Actions are goal-directed. It can be the goal of an action to change the environment (i.e. to produce an effect), but also to change one´s own situation in the environment (i.e. to move to a physical target). Previous research has shown that kinematics of actions directed towards physical targets are not only mere reactions to such targets. Instead, targets evoke intentional goals. Representations of such intentional goals influence action execution. However, thus far, most studies in the context of the ideomotor theory of action control have focused on the influence of anticipated action effects on action planning. The role of targets as action goals as well as the role of goal anticipations on overt action execution has mostly been neglected. In this dissertation the role of goal representations in action control was investigated. The ideomotor theory served as a theoretical framework. It was assumed that targets function as action goals similar to action effects and that action goals influence action execution by the anticipation of upcoming events. Action execution towards targets and towards effects was compared. This was done in the temporal and the spatial domain. Furthermore, goal representations were manipulated in order to evaluate their influence on action execution and to disentangle the role of physical target characteristics and the role of goal representations. The findings obtained strengthen the assumption that goal representations play an important role in action control. First, both targets and effects can be viewed as goals of an action in the temporal and spatial domain. Second, movement kinematics are shaped by the way targets are represented as action goals, rather than by physically target properties. In conclusion, as goal representations are formed before the action is actually executed they influence action execution by the anticipation of upcoming events. The ideomotor theory of action control should incorporate action targets as goals similar to action effects.

In the course of development organisms learn to associate their actions with the effects these actions have in the environment. Recent studies have shown that perceiving or anticipating action-effects automatically activates actions, which formerly have been experienced to cause these effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Using subliminal priming paradigms and electrophysiological measures I investigated whether subliminally (i.e., not consciously perceivable) presented action-effects can automatically activate associated actions and if so, whether this response priming by action-effects can bias free-choice actions. Secondly I investigated whether action-effects with different emotional valences influence response selection differently. To address the first question three experiments were performed. Each experiment consisted of two experimental phases. The first phase, the acquisition-phase, was a learning phase were simple key-press actions were associated with simple visual stimuli (i.e., action-effects; diamond or square) that were contingent on the actions. Immediately after the acquisition-phase the test-phase followed, in which participants performed free-choice actions after the presentation of a Go-signal. In Experiments 2 and 3 a NoGo-signal indicating that responses had to be withheld could appear with the same likelihood as the Go-signal. Unknown to the participants, one of the former action-effects (diamond or square) was presented subliminally prior to each Go- and NoGo-signal to investigate the influence of unconscious action-effects on response selection. Taken together, the results of the test-phases provided strong evidence that even subliminally presented (i.e., unconscious) action-effects can automatically activate associated responses. The response priming by action-effects became evident in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), an electrophysiological indicator of specific response activation processes. Under certain circumstanced this automatic response activation can bias free-choice actions although participants experienced the actions as freely chosen. In the test-phase of the first experiment more acquisition-phase-consistent than –inconsistent responses were chosen. If, for instance, a left key-press had been associated with a square during the acquisition-phase, the left key was chosen significantly more often after the subliminal presentation of a square in the test-phase. At least three factors seemed to influence which responses were chosen and executed: The strength of the priming effect, the complexity of the task (i.e., pure Go-blocks or intermixed Go/NoGo-blocks), and the elapsed time between the prime stimulus and the Go-signal. To address the second question simple key-press actions were linked to action-effects with different emotional valences (positive vs. negative pictures accompanied by high or low tones) during the acquisition-phase. In the subsequent test-phase, the effects-tones that had been associated with negative or positive pictures were presented and followed by a Go-signal, after which participants had to freely choose to press one of the two response keys. Results indicated that the anticipation of the emotional valence of an action-effect influenced free-choice action. Whereas the effect-tones induced a clear response bias (i.e., more acquisition-consistent than –inconsistent key-choices) if they had been associated with a positive emotional valence, this response bias was not reliable for action-effects associated with negative emotional features. In summary, the present results provide further proof for ideomotor theories of action control (James, 1890; Elsner & Hommel, 2001) which state that actions are automatically activated by anticipating their consequences.

