Thesis (M.A.)--Zhongguo wen hua xue yuan. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 198-215).

Thesis--Freie Universität Berlin. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (p. 252-262).

Thesis advisor: Christopher Baum / Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Reunification in 1990, Germany experienced many economic and labor market shifts. This empirical analysis evaluates the determinants of entrepreneurship in post-Reunification Germany from 1986 to 2014 using self-employment dependent variables as entrepreneurial proxies and measures of social capital as independent variables. Age, gender, nationality, education, income, risk attitudes, and social factors are all shown to be statistically significant predictors of entrepreneurial activity in Germany. The subsequent sociological analysis examines popular media’s portrayal of contemporary technological entrepreneurship in modern Berlin. The investigation highlights the differences between Berlin’s countercultural image and the need for sustainable funding and business plans for new technology ventures. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

This study deals with Allied policy for postwar Germany during the Second World War (1941-1945) and the Allied occupation (1945-1949). It is shown that the ideological division and the conflicting objectives of the occupation powers led to a disintegration of cooperation between the occupation powers, and resulted in the division of Germany as an alternative settlement to the "German Problem". The evidence is based on the available government documents, eye-witness accounts, and secondary sources.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Oldenburg, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 293-307) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Utah, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [351]-373).

No description available.

<p>This essay is a case-study of a phenomenon called “ostalgie” which could be described as GDR-nostalgia. “Ostalgie” is a compound of the two German words “ost” (east) and “Nostalgie” (nostalgia.) It is, like a similar phenomenon referred to as “communist nostalgia”, a type of nostalgia. However, if one were to define “ostalgie” as “communist nostalgia” important aspects of the phenomenon would be left out. Despite the vast research (mainly by German scholars) on the reunification process of the two German states, little has been said about the positive retrospective evaluation of the former GDR among eastern Germans. The purpose of this study is to examine what constitutes “ostalgie” and what it could lead to. To answer what ostalgie is I examine research literature and analyze so called “ostalgie” consumption products such as movies and souvenirs with GDR-symbols. Drawing on two alternative hypotheses, one related to political socialization and one related to unification related hardships, I discuss the possible explanations for the emergence of “ostaglie”. To answer what ostalgie could lead to I also analyze and discuss existing research and make my own interpretations based on personal experiences with the reunification process. This study is thus mainly based on a qualitative literature analysis but is also illustrated by quantitative measurements of “ostalgie-related” attitudes among Germans. I argue that “ostalgie” should be considered as an outcome of political socialization as well as unification related hardships and that it would be misleading to assume that “ostalgie” could be explained exclusively by one of the hypothesis discussed. “Ostalgie” is an expression for eastern Germans’ will or need to reminisce about the good aspects of the GDR. The consequences of “ostalgie” are first and foremost that it trivializes the GDR dictatorship. It has also been noted that nostalgic people have more negative attitudes towards the German democracy than non-nostalgic people. I conclude the paper by discussing the difficulties of measuring how widespread “ostalgie” sentiments are due to the problems of definition.</p>

Ce mémoire tente de présenter la politique allemande de François Mitterrand de 1981 à 1991 à travers le discours public du président français. À cette fin, il présente la position du chef d’État socialiste sur le rôle de l’Allemagne dans la construction de l’unité européenne et dans la politique de défense et de sécurité française, ainsi que sur la question de la réunification allemande. Il tente ensuite de situer la politique allemande de François Mitterrand par rapport à celle du général de Gaulle, et de juger de la valeur du discours public du président français comme source primaire. L’hypothèse principale que nous soutenons est que le président socialiste tente, de 1981 à 1991, de s’appuyer sur la République fédérale d’Allemagne pour atteindre les objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance fixés pour la France par de Gaulle dans les années 1960. Nous croyons qu’il souhaite d’abord se rapprocher de la RFA pour que celle-ci l’aide à unifier politiquement, économiquement et militairement l’Europe autour du couple franco-allemand. Nous croyons également que Mitterrand veut s’assurer, au début des années 1980, que la RFA restera ancrée solidement au camp occidental et qu’elle ne glissera pas vers le neutralisme, ce qui doit, selon le président français, permettre à la France d’augmenter son niveau de protection face à l’URSS et accroître son indépendance face aux États-Unis. Enfin, nous croyons que le président socialiste ne tente pas d’empêcher la réunification de l’Allemagne, mais qu’il tente d’en ralentir le processus afin de pouvoir mettre en place l’unité européenne au sein de laquelle il souhaite exercer une influence sur l’Allemagne réunifiée, et à partir de laquelle il prévoit développer sa politique d’après-guerre froide. Ces initiatives doivent permettre à la France d’absorber les contrecoups de la réunification allemande et de sauvegarder ses intérêts nationaux. Dans l’ensemble, la politique allemande de François Mitterrand est en continuité avec la politique allemande développée par le général de Gaulle de 1958 à 1964. Les deux hommes cherchent ainsi à s’appuyer sur la RFA pour créer l’unité européenne afin que celle-ci serve de tremplin à la France pour qu’elle atteigne ses objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance. Enfin, nous croyons que le discours public du président socialiste peut être utilisé comme source primaire car il renferme une quantité importante d’information, mais son utilisation doit se faire avec précaution car comme tous les discours politiques, il vise d’abord et avant tout à convaincre l’opinion publique du bien fondé des politiques avancées. / This memoir presents the German policy of former French president François Mitterrand from 1981 to 1991 through his public speech. For this purpose, it shows the former president’s position on the role of Germany in building the European community, in the development of the French defence policy, and on the German reunification. It also locates the German policy of Mitterrand by comparing it to Charles de Gaulle’s, as well as it analyses the value of this public speech as a primary source. The main assumption is that François Mitterrand tries, from 1981 to 1991, to lean on the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve the goals of grandeur and independance wished for France by de Gaulle in the 1960’s. We believe that Mitterrand wishes initially to get closer to the FRG in order, along with Germany, to unify Europe politically, economically and militarily around the Franco-German couple. We also believe that Mitterrand wants to make sure, at the beginning of the 1980’s, that the FRG will stay firmly anchored to the West and will not slide towards neutralism, thus allowing, according to the French president, to increase France’s protection towards USSR and independence towards the United States. Finally, we believe that Mitterrand does not try to prevent the German reunification but that he instead tries to slow down the process in order to realize the European unity within which he wishes to exert an influence on the reunified Germany, and from which he envisages his post-cold war policy. These initiatives must allow France to absorb the by-effects of the German reunification and preserve its national interest. Globally, the German policy of François Mitterrand is in continuity with the German policy developed by general de Gaulle from 1958 to 1964. Both men seek to lean on the FRG to create European unity in order to use it as a springboard for the achievement of France’s goals of grandeur and independance. Finally, we believe that Mitterrand’s public speech can be used as primary source because it contains a significant amount of information. But its use must be done with precaution in order to avoid the usual traps provided by these sources: convincing the public opinion of the good of the advanced policies.

M.A. (Historical Studies) / Please refer to full text to view abstract