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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisors: Stephen White and David Sosa. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 24, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 264-269).

Is Socrates in the Protagoras a sincere hedonist? The decipherment of the latter question is fundamental to the unraveling of key aspects of Plato’s ethical thought. It has been suggested that Socrates in the Protagoras finds hedonism philosophically attractive for it functions as a necessary anti-akrasia premise and therefore it fits his moral psychology. At the same time quantitative hedonism provides for commensurability of moral value and, in turn, for a more straightforward, quantifiable, and action-guiding Platonic ethical theory. Although initially appealing, the latter hypothesis is deeply problematic. On the one hand, hedonism is not a necessary theoretical tool either for commensurability of value or for a quantifiable eudaimonistic ethical theory. On the other hand a hedonistic interpretation of the Protagoras would result in a plethora of blatant anomalies for Platonic ethical theory as it is exhibited in the early and middle period dialogues. In particular, the endorsement of quantitative hedonism comes tied with an apotheosis of sophistic education and also with a purely instrumental conception of virtue which contradicts cardinal components of Socrates’ and Plato’s virtue theory. Therefore, a prohedonistic approach of the Protagoras is untenable and has to be rejected. As a result, a sufficiently plausible defense of the Socratic doctrine “no one does wrong willingly” needs to be constructed on non-hedonistic grounds. My suggestion is that we should recast Plato’s treatment of akrasia in terms of two – commonly defended by early Plato- descriptive theses of human psychology; that is, psychological eudaimonism and motivational intellectualism. This move will lead us to the conclusion that the traditional conceptualization of akrasia as a single and unified phenomenon is incomplete as it does not pay justice to the richness of Plato’s moral psychology. Rather, as I will maintain, there are two types of akrasia implicit in Plato’s treatment of the phenomenon: synchronic akrasia and diachronic akrasia. On this revisionary theoretical basis, the differences between early Plato and later Plato on akrasia can be understood as variations in the adherence or not to psychological eudaimonism and motivational intellectualism.

This dissertation explores a number of interrelated metaphysical and epistemological issues regarding pleasure, suffering and their apparent value and disvalue, thematically tied together by the broad idea that pleasant and unpleasant experiences are, respectively, experienced as good and bad. More specifically, I try, firstly, to advance the debate regarding the nature of pleasure by arguing for what I shall call the "Self-Experiential View" - the view that pleasant experiences are pleasant in virtue of being experienced as good. Secondly, I assess the merits of the "Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis" - the natural conjecture, expressed by a number of authors, that our especially intimate experiential relationship ("acquaintance") with the evaluative features of our hedonic experiences grounds a particularly robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs, which makes them less vulnerable to sceptical doubt. In chapter 1, I lay some groundwork for the ensuing discussion, by introducing a number of background claims which help to motivate these two theses. Moreover, I isolate two specific important ways of unpacking the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis and clarify some central concepts which feature prominently in the subsequent chapters. In chapter 2, I defend the "Self-Experiential View." I proceed by addressing a number of objections which have been levelled against the view in the literature, and locate it in relation to the views which currently dominate the debate regarding the nature of pleasure. In chapter 3, I assess and ultimately reject the first important version of the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis singled out in chapter 1, the "Naïve Realist Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis," which states that Naïve Realist acquaintance with pleasure's evaluative nature grounds a distinctive, especially robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs. In chapter 4, I assess the "Introspective Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis", the attempt to vindicate the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis by extending an acquaintance account of phenomenal introspective justification to the hedonic-evaluative case. By carefully unpacking a range of different candidate conceptions of introspective acquaintance, I home in on what I consider the most appealing acquaintance account of phenomenal introspection, and argue that it should not be extended to the hedonic-evaluative case, which means that this proposal also fails. A brief concluding chapter summarises the key conclusions of the dissertation and highlights some questions raised in the course of my discussion which would seem to warrant further investigation.

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Party Season is about sex and speech and employs some of the conventions of the porn film. Apparently inconsequential 'filler' scenes and dialogue link the pay-off scenes of vividly depicted sex. Except that, in Party Season, this relationship is gradually reversed - the scenes of excessive behaviour becoming 'filler' scenes linking the pay-off moments, the latter often embedded in deliberately extended 'unrealistic' dialogue. A key component of this as a piece of inquiry-based practice is the exploration of this altering balance and of how action and dialogue can function to produce such a reversal of conventionality. The intention with the accompanying essay is to sustain a progressive interweaving of reflective commentary and analytical vignettes. There is also an intended symmetry here - an 'excessive' essay (long, without conventional subheadings, breaks, etc.) will sit alongside the 'excessive' screenplay as its twin of sorts, a different style of invention. The essay is to speech what the screenplay is to sex.

Throughout history, two conceptions of happiness have been advocated. The hedonic ideal, which often predominates in modern Western societies, advocates enjoyment and avoidance of pain. The eudaimonic view argues that fulfillment comes from personal growth and excellence. This research was among the first empirical comparisons of eudaimonic and hedonic pursuits in terms of their actual relationships with happiness. / One study was conducted with a single questionnaire (117 participants) and a second used detailed experience-sampling (100 participants). In the majority of analyses, hedonic activity was linked with greater positive affect and lower negative affect than eudaimonic activity was, while eudaimonic activity was associated with greater meaning in life and higher personal expressiveness (i.e., authenticity, involvement, fulfillment, and feeling alive). These results suggest that positive and negative affect (more emotional and visceral) could be called hedonic well-being, while meaning and personal expressiveness (subtler, require thought, and involve feeling more integrated and right than good) might be called eudaimonic well-being. The findings also underline the limitations of assessing only hedonic happiness, as is usually done---it can lead to inaccurate conclusions about the benefits of eudaimonic pursuits. / The results also suggested a trade-off in time between the benefits of hedonic and eudaimonic activities. The links between hedonic activity and well-being were strongest during the activity but often weakened with time. In contrast, the links between eudaimonic activity and happiness were weakest during the activity but became stronger with repeated eudaimonic efforts. People with frequent eudaimonic interests were also happier during many activities, even hedonic ones, than those with few eudaimonic projects; such increased enjoyment was not experienced by people with frequent hedonic pursuits. These results are consistent with theories that hedonic activities produce immediate satisfaction but that it fades with time, whereas eudaimonic strivings are challenging but increase well-being in the long run. Eudaimonic activities may promote well-being by building personal capital, e.g., coping skills, improved life circumstances, and deeper appreciation of life experiences. / These findings suggest that the modern preoccupation with enjoyment and comfort is an incomplete ideal. People probably need significant eudaimonic pursuits to experience meaningful and lasting fulfillment.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Political Science, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on June 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 403-405). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Bowling Green State University, 2007. / Document formatted into pages; contains xiv, 346 p. Includes bibliographical references.