published_or_final_version / Chinese / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Cuno Kibele was the most prolific and most influential architect to live and work in Muncie, Indiana, in the first decades of the twentieth century. From 1905 to 1927, Kibele designed Muncie's grandest public buildings as well as schools, churches, factories, and commercial buildings. Kibele is most often identified with these buildings. The purpose of this thesis is to study a portion of Kibele's work that has been generally overlooked, his residential designs.Kibele was a reputable residential designer in Muncie. He was a sought-after architect for the city's rising middle class who lived in the suburbs just outside of town. Kibele's residential designs were unlike his other types of commissions in their simplicity and restraint of form and style. Kibele did not include stylistic details in his residential designs to the extent that he did in his other commissions. The few stylistic elaborations that Kibele did include in his residential designs were common-place Craftsman and Prairie style details.Kibele's residences were not high style or innovative in design, however they incorporated the latest social thinking and technological advances. In the early decades of the twentieth century, middle class residential design in America underwent a dramatic transformation. The Victorian home, with its rambling, asymmetrical plan, dense cluttered interior, and ornate detailing was pushed aside in favor of a new, modem aesthetic that favored simple clean lines, reduction of ornamentation, and an open interior arrangement. Kibele's residential commissions demonstrate the modem design principles that resulted from this transformation: the inclusion of modem technological advances; a kitchen redesigned for efficiency; simpler outline and reduction of ornamentation; a simple, open floor plan; and provisions for healthy living. / Department of Architecture

Thesis. 1976. M.ArchAS--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture. / Microfiche copy available in Archives and Rotch. / Bibliography: leaves 163-164. / M.ArchAS

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歐陽敬孝. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2002. / 參考文獻 (p. 248-270). / 中英文摘要. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Ouyang Jingxiao. / Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / Lun wen (zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2002. / Can kao wen xian (p. 248-270).

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The history of World War II has led many Americans to vie~ Benito Mussolini's Fascist Italy and Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany as European variants of a single Fascist ideology. Ho~ever, in the early years of the Mussolini and Hitler regimes, the conceptual category of international Fascism was by not so well-established, particularly ~here the Nazis were concerned. American and British diplomats stationed in Germany in the early 1930s only occasionally interpreted the rising Nazi party as an offshoot of Fascism, but frequently referred to it as a possible form of or precursor of Bolshevism in Germany. Published and unpublished American foreign policy documents, published British diplomatic documents, and a wide array of secondary sources have contributed information showing how perceptions of Nazism and Bolshevism were influenced by matters that clouded the issues. The similarity of American and British views on the subjects of Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism can be attributed to the new understanding among the policy elites of the two nations as they became the leading status quo powers after World War I. The United States in particular had gone through tremendous organizational changes during and after the war, and was entering into a new era of professional and bureaucratized foreign policy that differed from its ad hoc diplomacy of the past. American foreign policy of the interwar period combined a strong interest in business expansion with a relative lack of desire for international political entanglements. American political commitments of the 1920s, particularly in Germany, were backed primarily by loans and investment, and through reparations revision plans designed by unofficial diplomats recruited from the private sector. As American financial commitments to Germany became more dependent on German repayment, and as the Depression tightened its grip, the rise of the Nazis became an ever greater source of alarm. This concern was related not only to their unclear and ill-defined political ideas, but to the threat they seemingly posed to financial stability -- a threat that increased their resemblance to the Bolsheviks in the minds of many diplomatic observers. Various other factors were important in developing the Anglo-American view of Nazism as related to Bolshevism. These included the almost obsessive intensity of anti-Bolshevism in the United States and Great Britain throughout the interwar period; the close association of Bolshevism with economic chaos in the minds of Anglo-American leaders, with a concomitant tendency to see Bolshevism developing wherever economic chaos occurred in Europe; and the strong admiration for Mussolini's Italy in both Britain and the United States, which precluded possibilities of seeing much in common between Italian Fascism and Nazism during this period. Some important sources of conceptual confusion were inherent in the policies of Germany's post-World War I Weimar Republic. Leading German diplomats and politicians of the republic, such as Gustav Stresemann, used Anglo-American fears of Bolshevism as a cornerstone of their policy to gain revisions and modifications of the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty. In the early 1930s, the "Bolshevism bogey" was used by Ambassador Frederic Sackett, a political appointee of Herbert Hoover, to get Hoover's attention so that he would modify reparations policy in favor of Sackett's friend, the embattled Chancellor Heinrich Bruning. The internal factions of the rising Nazi party, including the left-leaning wing led by Gregor Strasser, appeared to give some credence to the idea that the Nazis could harbor communistic elements. After Hitler's rise to the chancellorship in 1933, American and British observers began to note more resemblances between the Hitler and Mussolini regimes. However, many of their earlier observations about the similarities of Nazism and Bolshevism have validity in terms of the more totalitarian nature of these regimes as compared to Italian Fascism and its other less extreme variants.

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