From 1589 to 1599, the relation between Henri IV and the Parlement of Paris was a tumultuous one. Some parlementaires associated with the Catholic League refused at first to recognize Henri of Navarre as their king. These magistrates met in Paris until April 1594. Meanwhile, their royalist colleagues congregated in Tours where, in March 1589, Henri III had transferred his sovereign court. From there, the royalist councillors helped Henri IV reconquer his realm. This, they did in spite of his religion, although they frequently asked him to convert to Catholicism. After the reunification of the two rival courts in April 1594, the parlementaires seemed to work as one and blocked the verification of numerous edicts presented by the king. Their opposition was so strong that it has led some historians to claim that it was endangering the State's survival. It slowly faded away after the verification of the Edict of Nantes in February 1599. In a pacified France, the conflicts between a king finally in control of his realm and his parlementaires became rare. The magistrates finally had confidence in the government which seemed to take adequate measures to stabilize France after more than thirty years of civil wars. / The difficult relationship between Henri IV and the Parlement of Paris between 1589 and 1599 was not created by the egoistic nature of the magistrates or their incompetence as claimed by numerous historians. If some of the Parlementaires--we will call them the "opportunists"--put their own interests before those of the realm, a majority of their colleagues had a very high idea of their political role within France, an idea based on centuries of relation between the kings of France and the Parlement as well as on the political role of the court as defined by theorists of the time. Confronted to a king they hardly knew, these "traditionalists", on whom this work will be centered, tried to make sure that the interests of the kingdom, its king and its inhabitants were protected. They would not give Henri IV's government the leeway it sought but would scrutinize and frequently block the edicts presented to them, and this until Henri IV proved that he could be trusted as the head of the realm.

This Master's thesis belongs to the field of sixteenth century studies. The text I have chosen to study is the Memoires of Marguerite de Valois, begun in 1594 and published in 1628, thirteen years following the death of this queen. My analysis encompasses both the conventions of genre and rhetoric evidenced in the text. The first chapter explores the peculiarities inherent in the memoirs genre, especially where these explicitly distinguish it from the autobiography. The second chapter examines the rhetorical aspects of Marguerite de Valois' Memoires. In doing so, I have highlighted and analyzed the rhetorical strategies employed in the text, whose ultimate intent was to convince the initial reader, Brantome, and subsequently posterity, of the political astuteness of an author who was also worthy of her correspondent's trust as a loyal ally.

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Selon John McDowell, l'atomisme et le holisme sont chacun incapables de porter fruit. Plutôt que d'osciller futilement entre ces deux pôles, il croit que nous devrions repenser notre façon de concevoir la relation liant l'esprit et le monde. Inspiré par certains passages de Kant, il nous invite donc à reconsidérer l'expérience de telle sorte qu'on y admette d'entrée de jeu l'exercice d'une liberté distinctement humaine-l'étendue de l'esprit devenant ainsi dénuée de toute contrainte externe. À notre avis, McDowell a plus de succès lorsqu'il dépeint le va-et-vient entre l'atomisme et le holisme que lorsqu'il propose une façon d'échapper à ce mouvement. Nous croyons que la fusion qu'il cherche à développer ne tient pas la route dans la mesure où, d'un point de vue naturaliste, il y a bel et bien lieu de distinguer la réceptivité empirique et la spontaneité conceptuelle. À l'encontre de McDowell, nous soutenons qu'il n'y a oscillation entre ces facultés que si l'on endosse une inférence allant du statut non-atomique des représentations au holisme, saut inductif qui repose sur une approche spéculative que nous rejetons. Le premier chapitre cherche à démontrer comment les théories holistes de filière quinéenne se fondent sur des présupposés spéculatifs et comment les éléments plus louables de la philosophie de McDowell à cet égard sont rendus impuissants par son assentiment à la critique que fait W. Sellars du "mythe du Donné". Le second chapitre reconstruit méticuleusement l'argument fort complexe qu'étale McDowell dans Mind and World, pour ensuite critiquer sa suggestion que la culture et l'éducation induisent chez l'être humain une attitude critique pouvant remplacer la friction produite par l'expérience. Le troisième chapitre soutient que la thèse de Sellars voulant que l'expérience peut causer mais non justifier nos représentations détruirait non seulement la connaissance empirique mais aussi la capacité de tirer des inférences. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre présente une nouvelle vision "constrictive" qui, par l'entremise des notions de coercition et de complexité, reconnait que la représentation du monde met en jeu une échelle plus large que l'atome mais plus petite que le tout. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Atomisme, Holisme, Représentation, John McDowell.

The Royal Society of London, the English scientific society founded in 1660, was involved in a number of disputes in the seventeenth century concerning who was the first person to make an invention or discovery. These priority disputes had a significant effect on the careers of most of the prominent figures in the early Royal Society, including Newton, Boyle and Hooke. Inventions and discoveries were the foundation of the Royal Society?s reputation, and thus needed to be claimed and protected in priority disputes. The subjects of these disputes ranged from solutions to mathematical problems to high-profile experiments. Such disputes frequently pitted Fellows of the Royal Society against intellectuals from the Continent. They were occasions for polemics framed in nationalistic terms, despite the collaborative spirit with which the transnational Republic of Letters purported to operate. This thesis examines how the Royal Society?s priority disputes began, how they functioned once underway, and how they concluded. It focuses on disputes between the Royal Society and its continental rivals, seeking to determine the extent to which nationalism was a factor. It argues that Society members, who were always guided by multiple loyalties, valued their loyalties to themselves, to the Society and to the English nation more than their loyalty to the Republic of Letters. Other social factors that motivated the disputants are also explored, including honour, credibility, and the Society?s ideal of aversion to conflict. This thesis highlights patterns in the behaviour of the participants of seventeenth-century priority disputes. It draws on methodology used in the sociology of science to analyze these patterns, examining the social construction involved in invention and discovery. Case studies are used to illustrate how the participants in priority disputes redefined several entities in ways that suited their own claims to priority: the invention or discovery being disputed, the etiquette of the Republic of Letters, the distinction between invention and innovation, and priority itself. Particular attention is paid to the activities of Henry Oldenburg, Secretary of the Royal Society, who communicated on behalf of the Royal Society through his correspondence network and the journal he edited, the Philosophical Transactions. This thesis argues that the Royal Society valued Oldenburg in part for his role in instigating priority disputes with non-English intellectuals, a role to which he was well-suited on account of his many contacts in England and on the Continent, his rhetorical skills, and his experience as a diplomat. It also analyzes the roles of experts like John Wallis and Timothy Clarke in priority disputes, arguing that Oldenburg could call upon them to defend English priority. However, it is noted that these figures (especially Wallis) sometimes abandoned the façade of English unity in favour of causes that affected them more personally, including their own priority claims. Accordingly, they employed the same polemical style in domestic priority disputes that they did in international ones. This study concludes with the suggestion that the polemics of figures like Oldenburg, Clarke and Wallis were crucial to the program of the seventeenth-century Royal Society because conflict, the idea of aversion to conflict notwithstanding, was an acknowledged and valued part of early Royal Society culture.

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