Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law - Selected Aspects Abstract At the time of the emergence of investor state arbitration, such regulation of states was seen as necessary to protect Western investors from expropriation of their investments by developing states, in which there was an absence of rule of law and the protections that flow from that. The ICSID Center was established primarily to ensure the availability of an assured impartial and independent dispute resolution service. The increase in the number of cases over the years, together with sometimes expansive, unexpected and inconsistent interpretations of International Investment Agreement provisions by tribunals, had triggered a worldwide debate and a number of countries had adopted reform measures. The EU has proposed a Permanent Investment Court to address criticism, aimed at investment arbitration and to be included as a measure under the TTIP. This concept has been also adopted in the CETA, and if successful, is likely to be adopted in other treaty agreements as the European Parliament has expressed a preference for the proposed investment court under the TTIP to be included in other free trade agreements. The concept of a permanent legal body providing public proceedings and decisions, establishing binding case law to address...

This research examines and critically analyses to what extent the host states might use their sovereignty in a manner that may be counterproductive to the interests of foreign investors on their territory; and the role played by international investment law in its regulation. Further, it considers the extent to which investor-state arbitration, under both the inter-state bilateral investment treaty (BIT), and investment contract, can be used to rebalance the uneven investment relationship arising from the adverse effect of host state sovereignty. The importance of the investor-state arbitration is based on the fact that such a process will be of no value if its award is not enforceable against sovereigns. It is therefore argued that arbitration enforcement against states must be augmented by further safeguards mechanisms. Challenges are faced by international investment law to minimise the possible adverse effect of host state’s sovereignty, in order to require states to respect investment agreements. Responsibility will be asserted by a wronged foreign investor if the state breaches customary international law when it hosts the foreign investment and if there is a violation of the specific investment agreement. Such challenges expose the limitations on how states can use their sovereign powers (whether legal, economic or political), against foreign investors and question the clarity of such boundaries. An unsuccessful litigant state will often seek to resist award enforcement, claiming sovereign immunity against its execution. International investment law and applicable national and regional bodies must find a balance between the interests of the foreign investor and the host state. This research concludes that the adjudication system used in England provides a framework in which a foreign investor can seek recognition of its claim and thus enforce a foreign arbitral award against recalcitrant states, but improvements could still be made as explained in thesis.

Cette thèse propose une étude globale sur les contrats build-operate-transfer (BOT). Ils sont traités dans leurs aspects financiers, juridiques et contractuels. Les investissements dans les infrastructures publiques telles que les transports, l’eau, l’énergie constituent non seulement un outil de développement économique, mais aussi contribuent à l’amélioration des conditions de vie humaine. Mais, pour réaliser ces projets souvent de taille importante, le financement est un des principaux soucis des décideurs publics. En particulier, le Cambodge figure parmi les États à bas revenus. Les contraintes financières sont telles que l’État recourt de plus en plus au secteur privé, notamment par le biais des contrats BOT. Par cette technique, l’État peut cibler ses besoins spécifiques, tout en évitant le déficit budgétaire. En contrepartie, le secteur privé bénéficie d’un droit d’exploiter une infrastructure en cause pour une durée généralement longue pendant laquelle il rentabilise ses investissements.En se basant sur l’association des intérêts publics et privés, la mise en œuvre des contrats BOT nécessite un cadre juridique adéquate, sans lequel les intérêts publics pourraient être menacés, et cela pourrait être dissuasif pour la décision des investisseurs, notamment étrangers. / This thesis suggests a comprehensive study on the build-operate-transfer contracts (BOT). They are analysed in their financial, legal and contractual aspects.Investment in public infrastructure such as transport, water, energy is not only a tool for economic development, but also contributes to the improvement of human life’s conditions. However, to achieve these major projects, funding is a major concern of policy makers. In particular, Cambodia is among the States with low income. Financial constraints are such that the State resorts increasingly to the private sector, including through BOT contracts. By this technique, the State can target their specific needs, while avoiding the budget deficit. In return, the private sector has a right to operate the infrastructure in question for a period generally long during which it recovers its investments.Based on a combination of public and private interests, the implementation of BOT contracts requires a proper legal framework, without which public interests might be threatened, and that could be a deterrent for the decision of investors, especially foreigners.

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.