The typical theoretical work on dividend policy suggests five possible imperfections that management should consider. They are taxes, asymmetric information, an incomplete contract, institutional constraints and transaction costs. Different from the typical framework, this dissertation is to study the optimal dividend poly with heterogeneous beliefs among investors. The first model in this study has analyzed investment/dividend policy with heterogeneous beliefs-the full information model in a frictionless economy with divergent types of shareholders. A high dividend policy is optimal with limited endowment for the optimistic investors as the stocks are sold not only to type-o investors, but also to at least one type-p investor holding some shares. A low dividend policy is appropriate with cash dividend D= X0-ao+1 is optimal as the shares are sold only to the type-o investors. Heterogeneous beliefs of investors change dividend policy given the same information even under full information. Following the Miller and Rock (1985) theory, the second model in this dissertation has analyzed heterogeneous beliefs among investors-the two period model in leading to changing a firm¡¦s optimal dividend policy. A firm¡¦s optimal dividend policy is changed not only by the ratio of the pessimistic to optimistic investors, but also heterogeneous beliefs. An increase in the ratio of pessimistic to optimistic investors will result in a higher dividend. On the other hand, as the beliefs of both optimistic and pessimistic investors increase, i.e. a new biotechnology is innovated, a relative low dividend policy is appropriate. Based on the previous analysis, the results show that optimal dividend policy with heterogeneous beliefs among investors in a firm¡¦s earnings exists under heterogeneous beliefs framework. A firm¡¦s optimal dividend policy is different from that of the MM dividend invariance theorem. It is not because of taxes, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, institutional constraints and traction costs, but heterogeneous beliefs of investors.

This study includes two theoretical works. In both works, I assume that economic agents have heterogeneous beliefs. I study collateralized loan transactions among economic agents arising from the divergent beliefs. Moreover, I make collateral requirements endogenously determined, along with interest rates and loan quantities. The theme of the first work is to study private transactions in currency crises. I assume that domestic residents have different beliefs on how resilient the central bank is in defending the currency. Due to the different beliefs, domestic residents willingly borrow and lend among themselves. I show that the heterogeneity of beliefs per se brings stability to the system, but that short-term collateralized loans among domestic residents arising from the divergent opinions make an exchange rate peg vulnerable. The second work is to understand credit default swaps in general equilibrium. The model features a market for a risky asset, a market for loans collateralized by the risky asset, and a market for credit default swaps referencing these loans. I show that the introduction of credit default swaps only as insurance has no effect on the price of the risky asset. And the introduction of credit default swaps both as insurance and as tools for making side bets depresses the price of the risky asset in general but has no effect hen the majority of the economy hold bearish views on the risky asset.

The main motivation behind this thesis is the lack of belief subjectivity in problems of contracting, and especially in problems of demand for insurance. The idea that an underlying uncertainty in contracting problems (e.g. an insurable loss in problems of insurance demand) is a given random variable on some exogenously determined probability space is so engrained in the literature that one can easily forget that the notion of an objective uncertainty is only one possible approach to the formulation of uncertainty in economic theory. On the other hand, the subjectivist school led by De Finetti and Ramsey challenged the idea that uncertainty is totally objective, and advocated a personal view of probability (subjective probability). This ultimately led to Savage's approach to the theory of choice under uncertainty, where uncertainty is entirely subjective and it is only one's preferences that determine one's probabilistic assessment. It is the purpose of this thesis to revisit the "classical" insurance demand problem from a purely subjectivist perspective on uncertainty. To do so, we will first examine a general problem of contracting under heterogeneous subjective beliefs and provide conditions under which we can show the existence of a solution and then characterize that solution. One such condition will be called "vigilance". We will then specialize the study to the insurance framework, and characterize the solution in terms of what we will call a "generalized deductible contract". Subsequently, we will study some mathematical properties of collections of vigilant beliefs, in preparation for future work on the idea of vigilance. This and other envisaged future work will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis. In the chapter preceding the concluding chapter, we will examine a model of contracting for innovation under heterogeneity and ambiguity, simply to demonstrate how the ideas and techniques developed in the first chapter can be used beyond problems of insurance demand.

The main motivation behind this thesis is the lack of belief subjectivity in problems of contracting, and especially in problems of demand for insurance. The idea that an underlying uncertainty in contracting problems (e.g. an insurable loss in problems of insurance demand) is a given random variable on some exogenously determined probability space is so engrained in the literature that one can easily forget that the notion of an objective uncertainty is only one possible approach to the formulation of uncertainty in economic theory. On the other hand, the subjectivist school led by De Finetti and Ramsey challenged the idea that uncertainty is totally objective, and advocated a personal view of probability (subjective probability). This ultimately led to Savage's approach to the theory of choice under uncertainty, where uncertainty is entirely subjective and it is only one's preferences that determine one's probabilistic assessment. It is the purpose of this thesis to revisit the "classical" insurance demand problem from a purely subjectivist perspective on uncertainty. To do so, we will first examine a general problem of contracting under heterogeneous subjective beliefs and provide conditions under which we can show the existence of a solution and then characterize that solution. One such condition will be called "vigilance". We will then specialize the study to the insurance framework, and characterize the solution in terms of what we will call a "generalized deductible contract". Subsequently, we will study some mathematical properties of collections of vigilant beliefs, in preparation for future work on the idea of vigilance. This and other envisaged future work will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis. In the chapter preceding the concluding chapter, we will examine a model of contracting for innovation under heterogeneity and ambiguity, simply to demonstrate how the ideas and techniques developed in the first chapter can be used beyond problems of insurance demand.

