Much of the literature pertaining to North and South Korean reunification is written under the presumption that the two nations will—and more importantly, that they should— eventually reunify. Rather than assuming that reunification is inevitable and hypothesizing how it might come about, I examine political, social, and economic ramifications of reunification in order to discuss why Korean unification should occur, if it all.

Ziel dieser Arbeit war es herauszufinden ob und wenn ja, welche ordnungs- und wirtschaftlichen Alternativen im Zuge der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands existierten. Die erste Frage ist mit einem klaren ja zu beantworten. Einige der möglichen Alternativen wurden in Abschnitt 4 vorgestellt, weitere sind denkbar. Warum sie sich nicht durchsetzten ist im Einzelnen schwer zu sagen. Politische Entscheidungen werden in einem Spannungsfeld konkurrierender Interessen, äußerer Zwänge und machtpolitischer Überlegungen getroffen. Gegen einige Alternativen, wie z.B. Alternative 2 sprachen die äußeren Umstände, die drohende massive Migration von Ost nach West. Für andere Alternativen, wie z.B. Alternative 4 gab es wohl zu wenig Fürsprecher. Einige dieser aufgezeigten Wege erscheinen vom heutigen Standpunkt aus betrachtet die besseren Alternativen zu sein. Zweierlei sollte man bei solchen Überlegungen nie vergessen. Erstens, dass es ungleich schwerer ist, Fehler zu vermeiden als bereits gemachte Fehler zu erkennen. Und zweitens, welche enormen menschlichen, politischen und finanziellen Leistungen im Zuge der Deutschen Einheit erbracht wurden und auch heute noch erbracht werden. Auf das Erreichte können wir stolz sein.

Thesis (D.A.)--Illinois State University, 2002. / Title from title page screen, viewed Aug. 13, 2004. Dissertation Committee: Gerlof Homan (chair), Richard Soderlund, Lawrence McBride. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 262-284) and abstract. Also available in print.

Ce mémoire tente de présenter la politique allemande de François Mitterrand de 1981 à 1991 à travers le discours public du président français. À cette fin, il présente la position du chef d’État socialiste sur le rôle de l’Allemagne dans la construction de l’unité européenne et dans la politique de défense et de sécurité française, ainsi que sur la question de la réunification allemande. Il tente ensuite de situer la politique allemande de François Mitterrand par rapport à celle du général de Gaulle, et de juger de la valeur du discours public du président français comme source primaire. L’hypothèse principale que nous soutenons est que le président socialiste tente, de 1981 à 1991, de s’appuyer sur la République fédérale d’Allemagne pour atteindre les objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance fixés pour la France par de Gaulle dans les années 1960. Nous croyons qu’il souhaite d’abord se rapprocher de la RFA pour que celle-ci l’aide à unifier politiquement, économiquement et militairement l’Europe autour du couple franco-allemand. Nous croyons également que Mitterrand veut s’assurer, au début des années 1980, que la RFA restera ancrée solidement au camp occidental et qu’elle ne glissera pas vers le neutralisme, ce qui doit, selon le président français, permettre à la France d’augmenter son niveau de protection face à l’URSS et accroître son indépendance face aux États-Unis. Enfin, nous croyons que le président socialiste ne tente pas d’empêcher la réunification de l’Allemagne, mais qu’il tente d’en ralentir le processus afin de pouvoir mettre en place l’unité européenne au sein de laquelle il souhaite exercer une influence sur l’Allemagne réunifiée, et à partir de laquelle il prévoit développer sa politique d’après-guerre froide. Ces initiatives doivent permettre à la France d’absorber les contrecoups de la réunification allemande et de sauvegarder ses intérêts nationaux. Dans l’ensemble, la politique allemande de François Mitterrand est en continuité avec la politique allemande développée par le général de Gaulle de 1958 à 1964. Les deux hommes cherchent ainsi à s’appuyer sur la RFA pour créer l’unité européenne afin que celle-ci serve de tremplin à la France pour qu’elle atteigne ses objectifs de grandeur et d’indépendance. Enfin, nous croyons que le discours public du président socialiste peut être utilisé comme source primaire car il renferme une quantité importante d’information, mais son utilisation doit se faire avec précaution car comme tous les discours politiques, il vise d’abord et avant tout à convaincre l’opinion publique du bien fondé des politiques avancées. / This memoir presents the German policy of former French president François Mitterrand from 1981 to 1991 through his public speech. For this purpose, it shows the former president’s position on the role of Germany in building the European community, in the development of the French defence policy, and on the German reunification. It also locates the German policy of Mitterrand by comparing it to Charles de Gaulle’s, as well as it analyses the value of this public speech as a primary source. The main assumption is that François Mitterrand tries, from 1981 to 1991, to lean on the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve the goals of grandeur and independance wished for France by de Gaulle in the 1960’s. We believe that Mitterrand wishes initially to get closer to the FRG in order, along with Germany, to unify Europe politically, economically and militarily around the Franco-German couple. We also believe that Mitterrand wants to make sure, at the beginning of the 1980’s, that the FRG will stay firmly anchored to the West and will not slide towards neutralism, thus allowing, according to the French president, to increase France’s protection towards USSR and independence towards the United States. Finally, we believe that Mitterrand does not try to prevent the German reunification but that he instead tries to slow down the process in order to realize the European unity within which he wishes to exert an influence on the reunified Germany, and from which he envisages his post-cold war policy. These initiatives must allow France to absorb the by-effects of the German reunification and preserve its national interest. Globally, the German policy of François Mitterrand is in continuity with the German policy developed by general de Gaulle from 1958 to 1964. Both men seek to lean on the FRG to create European unity in order to use it as a springboard for the achievement of France’s goals of grandeur and independance. Finally, we believe that Mitterrand’s public speech can be used as primary source because it contains a significant amount of information. But its use must be done with precaution in order to avoid the usual traps provided by these sources: convincing the public opinion of the good of the advanced policies.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 1995. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 240-269).

