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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

A logical approach to legal theory

Mullock, Philip January 1968 (has links)
No description available.
2

Moral Injury and the Puzzle of Immunity-Violation

Gero, Jesse 18 August 2010 (has links)
The First Amendment gives U.S. citizens a Hohfeldian legal immunity that disables Congress from removing citizens’ legal liberty to criticize the government. Any attempt by Congress to remove this liberty would fail, but such an attempt would still wrong citizens. The familiar concept of claim-violation does not fully account for this wrong. Claims name actions that ought not be performed and are violated when those actions are performed. Immunities names actions that cannot be performed. Congress would wrong citizens not by doing something it ought not do but by attempting and failing to do something it cannot do. Using elements of Jean Hampton’s expressive theory of punishment, I analyze Congress’ attempt (and other similar acts) as an expressive act that denies the existence of immunities. Congress’ immunity-“contradiction” would wrong U.S. citizens by denying the value that generates the immunity, by causing damage to the acknowledgement of the citizens’ value, and by threatening the existence of the immunity.
3

The application of the claim-right/duty correlative relationship of Wesley N. Hohfeld to the right of expression of the Christian faithful

Arnold, Amy Maria. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (J.C.L.)--Catholic University of America, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 59-64).
4

The architecture of rights

Frydrych, David January 2015 (has links)
This thesis concerns the various concepts of rights and philosophical accounts of them. Chapter 1 addresses some methodological issues affecting analytic legal philosophy and the philosophy of rights. Chapter 2 distinguishes between two kinds of philosophical accounts of rights: models and theories. Models outline the 'conceptually basic' types of rights, their differences, and their relationships with other kinds of 'normative positions' (e.g., duties, liabilities, etc.). Theories of rights serve two roles: first, to posit a supposed ultimate purpose for all rights; second, to provide criteria for determining what counts as 'a right' in the first place. The chapter also criticises both monistic models (ones positing only a single basic kind) for being under-inclusive and a subset of pluralistic ones (those positing several basic kinds) as over-inclusive. Chapter 3 clarifies the concepts of rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication. Chapter 4 explains the Interest-Will Theories of rights debate, while Chapter 5 argues that its constituents are irredeemably flawed, unnecessary, and under-inclusive. Chapter 6 further analyses the concept of rights enforceability, showing why legal rights are not invariably enforceable by legal powers. It then explains why wholly unenforceable legal rights nonetheless constitute 'imperfect' or defective cases. Chapter 7 argues there are more ways to enforce legal rights than just via powers, elucidating two such modes: legal rights can generally be claimed or invoked using legal liberties in private and social circumstances. While Chapter 8 shows why it might not always be possible to make liberty-based claims or invocations of right, it also provides reasons for thinking that legal rights that cannot be enforced in these ways are also imperfect.
5

[en] WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD AND THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS / [pt] WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD E OS CONCEITOS FUNDAMENTAIS DO DIREITO

DANIEL BRANTES FERREIRA 18 September 2007 (has links)
[pt] A dissertação tem por objetivo analisar e expor a teoria de Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, sendo assim, trata-se de um corte metodológico e de uma análise puramente autoral. Nesse sentido, a primeira parte do trabalho traz uma biografia do autor para assim situar o leitor no contexto em que sua teoria foi elaborada. O segundo capítulo adentra no cerne de sua teoria, ou seja, nos conceitos fundamentais do Direito, sua principal contribuição para a teoria geral do Direito. A terceira parte do trabalho visa diferenciar, através da aplicação dos conceitos fundamentais do Direito, direitos in rem e direitos in personam, termos que sempre geraram confusão para os juristas. O quarto capítulo, por sua vez, trará críticas que alguns autores fizeram à teoria do autor. A conclusão tentará demonstrar os pontos positivos e negativos da teoria de Hohfeld dando fechamento ao trabalho. / [en] The present work has as its main purpose to analyze and expose Wesley`s Newcomb Hohfeld theory, so the methodology used is purely authorial. Thus, the first part of the research brings the author`s biography in order to situate the reader in the theory`s elaboration context. The second chapter is about Hohfeld`s fundamental legal conceptions, his main contribution to the general law theory. The third part seeks to distinguish, applying the fundamental legal conceptions presented afore, the concepts of right in rem and right in personam, phrases that have always been confusing to jurists. Moreover, the fourth chapter will bring some critics made by important authors to Hohfeld`s theory. Furthermore, in the conclusion there will be made an attempt to expose the positive and negative topics in Hohfeld`s theory as a closure to the research.
6

Obligations erga omnes as multilateral obligations in international law

Féliz De Jesús, Ernesto José January 2012 (has links)
So-called obligations erga omnes, owed to the international community as a whole, including all States, now form part of positive international law. These obligations protect some of the most basic values of present-day international relations. Examples include the obligations not to commit genocide or torture, to uphold the most basic human rights, to respect the self-determination of peoples, and so on. However, there is little agreement as to what these obligations imply, how they have come about, and how to identify them. In the literature, at least, there is widespread agreement that obligations erga omnes are different in essence and in nature from obligations owed by one State to another State, so-called obligations inter partes. In turn, this —alleged— radical conceptual break severs obligations erga omnes from a wealth of norms that exist in present-day, general international law, but whose origins lie farther back in time. This thesis attempts to reconcile obligations erga omnes with obligations arising in classic, general international law. It explores what it means to be owed an obligation and how it came to pass that most obligations were owed inter partes. The particular way in which sovereignty came to be conceived and the furtherance of sovereignty, at the expense of other values, forms the pattern that gave rise to obligations inter partes. But even at that time, exceptions to this pattern existed which brought about obligations analogous to those owed erga omnes today. Relevant state practice will be analysed. If obligations erga omnes could have been created in classic international law, it is unjustified to maintain that obligations erga omnes represent so radical a break with the past. Obligations erga omnes are aggregates of bilateral, primary obligations. From this perspective, it is possible to identify these obligations, their consequences, and to discern their origins.
7

La naturaleza jurídica de la externalización (outsourcing) de procesos de conocimiento como contrato unitario relacional

Ramírez Herrera, Rodrigo Eduardo 09 January 2015 (has links)
No description available.

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