Facile de discourir sur la paix ; complexe, par contre, d’évaluer si paroles et gestes y contribuent vraiment. De manière critique, ce mémoire cherche à contextualiser l’émergence de la nation israélienne de 1881 à 1948, de même qu’un certain nombre de forces pacifistes juives, religieuses comme séculières, sionistes comme anti-sionistes, que cette société a engendrées ou provoquées de la fin du XIXe siècle à aujourd’hui. Dans un premier temps, quatre stratégies utilisées pour construire l’État juif sont explorées : la voie pratique (l’établissement de mochavot, kibboutzim et mochavim), la voie diplomatique (le lobbying de Herzl et Weizmann), la voie sociopolitique (la formation de syndicats, de l’Agence juive et du Va’ad Leoumi) et enfin la voie militaire (la mise sur pied d’organisations paramilitaires telles la Hagana, l’Irgoun, le Lehi et le Palmah). Cette exploration permet de mieux camper le problème de la légalité et de la légitimité des nations palestinienne et israélienne. Dans un deuxième temps, une approche conceptuelle et une approche empirique sont combinées pour mieux comprendre ce qu’est un camp de la paix. L’exploration conceptuelle remet en question les critères qu’utilisent certains chercheurs afin d’identifier si une organisation contribue, ou non, à la construction de la paix. L’exploration empirique trace les contours de deux camps de la paix israéliens : les militants de la gauche séculière achkenazi (un pacifisme qui a émergé dans les années 1970) et les religieux haredim (un pacifisme opposé à l’idéologie sioniste dès ses débuts). Ce survol permet de saisir que tout système de croyances peut provoquer la guerre autant que la paix. La conclusion discute des défis du dialogue intercivilisationnel, des défis tant intranationaux (l’harmonie sociale israélienne entre les juifs achkenazim, mizrahim, russes, éthiopiens, etc.) qu’internationaux (la paix entre les Palestiniens et les Israéliens). / It is easy to speak of peace, but much more difficult to evaluate to what extent one’s actions really contribute to it. This master’s thesis seeks to critically contextualize the emergence of the Israeli nation from 1881 to 1948 and highlight certain Jewish pacifist forces, religious and secular, zionist and anti-zionist, which this society has generated or compelled into being from the end of the XIXth century until today. First, four strategies used to build the Jewish state are explored: the practical path (setting up moshavot, kibbutzim and moshavim), the diplomatic path (Herzl and Weizmann’s lobbying), the sociopolitical path (establishing unions, the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Leumi) and finally the military path (setting up paramilitary organizations such as Hagana, Irgun, Lehi and Palmach). This exploration allows the researcher to better frame the issue of the legality and legitimacy of the Palestinian and Israeli nations. Secondly, the notion of peace camp is investigated using a combined conceptual and empirical approach. The conceptual inquiry questions the criteria used by some scholars to determine whether an organization contributes or not to peacebuilding. The empirical inquiry examines two peace camps: the Ashkenazi secular left (a pacifism that emerged in the 1970s) and the religious Haredim (a pacifism opposed to the zionist ideology from the start). This overview highlights the fact that any belief system can incite war as well as peace. The conclusion discusses the challenges of intercivilizational dialogue, challenges that are both intranational (social harmony between Ashkenazim, Mizrachim, Russian, Ethiopian, etc. Israeli Jews) and international (peace between Palestinians and Israelis).

Russia and Iran have been subject to mutual influence since the reign of Shah Abbas I (1588-1629). For most of the time this relationship was not one of equals: since the early nineteenth century and lasting at least until 1946, Russia and then the USSR, in strong competition with Britain, had been gradually, and for the most part steadily, increasing its political, cultural and economic influence within Iran up to very high levels. Nevertheless, the history of Russian/Soviet-Iranian relations still remains understudied, particularly in English-language scholarship. One of the main reasons for this gap must be sought in the hampered access of Western researchers to Russian archives during the Soviet time, which made them draw on Russian-language literature, traditionally pre-occupied with the history of social movements, and with the mechanical retelling of political and economic processes. Thus the cultural and political ties of the two countries on institutional and individual levels (especially during the period surrounding 1917), the influence of Russia, and then of the USSR, on Iran and vice versa, in political, economic and cultural spheres through the activities of individuals, as well as the methods and tools used by the “Big Northern neighbour” during the execution of its foreign policy towards Iran did not receive proper attention, and thus lack detailed analysis. This research addresses the lack of detailed analysis of the power/knowledge nexus in relation to Russia’s Persian/Iranian Studies – the largest and most influential sub-domain within Russia’s Oriental Studies during the late Imperial and the early Soviet periods. The specific focus of this study is the involvement of Russian ‘civilian’ (academic) and ‘practical’ (military officers, diplomats, and missionaries) Persian Studies scholarship in Russian foreign policy towards Persia/Iran from the end of the nineteenth century up to 1941 – a period witnessing some of the most crucial events in the history of both countries. It is during this period that Persia/Iran was the pivot of Russia’s Eastern foreign policy but at the same time almost every significant development inside Russia as well as in her Western policies also had an immediate impact on this country – the state of affairs that ultimately culminated in the second Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. My thesis is based on extensive research in eleven important political, military and academic archives of Russia and Georgia, which allowed me to consult a significant amount of hitherto unpublished, often still unprocessed and only recently declassified, primary sources. While engaging with notions such as Orientalism, my analysis aims at transcending Edward Said’s concept of a mere complicity of knowledge with imperial power. My theoretical approach builds on Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation of the interplay of power/knowledge relations, his notion of discourse, and his writings on the role of the intellectual. While demonstrating the full applicability of the Foucauldian model to the Russian case through the study of the power/knowledge nexus in late Imperial and early Soviet Russia’s Persian Studies, or Iranology, I focus on the activities of scholars and experts within their own professional domains and analyse what motivated them and how their own views, beliefs and intentions correlated with their work, how their activities were influenced by the hegemonic discourses within Russian society. I analyse the interaction of these intellectuals with state structures and their participation in the process of shaping and conducting foreign policy towards Iran, both as part of the Russian scholarly community as a whole and as individuals on the personal level. For the first time my work explores at such level of detail the specific institutional practices of Russia’s Oriental Studies, including the organisation of scholarly intelligence networks, the taking advantage of state power for the promotion of institutional interests, the profound engagement with Russia’s domestic and foreign policy discourses of the time, etc. In addition, the thesis presents a detailed assessment of the organisation of Iranology as a leading sub-domain within the broader scholarly field of Oriental Studies in the period from the end of the nineteenth century to 1941 and analyses the principles and mechanisms of its involvement in Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia/Iran.