Zugl.: München Univ., Diss., 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Originally presented as author's Master's thesis titled: Savremeni položaj Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve u konfliktu na Kosovu i Metohiji ; defended July 11, 2005, Fakultet civilne odbrane Univerziteta u Beogradu. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-75) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2010. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 613 p. : col. maps. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 597-613).

My critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the New York Times' front-page and editorial articles, within the framework of Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model, shows that the newspaper constructed the intervention in Rwanda as suicidal for the United States and beyond the capacity of the international community. On the other hand, U.S. and NATO intervention and military airstrikes against Serbia were represented as surgical and the only options available to save ethnic Albanian lives in Kosovo. My analysis finds that the New York Times' constructions of the two conflicts, conflict actors and victims of the conflicts heavily favored the official U.S. policy of nonintervention in Rwanda and intervention in Kosovo. In particular, the analysis of the Kosovo conflict discourse in the New York Times found strong support for the dichotomization hypothesis of the propaganda model. I further analyzed U.S. policy papers or the official propaganda discourses alongside news media discourses, and also reviewed my CDA findings alongside key historical episodes related to the two conflicts. My analysis shows, while the New York Times showcased and regurgitated arguments that were in favor of U.S. policy of intervention in Kosovo and nonintervention in Rwanda, the newspaper--deliberately or otherwise--omitted and distorted key details that could potentially and fundamentally reshape perceptions of the need or lack of need for U.S. interventions in each of the two conflicts. Lastly, my analysis finds that there was high degree of similarity between the official propaganda discourses and the discourses in the New York Times.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program / Donald J. Mrozek / From 1989 to 1999, the US had an opportunity to end its rivalry with Russia. However, a “loss aversion heuristic” dominated the decision-making processes of George Bush and Bill Clinton resulting in policies that provoked Russian fears of encirclement. This “loss aversion heuristic” manifested in four key security decisions: the reunification of Germany within NATO, NATO expansion to newly independent states, the Balkans interventions, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although initially suspicious of Gorbachev, Bush eventually pursued a policy of supporting his reforms. However, as the administration came to terms with the inevitability of German reunification and increased European integration as outlined in the Single European Act of 1987, worries about the US leadership role in Europe emerged. By the fall of 1989, Bush backed German reunification to bolster pro-NATO political parties in Germany. As he assumed the presidency in 1993, Clinton wanted to increase financial assistance to Russia. However, when it came to security issues, Clinton’s fear of losing democratic gains in Eastern Europe to an emerging Russian nationalist movement made him less conciliatory to Russia. Despite Yeltsin’s dismay, Clinton pushed for NATO’s enlargement to protect the newly independent states. The same “loss aversion heuristic” was in play with the NATO interventions in the Balkans in 1995 and 1998. Criticisms of NATO’s ineffectiveness at preventing genocide on the continent called into question the necessity of a European security organization that could not provide security. Even though the interventions cemented a continued rivalry with Russia, the US backed them as a means of protecting the relevance of NATO. These decisions had implications to the US policy of protecting the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Instead of securing a nuclear security partner, US policy contributed to Russians selling technology to rogue regimes, and they resisted US attempts to create an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) system in Eastern Europe. In this way, US policy success in securing NATO resulted in decreased nuclear security. In the first three security decisions, the US overestimated the probability of loss making them unable to consider a more cooperative posture vis-à-vis Russian security concerns. The result of this loss aversion was the protection of NATO and the loss of cooperation on the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Zugl.: Konstanz, Univ., Diss., 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Why do some communities experience more violence against civilians than others? This study argues that civilian communities embracing relationships that bridge salient group divides and norms of non-violence, will commit to actions of protection across those divides, which will in turn limit possibilities for armed actors to commit violence against civilians. On the other hand, communities that do not embrace bridging relationships and instead promote more violent norms, will commit to denunciation of other civilians during war. This will in turn create more opportunities for armed actors to commit violence against civilians. Through interview-based field research I test this theory on two communities in Kosovo. I compare the town of Prizren, largely spared from violence against civilians during the war of 1998-1999, to the town of Gjakova, which experienced higher levels of violence against civilians. The results show support for the theoretical argument. However, I cannot fully account for alternative explanations to the difference in violence. Research on civilian agency during the Kosovo war has been severely lacking, an empirical gap which I aim to partly fill through this research.

The aim of the thesis is to map and analyze the Czech public debate about the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO air forces in 1999. The North Atlantic Alliance attack on the FRY, which followed shortly after the Czech Republic had joined the Organization. Part of the political representation reacted to NATO's actions with restraint or regret, while the current, represented mainly by President Havel, became a principled supporter of the attack, even on the international political scene. The work deals with various levels of this debate: the initiation of individual actors in the problems of the NATO Operation in Yugoslavia, the starting points, argumentation strategies or links with other topics. It tries to reveal secondary motivations in the formulation of individual opinions (considerations of the security interests of the Czech Republic, worldview, prejudices, etc.). The source base of the work is mainly periodicals, especially the most read dailies. Klíčová slova (anglicky): Czech Republic, Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavian crisis, The conflict in the Balkans in 1999, NATO Air Strikes Against Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO

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