Tesis doct.--Filos.--Barcelona, 1970. / Bibliogr. p. [409]-416.

Th. 3e cycle--Philos.--Paris 10, 1973.

Thèse univ.--Lettres--Paris, 1960. / Bibliogr. f. I-VIII. Ex. dactylographié.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / We have found that Hegel's philosophy of history is in organic connection with the rest of his philosophical system. His hypothesis, the concept of Reason, has been taken from his system. Any understanding of his philosophy of history entails some acquaintance with his system as a whole. An understanding of Hegel's philosophy of history and, indeed, his thought in general, is made much easier if the direction in which he is going, the end he has in mind, is comprehended. Hegel's philosophy of history is an attempt to discover a meaning behind the entire course of the world. The empirical and historical facts are given to the philosophical historian; it is his task to ascertain the significance of these facts and the significance of their particular sequence. Hegel, by taking a comprehensive and synoptic view of the world's history, gives us, at first by way of hypothesis, the final cause of the world's history: Reason. Reason is the "inward guiding soul" of the world's history and that history presents us with a rational process. Hegel' s concept of Reason is quite comprehensive. It is man's substantial being and lies implicit within him. In this sense, the history of the world presents us man's gradual discipline of his own uncontrolled natural will. In terms of the Absolute, Reason is the Providential design at work in the world's history, and as such it is a purposive activity. Hegel's philosophy of history is, then, teleological. The history of the world offers us God's purposive and rational activity and in this respect history is, for Hegel, a Theodicaea. We have found also that another concept inextricably bound up with his system is the concept of Freedom. Self-conscious Reason, or Spirit, is gradually becoming conscious of its own freedom. Change in the realm of Spirit shows us an impulse of perfectibility. Freedom means for Hegel the Conscious realization upon the part of man that his interests, his inmost being, lie with the Universal. This is concrete Freedom and the State represents its embodiment. The State then plays a central role in Hegel's philosophy of history. It represents the freedom of man in conscious union with the Whole. History presents us with state or political forms which have shown the advancement of man's recognition of his own freedom. Hegel's division of the world's history is in accordance with these stages. The course of the world's history is one toward concreteness and inclusiveness. The success with which a given state integrates its citizens contained within the state determines the stage at which that society has reached. In the East man is blinded by the "Sun" and as such he is obedient to an abstract and external law. The "negation" of this is beginning to be realized by the Graeco-Roman civilizations, that external law and custom have no authority over the individual and that he should follow the dictates of his own conscience and reason. The "synthesis" of these two is the realization of the German world that their own conscience and reason are already there in the law and Reason contained in Society and the State. The freedom attained in history by man, then, is the freedom from the irrational control of nature while at the same time the freedom from uncontrolled natural will. In regard to the empirical facts of history, the actual events of history, Hegel does amazingly well. He considers the natural, geographical, end economic factors in history. We have found that the criticism charging Hegel with a priorism is not wholly founded but that certain difficulties do come about when we look closely at the relation which he holds between Absolute and finite mind. The "cunning of Reason" hardly seems reconcilable with the Theodicaea and there are difficulties in understanding what freedom as self-sufficiency could mean in an absolutistic system.

