This thesis examines the intersection of cultural discourse and economic policies of the Hungarian populist radical right party, Fidesz. It classifies the cultural discourse of the governing party as neo-traditionalist by examining how the party's leader, Viktor Orbán, rhetorically shapes his vision of the nation, espouses traditional values, and uses missionary politics to create a personalized moral code under the guise of cultural Christianity. It examines the government's economic policies of nationalization and re-privatization, crony capitalism, and national work program within a neo-feudalist classification. This research finds that the neo-feudalist economic policies of Fidesz serve as a reinforcement mechanism that legitimizes the cultural discourse espoused by Orbán. Furthermore, the neo-feudal economy is reshaping the social system into a highly centralized and hierarchical structure and having lasting macroeconomic effects, including demographic issues and increasing levels of wealth inequality. This emerging illiberal model of governance is not only reshaping Hungary's political, economic, and social systems, but also contributing to a larger movement away from the tenets of liberal democracy within CEE. Keywords Neo-traditionalism, Neo-feudalism, Delayed transformational fatigue,...

This thesis proposes to link certain consistent themes in the historiography of interwar and wartime Hungary. Hungary's inability to successfully resolve its minority problems led to the nation's dismemberment at Trianon in 1920 after World War I. This fostered a national Hungarian reaction against the Trianon settlement called the revisionist movement. This revisionist "Trianon syndrome" totally dominated Hungarian politics in the interwar period. As Hungary sought allies against the hated peace settlements of the Great War, Hungarian politics irrevocably tied the nation to the policies of Nazi Germany, and Hungary became nefariously assessed as "Hitler's last ally," which initially stained the nation's reputation after World War II. Although some historians have blamed the interwar Hungarian government for the calamity that followed Hungary's associations with Nazi Germany, this thesis proposes that there was little variation between what could have happened and what actually became the nation's fate in World War II. A new interpretation therefore becomes evident: the injustices of Trianon, Hungary's geopolitical position in the heart of Europe, and the nation's unfortunate orientation between the policies of Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia predestined the nation to its fate in World War II. There was no other choice for Hungarian policy in World War II but the Axis alliance. The historian of East Central Europe faces a formidable challenge in that the national histories of this region are often contradictory. Hungarian historiography is directly countered by the historical theories and propositions of its Czech, Serb, and Rumanian enemies. By historiographical analysis of the histories of Hungary, its enemies among the Successor States, and neutral sources, this thesis will demonstrate that many contemporary historians tend to support the primary theses of Hungarian historiography. Many of the arguments of the Hungarian interwar government are now generally supported by objective historians, while the historiographical suppositions of the Successor States at the Paris Peace Conference have become increasingly reduced to misinformation, falsification, exaggeration, and propaganda. The ignorance of the minority problems and ethnic history of East Central Europe led to an unjust settlement in 1919 and 1920, and by grossly favoring the victors over the vanquished, the Paris Peace Treaties greatly increased the probability of a second and even more terrible World War.

This study examines the representations of identities of the Hungarian Self and the Chinese Other in the Hungarian official foreign policy discourses surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This research paper uses Lene Hansen’s poststructuralist discourse analysis to examine how Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán represents Hungary’s identity in relation to the Chinese one since 2013 when the agreement on the BRI was signed. The study’s analysis reveals that the Hungarian Self and the Chinese Other have shared more similarities than differences since 2013. Historically, the Chinese Other has been considered radically different and threatening communist Other in relation to the democratic Hungarian Self. However, the representations of identities took a pivotal turn in the early 2010s when Hungary started to glorify China rather than despite it. Ever since then, the Chinese Other has been constituted as an equal in relation to the Hungarian Self and the differences between them have therefore not been radical. The analysis disclosed that the Other was most often described in regional terms, i.e. as the ‘’East’’ and as something that the Hungarian Self wanted to be a part of. Historically, Hungary and China have been constituted as temporally inferior in relation to the West, however, the analysis showed that the East has caught up with the West and that it is the East that will be leading in the future. Finally, by elevating the issue to a moral basis, Hungary presents itself as an ethically driven actor who has two main responsibilities; a responsibility to include the Chinese Other in European businesses and projects as well as an explicit international responsibility to defend traditional values and differences that exist between nations.

On November 4, 1956, Soviet forces brutally suppressed the Hungarian Revolution in Budapest. Although Nikita Khrushchev had attempted to "repair" the Soviet Union's image by denouncing Stalin's crimes, the Soviet invasion of Hungary damaged the Soviet Union's legitimacy in the international community. This thesis examines the popular and religious press' coverage of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. By publishing anticommunist editorials and letters to the editor, the popular press furthered the phenomenon known as Cold War Consensus. Historians have looked at Cold War Consensus as a conscious political project created by a number of individuals and institutions. This thesis emphasizes the role of the popular and religious press as agents in the solidification of the Cold War Consensus. Most notable was the popular and religious press' use of the victimization narrative. By portraying the Hungarian freedom fighters as victims of the Soviet system, the popular and religious press condemned the Soviet Union's actions while extolling "American values" such as democracy, freedom, and charity. The popular and religious press' treatment of Soviet brutality also built a sensationalized image of Hungarian refugees. The emphasis on Soviet savagery and narrative centered on incoming Hungarian refugees as heroes strengthened anticommunist rhetoric that was typical during the 1950s. / History

No / This article traces the changes in Anglo-Hungarian relations during the Second World War. Both official and clandestine dealings with the Horthy regime are explored, and put in the wider context of the shifting British attitude towards small states. It is argued that British officials came to endorse the fatalistic view of Sir Stafford Cripps that `smaller countries must fall under the sway of highly industrialised and rigidly controlled major powers¿. The Foreign Office was no longer willing to champion national causes in Central Europe; Horthy¿s Hungary was a case in point. Although Britain declared war on Hungary as late as December 1941, and only under strong Soviet pressure, from April 1941 the BBC was explicitly instructed to treat Hungary as an `enemy state¿. This hostile attitude changed in the spring of 1943, when the British government entered into secret negotiations with Regent Horthy and the Kállay government. Paradoxically, the Foreign Office was far more appreciative of any signs of independence and neutrality in Hungarian foreign policy than two years earlier, when such a policy held some promise. Hungary may have been branded as `an enemy country which will have to work her passage home¿, but British agents still played a pivotal role in the attempts by the Horthy regime to change sides in the war. A similar dichotomy can be detected in the British attitude towards the Soviet occupation of the country. Whilst the head of the British Military Mission was instructed to follow the Soviet lead in the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, he was also ordered `to resist any attempt by the Soviet authorities to encroach on Hungarian sovereignty or independence¿. This contradiction was the result of negative memories from the interwar years, when Britain failed to capitalise on her prestige and influence in Central and Eastern Europe.