Thesis (doctoral)-Universität, Oldenburg, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 293-307) and index.

Orientador: Sebastião Carlos Velasco e Cruz / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T11:53:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ferreira_SolangeReis_M.pdf: 647247 bytes, checksum: 6a191e996d32e3ed01cc3487a4de368d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Nesta dissertação discutiremos a política externa da Alemanha depois da reunificação com ênfase na sua cultura estratégica. Tendo como ponto inicial uma negativa do governo alemão em apoiar a invasão do Iraque pelos Estados Unidos no ano de 2003, identificaremos os interesses que determinaram o comportamento da Alemanha a partir da problemática da identidade e da relação do país com seus principais aliados: União Européia e Estados Unidos. Veremos que, para estudar a Alemanha reunificada, será preciso recorrer às abordagens construtivistas, pois essas análises propõem a observação dos fenômenos políticos internacionais, não apenas a partir da distribuição de poder, mas também de elementos ideativos. Com o objetivo de alcançar um resultado mais autêntico, trabalharemos, principalmente, com base na literatura acadêmica e em artigos de think tanks alemães. O trabalho será composto de quatro partes. Na introdução serão expostos: o contexto político internacional no século XXI, a ruptura nas relações transatlânticas, uma breve retrospectiva da reconstrução dos fundamentos da política externa alemã no pós-guerra e o papel da identidade no comportamento de Estado. O primeiro capítulo apresentará as escolas de pensamento que orientaram o debate nacional na Alemanha sobre os rumos da política externa após a reunificação, destacando seus principais autores e prognósticos. Pretendemos que o segundo capítulo venha a conhecer os interesses que orientaram a política externa da Alemanha, e quais identidades, desenvolvidas no contexto da guerra fria, da integração européia e da reunificação do país, constituem cada um desses interesses. Analisaremos quando o comportamento da Alemanha, diante de importantes eventos internacionais entre 1990 e 2003, foi caracterizado por continuidade ou mudança no que concerne às suas relações com os principais aliados no aspecto da estratégia de segurança. Como conclusão, apresentaremos os interesses relacionados às suas identidades e tentaremos traçar um cenário provável para a política externa da Alemanha no século XXI / Abstract: This research analyses german foreign policy after its reunification in 1990. It departs from the german refusal to support US invasion into Irak in 2003 and try to identify the interests that have been determining german behavior since the reunification by considering important aspects of german strategic culture in relation to its main allies: the European Union and the United States. In order to support the comprehension of identity rolle in foreign policy it consider some aspects of Constructivism, although the theoretical approach is not the focus of this research. Our purpose is to learn about Germany and its international relations from the perspective of the german debatte based on the opinion of those agents that might influence the political decision-making process in foreign policy. Therefore it relies on the material published by some of the important academic research centers, the main think tanks and the most proeminent political foundations from 1990 to 2003. In extension we aim to expose traces of continuity or change in german foreign policy and understand how the german literature and experts explain behavior as a consequence of determinant variables such as identity and interests / Mestrado / Relações Internacionais / Mestre em Relações Internacionais