MAGALHÃES, Francisco Lisbôa. A unidade entre sujeito e objeto na Pequena lógica de Hegel. 2007. 113f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2007. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-27T16:21:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_dis_flmagalhaes.pdf: 903837 bytes, checksum: bde5af3a9c37cfaee2e40740633f12de (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-09-29T14:18:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_dis_flmagalhaes.pdf: 903837 bytes, checksum: bde5af3a9c37cfaee2e40740633f12de (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-29T14:18:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_dis_flmagalhaes.pdf: 903837 bytes, checksum: bde5af3a9c37cfaee2e40740633f12de (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / The objective of this work is to present the unit between subject and object, while totality, in the Small Logic of Hegel. For in such a way, the Introduction of the Phenomenology of Mind was overcome as first reflection, for being the workmanship where Hegel initiates the study on the subject evidenced here. In this workmanship, Hegel weaves critical to the philosophical tradition that deals with the separate subject and object, both without no relation. Therefore, he presents the common conscience at its moments of apprehension of the reality, denying and surpassing each one of them to disclose the truth of knowing. Knowing of the object that is, is to know of the same conscience, now it is the demonstration of the unit between subject and object. Equally it served of reference the moments that Hegel displays in the Doctrine of the Being, the Essence and the Concept, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. Hegel shows, in each section of this workmanship, that the being traces a passage that has beginning with the immediate, where the being, with the nothing, keeps identity in the difference, passing to the moments of being-there and be-for-itself. In the essence, this relation appears while identity of I join it with many, while effectiveness. In the concept, the manifest being if while same concept, as objective totality, and each moment of the being appears in its self-differenciation of the universal one. The conducting wire of all the itinerary of the being if gives in the contradiction, over-admintting itself each moment for another one, in way dialectic. In this over-admintation, the totality if presents while manifestation of its parts, and these, being the reality of all the totality. One is about an alive totality, where the existence and its functioning cannot be produced by any thing that not he himself. E this if gives in the unit between subject and object, where the object is not justified by itself, but for the citizen that apprehends it. E apprehending of this is always to apprehend of something. Thus, if it gives the dialectic, while totality of the unit, or totalized unit. / O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar a unidade entre sujeito e objeto, enquanto totalidade, na “Pequena Lógica” de Hegel. Para tanto, tomou-se como primeira reflexão a Introdução da Fenomenologia do Espírito, por ser a obra onde Hegel inicia o estudo sobre o tema aqui evidenciado. Nesta obra, Hegel tece uma crítica à tradição filosófica que trata o sujeito separado do objeto, ambos sem nenhuma relação. Por isso, apresenta a consciência comum em seus momentos de apreensão da realidade, negando e superando cada um deles para revelar a verdade do saber. O saber do objeto que é, é o saber da consciência mesma, e agora é a demonstração da unidade entre sujeito e objeto. Também serviram de referência os momentos que Hegel expõe na Doutrina do Ser, da Essência e do Conceito, na Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas, em seu volume I. Hegel mostra, em cada seção desta obra, que o ser traça um percurso que tem início com a imediatez, em que ele, com o nada, mantém identidade na diferença, passando para os momentos do ser-aí e do ser-para-si. Na essência, essa relação aparece enquanto identidade do uno com o múltiplo, enquanto efetividade. No conceito, o ser se manifesta enquanto conceito mesmo, como totalidade objetiva, e cada momento do ser aparece em sua autodiferenciação do universal. O fio condutor de todo o itinerário do ser se dá na contradição, suprassumindo-se cada momento por outro, de maneira dialética. Nessa suprassunção, a totalidade se apresenta enquanto manifestação de suas partes, e estas sendo a realidade de toda a totalidade. Trata-se de uma totalidade viva, onde a existência e o seu funcionamento não podem ser produzidos por qualquer coisa que não pelo seu funcionamento mesmo. E isso se dá na unidade entre sujeito e objeto, em que o objeto não se explica por si mesmo, mas pelo sujeito que o apreende. E o apreender deste é sempre o apreender de algo. Assim, se dá a dialética enquanto totalidade da unidade ou unidade totalizada.

Despite the evident distance between Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical projects, there is a shared terrain from which both authors respond to the excesses of Enlightened modernity, which reacted against history and tradition in the name of a subjective consciousness perceived as the unconditioned nucleus of reality. This paper wants to show how close these alleged antagonists are when it comes to sharing an intuition about the fundamental temporality which underlies existence and human experience. From this common vantage, which is, in both cases, hinged on the notions of remem-brance” and forgetfulness”, we strive to generate a vivid –if strained– exchange between Hegel and Nietzsche as critics of modernity.

