This paperwork explores the pre-christian traditions and folk customs in modern day Bulgarian folk life. The goal has been to discover how these traditions and customs have survived the coming of Christianity, and how they have been transformed into Christian customs. Bulgaria has a rich cultural heritage, thanks to the three main groups of people who have inhabited the Bulgarian lands –the thracians, the proto bulgars and the slavs. Traces of their pagan beliefs and ritual practices are possible to find in modern day folklore and folk life in Bulgaria. Most of the customs are to be found in the agricultural sphere, a sphere not so much affected by modernization, thus holding on to a worldview influenced by mythological and supernatural beliefs. The Bulgarian folk calendar is divided in two, marking the beginning and the end of the agricultural year. Most of the customs, practices and rituals are directed and performed to ensure the health and fertility of fields, farm animals and people. One of the most distinctive pagan practice, animal sacrifice - kurban, is still a very important element in the Bulgarian folk life. It is performed at Christmas, Atanasovden, the feast day of St. Constantine and St. Helen, and on Gergiovden. There are also other types of sacrifice, like pouring wine or throw corns and beans into the ground to ensure the earths fertility and rich harvest. A fish kurban is made on the feast day of St. Nicholas, patron saint of all sailors and fishermen, master of the waters. The saints play a significant role in Bulgarian religious traditions. They are the main bearers of the ancient and pagan heritage, because many of them have inherited the properties and attributes of the old deities. People worshipped and sacrifices to the old gods to gain their good will and protection, and after the introduction of Christianity, the saint became those who people turned to for protection.

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Sociala medier används för att upprätthålla befintliga relationer, både gällande vänskap och kärlek.  Gestaltningen av vänskap och kärlek skiljer sig åt mellan de sociala medierna. På Jodel finns en terapifunktion. Det innebär att personer talar ut om sina personliga problem och att man ropar på hjälp. Det upplevs som terapeutiskt att uttrycka känslor som nedstämdhet, oro och ångest. Under tearpifunktionen finns temana; hjälp mig, beklaga och bekännelse. Dessa teman ger på olika sätt uttryck för funderingar över relationer. På Twitter finns en tillgivenhetsfunktion. Det innebär att personer hyllar andra och förklara vilken bra person någon är eller beskriver en god gärning denne utfört. Under tillgivenhetsfunktionen finns tema prisa. På Instagram finns en idealisera rollen-funktion. Det handlar om att på olika sätt vilja presentera sig själv och sina relationer fördelaktigt. Människan vill skapa en ideal bild av sig själv. Under idealisera rollen som funktion finns temana; kolla vad jag gör, lyssna på mig, inspirera mera, fniss och lyckorus. Dessa teman gör på olika sätt uttryck för hur personer vill presentera sig själv för andra. Sociala medier är sociala på det sätt att de ger utrymme för uttryck om relationer och kan vara plattformar för att knyta nära band med andra. Det som är socialt är att man pratar om sina relationer och bekräftar vilka relationer som är viktiga. Det blir tydligt vilka som inkluderas i ens nära relationer och vilka som inte gör det. På sociala medier kan vi enkelt definiera oss själva på det sätt vi vill och utåt sett vill man vara omtyckt och populär. På de icke-anonyma sociala medierna visar vi upp vår ideala bild av oss själva och på de anonyma tillåts vi uttrycka sådant som vi annars bara delar med våra nära och kära offline.

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In recent years, scientists and science popularisers alike have seen profound consequences for our view of ourselves and the organisation of society in new findings about the functioning of the human brain. Prominent in the debate surrounding these claims is the question of free will, i.e. whether or not humans are able to choose and act freely in a certain fundamental sense thought required for our practice of holding ourselves free and responsible for our actions, both morally and legally. One common position, as taken by, e.g. Sam Harris (populariser) and Daniel Wegner (scientist), holds that free will of this kind is unsupportable in the face of empirical evidence – i.a. evidence from neuroscience about the way consciousness lags behind unconscious neural processes – and that we therefore need to revise our views and practices in light of these scientific facts. In this thesis, I argue that what might be termed the "revisionist" position is predicated not only on empirical evidence, but is essentially motivated by a belief in the fundamental incompatibility of free will with any reasonable (meta-) physics. In Part 1 I investigate the fundamental philosophical debate and find that the question of the possibility of free will is unresolved, thus challenging any simple appeal to the impossibility of free will such as that made by Harris in his short book on the subject, Free Will (2012). I also provide independent reason for upholding a broadly commonsense belief in free will by highlighting the sceptical nature of the challenge from determinism, which can be overcome with the help of P.F. Strawson’s "soft naturalism"-appeal to our self-justified reactive attitudes. In Part 2 I investigate the empirical evidence adduced as support for the revisionist position, focused through the well-developed argument presented by Wegner in his Illusion of Conscious Will (2002). Here I argue that the revisionist interpretation of the data loses out to a traditional interpretation that is realist about conscious causal efficacy when the former is divested of its untenable appeal to incompatibilism. I conclude that neuroscience has not settled the question of free will, and, furthermore, that the current state of the two debates – the theoretical and the empirical – supports a continued belief in free will of a kind that fits with our practice of generally believing ourselves free in our choices, and responsible for our actions.

Oppgaven tar for seg forholdet mellom dataspill og skillet mellom fakta og fiksjon, og ser på muligheten for en possibilistisk løsning på hvorvidt dataspill er fiktive eller ikke. En generell innføring gir grunnlag for en videre lesning av oppgaven som legger fram tre tekster som alle omhandler dette forholdet. Deretter blir disse tre tekstene kritisert, og en egen teori om fiksjon,basert på proxyer for innhold i mulige verdener, nærhet mellom verdener og leserens/ spillerens forståelse av vår verden og spillverdenen legges fram. Det følger av dette at man ikke kan si at et medie, eller intensjon hos forfatter er betingelser for fiksjon, og spørsmålet om hvorvidt dataspill er fiksjon eller ikke blir vist å være et spørsmål uten noe nødvendig svar. Videre utforskes dataspillenes metafysikk med fokus på hva vi med sikkerhet kan si om den eller de verdener dataspillet viser til, med fokus på tid og identitet. Det er i hovedsak David Lewis’ filosofi som utgjør det teoretiske grunnlaget rundt mulige verdener, men det vises også at han i noen tilfeller er uklar, eller tar feil. Konklusjonen blir at det ikke er mye vi kan si med sikkerhet om verdenene spill viser til generelt, men at dataspill kan være et interessant instrument for mer eksperimentelt rettede filosofer. Til slutt kommer en oppsummering, samt en tilbakevisning av kritikk rettet mot possibilistiske forklaringer av fiksjon.

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