Cette thèse propose un regard transitif sur l'art contemporain en RDA des années 1970 et 1980 et dans les nouveaux Länder en s'appuyant sur l'exemple de deux artistes, Lutz Dammbeck et Karla Sachse. Leurs productions artistiques réalisées avant et après la chute du mur de Berlin, reflètent le processus de construction identitaire en RDA et questionnent également la construction de la mémoire collective allemande. Le premier chapitre propose un aperçu des éléments d'histoire qui ont contribué à cette construction identitaire est-allemande qui touchait toute la société. Les artistes présenté-e-s dans le deuxième et troisième chapitre de cette thèse sont exemplaires pour un grand nombre d'artistes pouravoir refusé la doctrine du réalisme socialiste et n’avoir pas attendu la fin de la RDA pour créer des oeuvres pertinentes et subversives. Les années 1989 et 1990, l'année de la chute du mur et l'année de la réunification allemande, représentent bien un tournant géo-politique important, mais ne signifient pas réellement une rupture pour les artistes issu-e-s des scènes alternatives est-allemandes, comme c’est le cas pour Lutz Dammbeck et Karla Sachse / This thesis proposes a transitive view on contemporary art in the GDR in the 1970s and 1980s and in the new Länder based on the example of two artists, and Lutz Dammbeck and Karla Sachse. Their artistic productions performed before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, reflect the process of identity construction in the GDR and also question the construction of Germany's collective memory. The first chapter provides an overview of the history that contributed to the construction of identity affecting the whole German society. The artists presented in the second and third chapter of this thesis are exemplary for many artists who refused the doctrine of socialist realism and did not wait for the end of the GDR tocreate important and subversive works. The years 1989 and 1990, the year the Berlin Wall fell and the year of German reunification, represent an important geo-political turn, but mean not really an aesthetic rupture for artists from east German alternative scenes as it is the case for Lutz Dammbeck and Karla Sachse

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Interdepartmental Program / Donald J. Mrozek / From 1989 to 1999, the US had an opportunity to end its rivalry with Russia. However, a “loss aversion heuristic” dominated the decision-making processes of George Bush and Bill Clinton resulting in policies that provoked Russian fears of encirclement. This “loss aversion heuristic” manifested in four key security decisions: the reunification of Germany within NATO, NATO expansion to newly independent states, the Balkans interventions, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although initially suspicious of Gorbachev, Bush eventually pursued a policy of supporting his reforms. However, as the administration came to terms with the inevitability of German reunification and increased European integration as outlined in the Single European Act of 1987, worries about the US leadership role in Europe emerged. By the fall of 1989, Bush backed German reunification to bolster pro-NATO political parties in Germany. As he assumed the presidency in 1993, Clinton wanted to increase financial assistance to Russia. However, when it came to security issues, Clinton’s fear of losing democratic gains in Eastern Europe to an emerging Russian nationalist movement made him less conciliatory to Russia. Despite Yeltsin’s dismay, Clinton pushed for NATO’s enlargement to protect the newly independent states. The same “loss aversion heuristic” was in play with the NATO interventions in the Balkans in 1995 and 1998. Criticisms of NATO’s ineffectiveness at preventing genocide on the continent called into question the necessity of a European security organization that could not provide security. Even though the interventions cemented a continued rivalry with Russia, the US backed them as a means of protecting the relevance of NATO. These decisions had implications to the US policy of protecting the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Instead of securing a nuclear security partner, US policy contributed to Russians selling technology to rogue regimes, and they resisted US attempts to create an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM) system in Eastern Europe. In this way, US policy success in securing NATO resulted in decreased nuclear security. In the first three security decisions, the US overestimated the probability of loss making them unable to consider a more cooperative posture vis-à-vis Russian security concerns. The result of this loss aversion was the protection of NATO and the loss of cooperation on the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

No description available.