Actions are goal-directed. It can be the goal of an action to change the environment (i.e. to produce an effect), but also to change one´s own situation in the environment (i.e. to move to a physical target). Previous research has shown that kinematics of actions directed towards physical targets are not only mere reactions to such targets. Instead, targets evoke intentional goals. Representations of such intentional goals influence action execution. However, thus far, most studies in the context of the ideomotor theory of action control have focused on the influence of anticipated action effects on action planning. The role of targets as action goals as well as the role of goal anticipations on overt action execution has mostly been neglected. In this dissertation the role of goal representations in action control was investigated. The ideomotor theory served as a theoretical framework. It was assumed that targets function as action goals similar to action effects and that action goals influence action execution by the anticipation of upcoming events. Action execution towards targets and towards effects was compared. This was done in the temporal and the spatial domain. Furthermore, goal representations were manipulated in order to evaluate their influence on action execution and to disentangle the role of physical target characteristics and the role of goal representations. The findings obtained strengthen the assumption that goal representations play an important role in action control. First, both targets and effects can be viewed as goals of an action in the temporal and spatial domain. Second, movement kinematics are shaped by the way targets are represented as action goals, rather than by physically target properties. In conclusion, as goal representations are formed before the action is actually executed they influence action execution by the anticipation of upcoming events. The ideomotor theory of action control should incorporate action targets as goals similar to action effects.

Unsere Fähigkeit Erwartungen auszubilden über zukünftige Ereignisse oder die Ergebnisse unserer eigenen Handlungen ist von entscheidender Bedeutung für zielgerichtetes Verhalten. Obgleich diese Ansicht einer Reihe von einflussreichen theoretischen Strömungen in der kognitiven Psychologie zugrunde liegt, bleiben bislang wichtige Fragen dazu offen. Jüngere Ergebnisse aus neurophysiologischen und Bildgebungsstudien legen nahe, dass bewusste Ziele – ähnlich expliziter Erwartung – nicht mehr sind als ein Nebenprodukt von automatischen und unbewussten Aktivierungsmustern und keinen echten Einfluss auf Verhalten haben. Explizite subjektive Erwartung wird vielmals abgetan, weil sie kein zuverlässiges Maß „wahrer“ mentaler Prozesse darstelle, oder weil sie nicht notwendig sei, um Verhalten zu erklären. In der vorliegenden Arbeit beschäftige ich mich mit der Rolle expliziter subjektiver Erwartung und untersuche die folgenden Fragen: (1) Sind verbalisierte Vorhersagen ein valider Indikator für intern generierte Erwartungen? (2) Haben solche Erwartungen tatsächlich einen Einfluss auf Handlungsvorbereitung? (3) Worin besteht der Unterschied zwischen Erwartungen, die auf äußeren oder inneren Quellen beruhen? Die Ergebnisse aus drei Studien, die ich im Rahmen dieser Dissertation durchgeführt habe, belegen, dass verbalisierte Vorhersagen ein valider Indikator von subjektiver Erwartung sind. Subjektive Erwartung kann nicht als ein Nebenprodukt von Handlungsvorbereitung verstanden werden, sondern trägt zu dieser bei und spielt daher eine wichtige Rolle in der Handlungskontrolle. Selbstgenerierte Erwartung beeinflusst gegenüber Cue-induzierter Erwartung verstärkt frühe Aufmerksamkeits- und zentrale Entscheidungsprozesse. Selbstgenerierte Vorhersagen führen zu verstärkten Verhaltenseffekten, und zwar sowohl bei Stimuluserwartungen als auch bei Erwartungen bezüglich einer Aufgabe. Subjektive Erwartung ist demnach auch entscheidend für kognitive Kontrolle. / Our ability to form expectations about future events or the results of our own actions is crucial for efficient behavior. While this notion underlies a range of influential theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology, from reinforcement learning to ideo-motor theory, a number of open questions remain. Recent results from neurophysiological and brain imaging studies suggest that conscious intention – or explicit expectation – is nothing more than a by-product of automatic and unconscious activation patterns, without any real impact on behavior. Explicit subjective expectation has been dismissed by many researchers who regard it either an unreliable measure of “true” mental processes, or question its necessity in explaining behavior in general. In the current work, I focus on the role of explicit subjective expectation and attempt to