Thesis (Ph. D.)--Washington State University, August 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 156-164).

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published_or_final_version / Computer Science / Master / Master of Philosophy

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Thesis advisor: Utku Unver / This dissertation is composed of three essays in microeconomic theory. The first and second essays are in the theory of matching, with hierarchical organizations and complementarities being their respective topic. The third essay is in on electoral competition and political polarization as a result of manipulation of public opinion through social influence networks. Hierarchies are a common organizational structure in institutions. In the first essay, I offer an explanation of this fact from a matching-theoretic perspective, which emphasizes the importance of stable outcomes for the persistence of organizational structures. I study the matching of individuals (talents) via contracts with institutions, which are aggregate market actors, each composed of decision makers (divisions) enjoined by an institutional governance structure. Conflicts over contracts between divisions of an institution are resolved by the institutional governance structure, whereas conflicts between divisions across institutions are resolved by talents' preferences. Stable market outcomes exist whenever institutional governance is hierarchical and divisions consider contracts to be bilaterally substitutable. In contrast, when governance in institutions is non-hierarchical, stable outcomes may not exist. Since market stability does not provide an impetus for reorganization, the persistence of markets with hierarchical institutions can thus be rationalized. Hierarchies in institutions also have the attractive incentive property that in a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with talents making offers to institutions, the choice problem for divisions is straightforward and realized market outcomes are pairwise stable, and stable when divisions have substitutable preferences. Complementarity has proved to be a challenge for matching theory, because the core and group stable matchings may fail to exist. Less well understood is the more basic notion of pairwise stability. In a second essay, I define a class of complementarity, asymmetric complements, and show that pairwise stable matchings are guaranteed to exist in matching markets where no firm considers workers to be asymmetric complements. The lattice structure of the pairwise stable matchings, familiar from the matching theory with substitutes, does not survive in this more general domain. The simultaneous-offer and sequential-offer versions of the worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm can produce different matchings when workers are not necessarily substitutable. If no firm considers workers to be imperfect complements, then the simultaneous-offer version produces a pairwise stable matching, but this is not necessarily true otherwise. If no firm considers workers to be asymmetric complements, a weaker restriction than no imperfect complements, then the sequential-offer version produces a pairwise stable matching, though the matching produced is order-dependent. In a third essay, I examine electoral competition in which two candidates compete through policy and persuasion, and using a tractable two-dimensional framework with social learning provide an explanation for increasing political polarization. Voters and candidates have policy preferences that depend upon the state of the world, which is known to candidates but not known to voters, and are connected through a social influence network that determines through a learning process the final opinion of voters, where the voters' initial opinions and the persuasion efforts of the candidates affect final opinions, and so voting behavior. Equilibrium level of polarization in policy and opinion (of both party and population) increases when persuasion costs decrease. An increase in homophily increases the equilibrium level of policy polarization and population opinion polarization. These comparative static results help explain the increased polarization in both the policy and opinion dimensions in the United States. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 160-167).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 121 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 58-60).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Texas, Dec., 2008. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

An intrinsic case study (Stake, 1995) was implemented to analyze data on social groups. In particular, naturally occurring social interactions were observed to decipher how cliques and hierarchies were displayed among groups of young children aged three to six. Participants were 16 pre-kindergarten children, four core staff members, three student teachers, and nine student workers or practicum students in a laboratory classroom setting. The fieldwork transpired over 28 visits, totaling approximately 93 hours, at a campus childcare facility referred to as The Center. Data collection consisted of observation, time samples, and semi-structured interviews. Distinct characteristics of this study included the uniqueness of the setting and the areas of data collection within the classroom. The researcher documented every 30 minutes where the children were located as well as with whom they were playing. The time samples resulted in 307 single interactions, 273 dyadic interactions, 131 triadic interactions, 58 quad interactions, and 60 interactions with five or more children which calculated to 829 total interactions documented in 182 time samples. The form and function of each relationship identified was explored through the use of observational field notes and semi-structured interviews with the children. In addition, supplemental perspectives from the core staff member interviews were included. Three sets of children had notably more dyadic interactions captured in the time samples. One triadic set of children had considerably more interactions captured and another set, although not as evident in the time samples, was identified by the core staff members. The researcher explored the relationships identified to determine the consistency within the roles, the impact of gender, and manner in which power was established. One small scale hierarchy transformed into an established hierarchy as two children floated in and out of the clique or when other children attempted to enter their play. Close examination of the functioning of this hierarchy led to the emergent themes of The Power of Exclusiveness and The Power of Exclusion. Suggestions for future research and implications for practice are detailed.