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This dissertation is a comparative case study of British policy towards and perceptions of Persia/Iran during the latter's two modern revolutions, 1906-1909 (Constitutional) and 1976-1979 ('Islamic'). The study covers both official perceptions and policy, meaning that of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service and the perceptions of the press, civil society, Parliament and wider public opinion; thus it is not a traditional exercise in diplomatic history. It explores British views of both the Shah/government and opposition forces during these two periods in detail and presents these views in a comparative perspective. The research paints a broad social and historical picture of how changes in both British and Iranian government, society and global status affected their mutual relations. Key themes relate to how the decline of (Edwardian) Liberalism, the transformation of the Left in the twentieth century and Britain's decline as an imperial power affected its perceptions and policy-making in Iran; how civil society and public opinion exerted a disproportionately strong influence in the earlier period before Britain was even a fully democratic society; how notions of Orientalism and Aryanism shaped official and public perceptions; and how changing geopolitics impacted perceptions, particularly in the case of Tsarist Russia versus the Soviet Union. This study has revealed numerous counter-intuitive points about the foreign relations and perceptions of British government and society vis-à-vis Iran and prompts a reconsideration of the evolution of British public and official attitudes during the twentieth century as manifested in the case of Iran at two critical historical junctures.

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This thesis presents research that subscribes to the broader theme of the Economic History of South Asia from 1891 to 2009. First, Chapter 2 shows that the Partition induced expulsion of religious minorities reduced school provision in Pakistan. The effect of minorities is explained by their education, occupational structure and their contribution towards local social capital. Then, Chapter 3 examines how areas affected by the Partition fare in terms of long-run agricultural development in India. It finds that areas that received more displaced migrants after Partition perform better in terms of crop yields, are more likely to take up of high yielding varieties (HYV) of seeds, and are more likely to use agricultural technologies. It highlights the superior educational status of the migrants as a potential pathway for the observed effects. Next, Chapter 4 shows that the agricultural productivity shock induced by the adoption of HYV of seeds reduced infant mortality across districts in India. It uses data on the characteristics of children and mothers in the sample to show that it was children born to mothers whose characteristics generally correlate with higher child mortality, children born in rural areas, boys, children born in rice and wheat producing districts and children born in poorer households who benefit more from HYV adoption. Furthermore, Chapter 5 shows that baseline differences in irrigation prior to the adoption of HYV are associated with differences in the growth of yields after adoption. It explores the relationship between irrigation and yields over time to uncover potential mechanisms for the observed relationship. Finally, Chapter 6 empirically investigates the relationship between religious shrines and literacy in the Punjab province of Pakistan.

At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most difficult to evaluate. Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive influence on the campaign of March-August 1918.

The main purpose of this study has been to establish the chanoino character of the RAs (Research Associations) in the UK from 1970 to 1989 and beyond. The last major piece of research carried out on the RAs was the Bessborough Report which was undertaken in 1972. One of the main problems encountered was the availability of secondary data on the RAs. Most of the data, especiall y statistical ones, had to be generated from primary sources e.g. Annual Reports of RAs, internal papers of RAs and interviews. Consequently, a great amount of time and effort went into the accumulation of data. The thesis is divided into five parts. Part 1 consists of the research methodology. Part 2 and 3 provide the necessary background information in order to map out the changes in the RAs over the two decades. Part 4 forms the core of the thesis and it presents the results of the research model used. Part 5 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

This dissertation reconstructs how blood groups were made into pre-eminent objects of human genetic research and powerful markers for producing human biological difference. By tracing the ways in which three British laboratories became international centres for blood-group genetic research, it also offers an expanded history of postwar human genetics. In early 1930s Britain a community of geneticists, including R.A. Fisher and B.S. Haldane, promoted blood groups as having the potential to give the study of human heredity 'a solidly objective foundation, under strict statistical control'. Fisher and colleagues at the Cambridge Galton Serum Unit- especially Robert Race and Arthur Mourant- implemented this vision, the dissertation shows, using the arrangements for large-scale blood transfusion set up early in the Second World War. In 1946, Mourant became director of the Blood Group Reference Laboratory and Race of the Blood Group Research Unit, both at London's Lister Institute. As well as standardising blood-grouping reagents and investigating serological problems for the World Health Organization, these laboratories collected, analysed and published vast quantities of genetic data, making the Lister the global centre for blood-group genetics. During this period, human genetics changed from a marginal research field to an established discipline, partly, the dissertation argues, as a result of this blood-group research. By the 1950s a third of all human genetics publications were on blood groups: as one of the few human traits with simple Mendelian inheritance, they formed the basis for linkage studies and association surveys, and underpinned innovation in theoretical population genetics. Against a backdrop of intense international discussion about the meaning and scope of race science, blood groups were also made into tools for a supposedly 'obj ective' and 'unprejudiced' anthropology. This first history of how blood groups became scientific objects follows their collection in Britain and overseas, the grouping of samples, their transformation into data, and their presentation as credible genetic knowledge. It also offers the first sustained analysis of the functions of genetic nomenclatures. I argue that mid-century human genetics was profoundly influenced by the questions and practices of physical anthropology, by clinical practice, and by international infrastructures for medical research.