My critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the New York Times' front-page and editorial articles, within the framework of Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model, shows that the newspaper constructed the intervention in Rwanda as suicidal for the United States and beyond the capacity of the international community. On the other hand, U.S. and NATO intervention and military airstrikes against Serbia were represented as surgical and the only options available to save ethnic Albanian lives in Kosovo. My analysis finds that the New York Times' constructions of the two conflicts, conflict actors and victims of the conflicts heavily favored the official U.S. policy of nonintervention in Rwanda and intervention in Kosovo. In particular, the analysis of the Kosovo conflict discourse in the New York Times found strong support for the dichotomization hypothesis of the propaganda model. I further analyzed U.S. policy papers or the official propaganda discourses alongside news media discourses, and also reviewed my CDA findings alongside key historical episodes related to the two conflicts. My analysis shows, while the New York Times showcased and regurgitated arguments that were in favor of U.S. policy of intervention in Kosovo and nonintervention in Rwanda, the newspaper--deliberately or otherwise--omitted and distorted key details that could potentially and fundamentally reshape perceptions of the need or lack of need for U.S. interventions in each of the two conflicts. Lastly, my analysis finds that there was high degree of similarity between the official propaganda discourses and the discourses in the New York Times.

Since the end of the Cold War, traditional justifications for war have diminished in relevance and importance, while the use of Humanitarian Military Interventions (HMI) has proliferated, to the point that formerly traditional wars – e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq invasions – have become retroactively redefined as HMIs. While HMI suffers from a number of problems, from international law to historical track record, its proponents have managed to turn aside all arguments by claiming they represent either statistical outliers, improper implementation, or at best indicate a need for a certain degree of fine-tuning. Crucially, the validity of the HMI practice is never brought into question. In order to attempt to break this dialectic stalemate, this dissertation recasts HMI as a Kuhnian paradigm. Doing so provides for a better understanding of HMI as a holistic Weltanschauung, and allows the problems of HMI to be understood as anomalies. Unlike arguments, anomalies need not engage with every discrete position held by the paradigm. Instead, they serve as a direct demonstration of the untenability of a position, as evidenced by systemic failure to produce the desired results. Consequently, the paradigm approach allows for a binary resolution to the problems of HMI: either the anomalies can be explained by the paradigm, or the paradigm has failed. The present analysis begins with an examination of paradigms and their structures, and then follows the history and context of HMI is considered from a philosophical and historical perspectives. Then, the structure of HMI as a paradigm is unpacked, with the attendant ends, means, justifications, and implications. Finally, four categories of HMI anomalies are presented, leading to the conclusion that the HMI paradigm is a failed one.