion(s) insofar as the research explores the ontological ground of Religion as a phenomenon. Due to the exploratory and methodological/foundational emphasis of the research, the thesis is almost entirely preliminary. Herein, the research focuses on three main issues: how the notion of Religion is preconceived, how Heidegger’s phenomenology can be tailored to the phenomenon of Religion, and how philosophical thought (in this case, Pre-Socratic philosophy) discloses indications of the meaning of Religion. Pre-Socratic thought is then utilised as a foundation for a preliminary interpretation of how Religion belongs-to humans in our being. This research provides two interrelated theses: the provision of an interpretation of Religion as an existential phenomenon, and an interpretation of Religion in its ground of being-human. With regard to the former, I argue that Religion signifies a potential relation with the ‘originary ground’ of life as meaningful. Accordingly, the second interpretation discloses the meaning of Religion as grounded in being-human; that for humans in our being, the meaning of life is an intrinsic question/dilemma for us. This being-characteristic, I argue, can be called belief.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This research explores the possibility of a phenomenology of religion that is ontological, founded on Martin Heidegger’s philosophical thought. The research attempts to utilise Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenology as ontology while also engaging in a critical relation with his path of thinking; as a barrier to the phenomenological interpretation of the meaning of Religion. This research formulates Religion as an ontological problem wherein the primary question becomes: how are humans, in our being, able to be religious and thus also able to understand the meaning of ‘religion’ or something like ‘religion’? This study focuses on the problem of foundation; of whether it is possible to provide an adequate foundation for the study of religion(s) via the notion ‘Religion’. Further, this study also aims to explore the problem of methodological foundation; of how preconceptions of the meaning of Religion predetermine how religion(s) and religious phenomena are studied. Finally, this research moves toward the possibility of founding a regional ontological basis for the study of religion(s) insofar as the research explores the ontological ground of Religion as a phenomenon. Due to the exploratory and methodological/foundational emphasis of the research, the thesis is almost entirely preliminary. Herein, the research focuses on three main issues: how the notion of Religion is preconceived, how Heidegger’s phenomenology can be tailored to the phenomenon of Religion, and how philosophical thought (in this case, Pre-Socratic philosophy) discloses indications of the meaning of Religion. Pre-Socratic thought is then utilised as a foundation for a preliminary interpretation of how Religion belongs-to humans in our being. This research provides two interrelated theses: the provision of an interpretation of Religion as an existential phenomenon, and an interpretation of Religion in its ground of being-human. With regard to the former, I argue that Religion signifies a potential relation with the ‘originary ground’ of life as meaningful. Accordingly, the second interpretation discloses the meaning of Religion as grounded in being-human; that for humans in our being, the meaning of life is an intrinsic question/dilemma for us. This being-characteristic, I argue, can be called belief.

My PhD thesis, The Flower of Suffering, offers a philosophical evaluation of Aeschylus' Oresteia in light of Presocratic ideas. By examining several aspects of the tragic trilogy in relation to some of Aeschylus' near-contemporary thinkers, it aims to unravel the overarching theological ideas and the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions underpinning the Oresteia's dramatic narrative. My aim is to bring to relief those aspects of the Oresteia which I believe will benefit from a comparison with some ideas, or modes of thought, which circulated among the Presocratic philosophers. I will explore how reading some of this tragedy's themes in relation to Presocratic debates about theology and cosmic justice may affect and enhance our understanding of the theological ‘tension' and metaphysical assumptions in Aeschylus' work. In particular, it is my contention that Aeschylus' explicit theology, which has been often misinterpreted as a form of theodicy where the justice of heaven is praised and a faith in the rule of the gods is encouraged, is presented in these terms only to create a stronger collision with the painful reality dramatized from a human perspective. By setting these premises, it is my intention to confer on Greek tragedy a prominent position in the history of early Greek philosophical thought. If the exclusion of Presocratic material from debates about tragedy runs the risk of obscuring a thorough understanding of the broader cultural backdrop against which tragedy was born, the opposite is also true. Greek tragedy represents, in its own dramatic language, a fundamental contribution to early philosophical speculation about the divine, human attitudes towards it, indeed, the human place in relation to the cosmic forces which govern the universe.