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[pt] Estudos empíricos de como ações respondem às expectativas são de crescente importância, pois fornecem informações essenciais sobre as escolhas dos agentes e contribuem para modelos teóricos. Nós construímos uma base de dados inédita combinando dados de previsões de investidores institucionais do valor mensal de variáveis macroeconômicas com suas escolhas de portfolio. Essa base nos permite investigar como esses dois aspectos estão correlacionados. Encontramos que um aumento de expectativa de inflação e da expectativa de câmbio estão correlacionados com uma redução na exposição a pré fixados. Também observamos uma correlação negativa entre as expectativas da taxa de juros e a exposição à inflação se controlamos para as expectativas das demais variáveis. / [en] Empirical studies of how actions respond to expectations are of increasing relevance, as they provide vital information on agents choices and contribute to theoretical models. We explore how this pass-through occurs in institutional investors in Brazil. We assemble a novel dataset by matching data on institutions forecasts of inflation, the exchange rate and the interest rate with their hedge funds portfolio holdings. This dataset allows us to investigate how institutional investors expectations are related to their portfolio choices. We document that increases in funds inflation and exchange rate expectations are correlated with decreases in their exposures to fixed rate bonds. We also observe a negative correlation between their expectation of the interest rate and their exposure to inflation bonds once we control for the other variables.

Cette thèse a pour sujet les effets que l’information a sur les incitations. Les trois articles fournissent et explorent des résultats lorsque l’information est la principale variable d’intérêt, est endogène, pas homogène entre les acteurs et évolue dans le temps d’une manière qui n’est pas nécessairement rationnelle. Le premier article étudie les problèmes de hold-up dans les hiérarchies verticales avec la sélection adverse montrant qu’alors que le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs augmente, les distorsions provenant de l’asymétrie d’information disparaissent. En outre, il étudie l’effet de la scolarité et du degré d’hétérogénéité de la population de travailleurs sur la répartition du pouvoir de négociation dans les marchés réglementés. Le deuxième article assouplit l’hypothèse des croyances homogènes dans les relations principal-agent avec sélection adverse. Dans un apprentissage évolutif qui est imitatif, les principaux peuvent avoir des croyances différentes sur la répartition des types d’agents dans la population. La convergence à une croyance uniforme dépend de la taille relative de la polarisation dans les croyances. En outre, le modèle est une version d’un cobweb stable. Notre approche offre des explications pour l’alternance des périodes avec quantité oscillante et relativement stable. Le troisième article étudie la fac¸on dont le contenu informatif des politiques juridiques, comme la responsabilité stricte et négligence, en cas de soucis morales, influence la conception optimale des régimes de responsabilité. Plusieurs cas récents ont montré qu’un individu ayant causé un dommage s’expose non seulement a une sanction légale — par exemple, une amende — mais aussi a un boycott social, la désapprobation ou la stigmatisation. L’article montre que le choix d’une stratégie dépend de façon complexe de l’importance du dommage et du “coût moral”. / This thesis focuses on the effects that information has on incentives. The three papers provide and explore some results when the information is the main variable of interest, it is made endogenous, not homogeneous between actors and evolving over time in a way that is not necessarily rational. The first paper studies hold-up problems in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection showing that as the bargaining power of the worker increases, distortions coming from asymmetric information vanish. Moreover, it studies the effect of schooling and degree of heterogeneity in the workforce on the allocation of bargaining power in regulating markets. The second paper relaxes the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents’ types in the population. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the bias in beliefs. In addition, the set-up is a version of a stable cobweb model. Our approach offers explanations for alternating periods of oscillating and relatively steady quantity. The third paper studies how the informative content of legal policies as strict-liability and fault-based, in case of moral concerns, influences the optimal design of liability regimes. Many recent cases show that an individual found to have caused harm faces not only the possibility of a legal sanction — e.g., the damages he must pay — but also social boycott, disapproval or stigma. The paper shows that the choice of a policy depends in a complex way on the magnitude of the harm and the “moral cost”.Keywords: Bargaining, Adverse Selection, Hold-up, Evolutionary Game Theory, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Bifurcation Theory, Boycott, Law Enforcement, Strict Liability, Negligence.

異質信念(Heterogeneous beliefs)修正傳統資產定價理論中同質信念(Homogeneous beliefs)的基本假設，探討投資者間所持有的不同資訊，以及對於資訊的不同參考程度，如何影響資產定價。 本文試圖以Banerjee(2008)的模型，估計出臺灣投資者對於台灣各家公司股票的價格參考密度；並且透過外部研究者的預測作為市場不同信念的代理變數，探討異質信念對於臺灣股市交易的價量影響。 經由實證結果發現，在台灣的股市交易市場上，當市場的資訊流通速度愈快，投資者對公開資訊的參考密度愈低，投資者愈易依賴自己所持有的私人資訊。當投資者的行為決策將愈顯紛歧時，對交易量和報酬率的影響皆為正。 / Heterogeneous beliefs, which revise the basic assumption of traditional asset pricing theory- Homogeneous beliefs, study the impact on asset pricing by different information owned and referred by investors. I use the model derived from Banerjee(2008)to estimate the degree how Taiwan investors will take into account stock prices when they make investment decisions. Also, I study how heterogeneous beliefs of investors influence stock prices and trading volume in Taiwan stock market, using predictions of external researchers as a proxy variable of dispersion in beliefs. The empirical results show that the degree which investors take into account prices will be lower when a faster information flowing speed exists in Taiwan stock market. When investors rely more on their private information, their investment decision will become much diversified. Dispersion in beliefs has a positive influence on stock trading volume and return.