Hegel and Eliot have been chosen for this study not because of their differences but because of similarities in their thought. Although most of Hegel's works are obscure and pedantic, it is possible to show that his early thinking reflects a deep awareness of many of the implications of the new age. A growing number of philosophers and theologians today are apparently "rediscovering" Hegel as one who caught a vision of the transition in man's history and whose insights are valuable today.

Thesis advisor: Paul T. Wilford / This dissertation is an inquiry into Hegel’s account of the modern constitutional state. In particular, it traces Hegel’s understanding of its historical genesis, theoretical foundations, and sustaining conditions. Chapter one begins with an examination of the presuppositions, method, and structure of Hegel’s philosophy of history, which provides the anthropological and historical framework that underpins his political thought. Hegel argues that the human is a rationally reflective, socially embedded, historically self-transformative being, whose nature can only be fully realized through intersubjective recognition under norms that affirm the inherent dignity and equality of human beings. Seeking to uncover the logic that has been at work within history, he portrays it as a “progress in the consciousness of freedom” that is driven by the search for a form of intelligibility and a corresponding socio-political order in which the human being can be fully at home in the world. Chapters two and three reconstruct Hegel’s account of this historical development, which proceeds through a series of ethical-political orders that each instantiate a distinct image of the human and the divine. This development culminates in the production of institutional conditions that allow for the full recognition of human freedom: the emergence of a universal notion of right, the affirmation of individual moral autonomy, and the creation of modern constitutional nation-states. Chapter four turns to Hegel’s conception of the political order that best realizes modern notions of justice and freedom. While Hegel fully affirms and embraces a notion of the individual as a rights-bearing and morally autonomous agent, he contends that a philosophically adequate conception of freedom must account for the historically-formed institutions that realize freedom by making it concrete. His conception of ethical life portrays the modern individual as the creation of specific institutional configurations, shared normative commitments, habits, and mores that bind a community together and produce a "second nature.” Hegel thereby provides a conception of political community that integrates the historical, social, and cultural conditions that nourish and sustain modern liberal institutions and their underlying aspirations. The dissertation concludes with a critical juxtaposition between Hegel’s and Carl Schmitt’s judgements of liberalism in an attempt to reflect upon the enduring tensions within the modern constitutional state. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Zugl.: Köln, Univ., Diss., 2006

Os anos de juventude de Hegel representam um momento importante da formação de seu pensamento: através deles é possível acompanhar seu desenvolvimento partindo da formação teológica rumo ao sistema propriamente filosófico. Após a passagem por Tübingen e Berna, entre 1797 e 1800 Hegel se estabelece em Frankfurt e retoma em seus escritos temas dos anos anteriores explorando-os, porém, sob uma nova abordagem. Tais temas podem ser agrupados em dois níveis: Hegel detém-se, por um lado, nas figuras concretas do judaísmo, do cristianismo, do mundo helênico e da filosofia kantiana; por outro, no lado conceitual expresso na sequência legalidade, moralidade, amor e religião, costurando um percurso da liberdade em seus limites e avanços. Este percurso se desdobra ainda em noções que extrapolam o campo da religião e avançam pelo terreno do direito e da estética, como o crime, o castigo, o destino e a vida, com as quais Hegel analisa os conflitos de seu tempo representados sobretudo na necessidade de unificação frente ao mundo cindido. / The young years from Hegel represent an important moment from the formation of his thought: through them it´s possible to notice his development starting from the theological formation towards the philosophycal system. After passing for Tübingen and Bern, between 1797 and 1800 Hegel settles in Frankfurt and resumes in his writings the subjects of his previous years exploring them, however, with a new approach. Those subjects can be grouped together in two levels: on the one hand Hegel stoppes on the concret figures of Judaism, Christianity, Hellenism and Kant\'s philosophy; on the other hand, he focuses on the conceptual side expressed on the sequence legality, morality, love and religion, linking a route of the freedom in its limits and advances. This route develops itself in notions that exceed the field of religion, advancing on areas of right and aestethic, such as crime, punishment, fate and life, with those Hegel analyzes the conflicts of his time represented especially on the necessity of unification in face of the separated world.