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The main intention of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms of the protection of civilians in the context of humanitarian crises. The first part provides theoretical definition of the protection of civilians and its legal underpinnings. The roles of individual actors such as the state and its agencies, UN peacekeeping missions, cluster system, non govermental organisations and civil society itself are being defined. The paper futher focuses on the prevention in humanitarian crises, especially on the principles of peacekeeping, human security and gender. The second part consists of a case study of Haiti in the context of the 2010 devastating earthquake and the ensuing humanitarian crisis. First it discusses the impact of the earthquake on the infrastructure, environment, government, economy and education as well as its consequences for the civilians themselves. The impact of the earthquake is compared with the priorities of the state, as seen after the earthquake. Response to the earthquake is cathegorized as national and international, each of which has its specific characteristics and is based on different prior and post disaster conditions. Specific groups of civilians - minors and civilians affected by gender violence- are focused on .The protection of civilians in the specific areas is also addressed - namely duringthe cyclone Thomas, in the IDP camps and in the area struck by the cholera epidemics. The work culminates in the research which consists of three parts - a questionnaire for NGOs, civilians and government officials.

The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen. / These two conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary.

Nowhere in the world is the demand for peace more prominent and challenging than in Africa. From state collapse and anarchy in Somalia to protracted wars and rampant corruption in the Congo; from bloody civil wars and extreme poverty in Sierra Leone to humanitarian crisis and authoritarianism in Sudan, the continent is the focus of growing political and media attention. This book presents the first comprehensive overview of conflict and peace across the continent. Bringing together a range of leading academics from Africa and beyond, "Peace and Conflict in Africa" is an ideal introduction to key themes of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, security and development. The book's stress on the importance of indigenous Africa approaches to creating peace makes it an innovative and exciting intervention in the field.

This essay conducts a Plausibility Probe Case Study focused on how the UN and the wider international community have approached the civil war in Ethiopia. Because the Ethiopian Government has been unable to protect its population, Ethiopia can be considered a typical case for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was introduced in response to the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and builds upon the idea of the international community having a responsibility to assist states to protect their populations. R2P’s normative status remains debated, however, due to criticism directed against R2P’s third pillar which prescribes the international community a responsibility to act when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its population. Therefore, scholars have started to analyse R2P’s status by the use of Finnemore & Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle Theory, disagreeing about R2P’s normative strength and whether R2P will ever be able to enter the third stage of the Norm Life Cycle (NLC). This essay applies the same theory to the empirical findings from the Ethiopian case with the primary aim to contribute to the debate about R2P’s normative status. Findings show how R2P seems to be positioned at the second stage of the NLC. This does not necessarily mean that R2P should be considered a weak norm as the UN and the international community have indirectly complied with R2P when approaching the Ethiopian conflict. Yet, the fact that none of the relevant actors under study has mentioned R2P explicitly indicates how R2P still remains a controversial norm within international politics.

Les aides humanitaires aux réfugiés occupent de plus en plus une place importante dans l’action extérieure du gouvernement des Émirats Arabes Unis au cours de ces dernières années, compte tenu du nombre croissant de crises humanitaires dans l’ensemble des régions du monde et en particulier au Moyen-Orient. Or, il faut préciser ici que l’action extérieure du gouvernement des Émirats en matière d’aide humanitaire se conforme à l’action de l’ensemble des États du Golfe du fait de la coordination des politiques étrangères effectuées par le Conseil de coopération des États du Golfe (CCG). Celui-ci entretient des rapports très étroits avec les agences humanitaires des Nations Unies (notamment le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (ci-après « HCR ») et le Mouvement international de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge en tentant de développer un dialogue politique plus poussé / Humanitarian aid to refugees has become an increasingly important part of the United Arab Emirates government’s external action in recent years, given the increasing number of humanitarian crises in all regions of the world, and in particular in the Middle-East. However, it should be noted here that the UAE’s external action in the field of humanitarian aid is in link with the action of all the Gulf States because of the coordination of foreign policies carried out by the Cooperation Council of the United Gulf States (GCC). The latter has very close relations with the United Nations humanitarian agencies (in particular the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter “UNHCR”) and the international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, attempting to develop a deeper political dialogue