answer the following questions: (1) Are verbalized predictions a valid indicator of internally generated expectations? (2) Do such expectations really affect action preparation? (3) What are the differences between expectations arising from external or internal sources? Results from the three studies conducted within the scope of this dissertation demonstrate that verbalized predictions are in fact a valid indicator of subjective expectation and are suitable for use in experimental paradigms. Also, subjective expectation cannot be described as a mere by-product of preparation, but instead feeds into preparation and therefore plays a role in action control. Self-generated expectation was shown to involve early attentional and central decision processes to a greater degree than cue-induced expectation. Consequently, self-generated predictions entailed greater behavioral effects not only for stimulus expectations, but also for expectations regarding a task set. Subjective expectation is therefore also elemental in cognitive control.

In the course of development organisms learn to associate their actions with the effects these actions have in the environment. Recent studies have shown that perceiving or anticipating action-effects automatically activates actions, which formerly have been experienced to cause these effects (Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Using subliminal priming paradigms and electrophysiological measures I investigated whether subliminally (i.e., not consciously perceivable) presented action-effects can automatically activate associated actions and if so, whether this response priming by action-effects can bias free-choice actions. Secondly I investigated whether action-effects with different emotional valences influence response selection differently. To address the first question three experiments were performed. Each experiment consisted of two experimental phases. The first phase, the acquisition-phase, was a learning phase were simple key-press actions were associated with simple visual stimuli (i.e., action-effects; diamond or square) that were contingent on the actions. Immediately after the acquisition-phase the test-phase followed, in which participants performed free-choice actions after the presentation of a Go-signal. In Experiments 2 and 3 a NoGo-signal indicating that responses had to be withheld could appear with the same likelihood as the Go-signal. Unknown to the participants, one of the former action-effects (diamond or square) was presented subliminally prior to each Go- and NoGo-signal to investigate the influence of unconscious action-effects on response selection. Taken together, the results of the test-phases provided strong evidence that even subliminally presented (i.e., unconscious) action-effects can automatically activate associated responses. The response priming by action-effects became evident in the lateralized readiness potential (LRP), an electrophysiological indicator of specific response activation processes. Under certain circumstanced this automatic response activation can bias free-choice actions although participants experienced the actions as freely chosen. In the test-phase of the first experiment more acquisition-phase-consistent than –inconsistent responses were chosen. If, for instance, a left key-press had been associated with a square during the acquisition-phase, the left key was chosen significantly more often after the subliminal presentation of a square in the test-phase. At least three factors seemed to influence which responses were chosen and executed: The strength of the priming effect, the complexity of the task (i.e., pure Go-blocks or intermixed Go/NoGo-blocks), and the elapsed time between the prime stimulus and the Go-signal. To address the second question simple key-press actions were linked to action-effects with different emotional valences (positive vs. negative pictures accompanied by high or low tones) during the acquisition-phase. In the subsequent test-phase, the effects-tones that had been associated with negative or positive pictures were presented and followed by a Go-signal, after which participants had to freely choose to press one of the two response keys. Results indicated that the anticipation of the emotional valence of an action-effect influenced free-choice action. Whereas the effect-tones induced a clear response bias (i.e., more acquisition-consistent than –inconsistent key-choices) if they had been associated with a positive emotional valence, this response bias was not reliable for action-effects associated with negative emotional features. In summary, the present results provide further proof for ideomotor theories of action control (James, 1890; Elsner & Hommel, 2001) which state that actions are automatically activated by anticipating their consequences.