Οι Επτά επί Θήβας του Αισχύλου, σύμφωνα με όσα γνωρίζουμε, παρουσιάστηκαν για πρώτη φορά στην αρχαία Αθήνα το 467 π.Χ. και βραβεύτηκαν ως μέρος της τετραλογίας Λάϊος, Οιδίπους, Επτά επί Θήβας και του σατυρικού δράματος Σφιγξ, σε μια εποχή όπου η δημοκρατία έχει εγκαθιδρυθεί στην Αθήνα, αλλά έχουν αφήσει έντονα ίχνη σε αυτήν και την πολιτική της οι Περσικοί πόλεμοι. Στην εργασία αυτή θα επιχειρήσουμε να διερευνήσουμε και να αναδείξουμε τις σχέσεις της τραγωδίας των Επτά επί Θήβας με αποσπάσματα της προσωκρατικής σκέψης, ξεκινώντας από τα έπη του Ησιόδου, που οι μελετητές θεωρούν σημαντικά ως υπόστρωμα αυτού του έργου, και φτάνοντας μέχρι τον Πρωταγόρα, που η δράση του αρχίζει την εποχή που πρωτοπαρουσιάστηκε το έργο. Παρόλο που οι μελετητές δεν έχουν ασχοληθεί συχνά με αυτό το ζήτημα, φαίνεται να έχει ιδιαίτερη σημασία για την ερμηνεία αυτής της τραγωδίας, γι’ αυτό το λόγο θα επιμείνουμε σε αυτήν την έρευνα και θα προσπαθήσουμε να δείξουμε πώς ο Αισχύλος χρησιμοποιεί όχι μόνο τους διάφορους μύθους αλλά και φιλοσοφικούς στοχασμούς της εποχής του, για να τους μετουσιώσει σε θέατρο. / --

This Thesis consists of two parts theoretical and practical. The theoretical part forms an integrated theoretical conception that seeks inspiration from Greek myths and offers creative starting points for the practical part which is the creative project of realization of an artist book. There are also described the origins and development of the mythical tradition in Greece. The main source of inspiration is found in the myths of origin by the epic poet Hésiodos. The mythical perspective on the origin in chaos is enhanced by the views of Pre-Socratic philosophers who influenced by the mythical tradition sought the rational origin, the primaeval existence. The artist book inspired by the myth of origin is produced in a shape of a folder of ten sheets in A2 format.

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.

Le présent travail s’inscrit dans une démarche de reconstitution de la notion de vie au sein de la pensée antique. Il s’agit de rétablir son sens au coeur de la langue et de la culture grecque, et particulièrement, à l’intérieur de la philosophie et de la pensée aristotélicienne. L’étude s’organise autour de deux termes fondamentaux et propres à la langue grecque, à savoir les mots βίος et ζωή. La première partie s’attache à dégager la forme et le sens «original» des mots, et étudie les facteurs linguistiques et culturels intervenant dans la formation et l’évolution de la forme et du sens des mots en question. Les mots βίος et ζωή se présentent donc comme les éléments structurants de cette étude. La reconstitution du contexte historico-linguistique des mots conduit à la deuxième partie de ce travail, où sont analysés le travail de poètes tels Homère et Hésiode, ainsi que des premiers philosophes, usuellement nommés présocratiques. Dans cette partie du travail de recherche, la notion de vie est dégagée de l’enquête naturelle menée par les premiers penseurs, ainsi que des images fournies par la tradition poétique. Après avoir replacé la notion de vie au sein de son contexte historico-culturel et linguistique, on entame l’étude de la pensée aristotélicienne sur la vie. L’interrogation de départ tient au fait de déterminer si la notion de «vie» chez Aristote passe nécessairement et uniquement par l’étude des êtres vivants et de l’âme, ou si elle dépasse la finalité biologique pour embrasser autres domaines de sa philosophie. Cette partie vise une approche intégrationniste et dynamique de la vie à l’intérieur de la pensée aristotélicienne. La reconstitution de la notion de vie chez Aristote amène à une réflexion sur son lien avec l’enquête naturelle menée par les premiers penseurs. En dernier ressort, l’hétérogénéité de cette étude permet de voir de quelle façon Aristote, certes pionnier dans les recherches sur la vie, conserve pourtant toujours une structure de pensée propre à la Grèce antique : Aristote élabore sa pensée à partir et à l’intérieur de son temps et de la tradition qui lui précède. / The reconstitution of the notion of life within the ancient philosophy is the principal idea of the present study. The aim is to re-establish the conception of this notion within the Greek language and culture, especially within the knowledge of early philosophers and the philosophy of Aristotle. The arrangement of this contribution is based on the meaning and relation of the words βίος and ζωή, two fundamental terms, exclusive to the Greek language. The first part of the study shed new light on the formal constitution and «original» meaning of these words. In particular the linguistic and cultural factors which converge in their formation and evolution are investigated in detail. The reconstruction of the historical and linguistic context of the words βίος and ζωή gives rise to the second part of the study by the means of reconstructing the notion of life within the poetical tradition and investigation of nature, conducted by the early philosophers. The third part of the study approaches the notion of life in the philosophy of Aristotle from the principle question at issue: whether the idea of life is reduced to the investigation of living organisms and his theory of soul or if it exceeds the biologic purpose to encompass other categories of his philosophy. This analysis of the notion of life within the philosophy of Aristotle is conducted by an integrating and dynamic perspective. The reconstitution of the notion of life in the work of Aristotle leads to a reflection about the closeness of his ideas to anterior investigations of natural objects and processes done by the early philosophers. Apart from being a pioneer in the investigation of life, he is also tributary to a particular kind of thinking in ancient Greece. Aristotle’s way of thinking, although far-reaching, is based within his period and preceding traditions