Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / This thesis theoretically and empirically analyzes the nature and consequences of interactions between family members. The first chapter tests whether children's human capital accumulation was significantly affected by earnings shocks to their nonresident kin in the context of the 1997-8 financial crisis in Indonesia. The crisis produced sudden, heterogeneous shocks that facilitate the construction of an exogenous measure of earnings changes. Results indicate that earnings shocks to nonresident kin - including extended family and relatives living in other districts- significantly affected children's human capital accumulation between 1997 and 2000, and ultimate educational attainment measured nearly a decade after the crisis hit. Supplementary results point to intra-family transfers, underpinned by ex post altruism, as an important channel of causation. The second chapter develops a theoretical model of private transfers underpinned by ex post altruism among members of a network. I use this model to analyze equilibrium transfer patterns and inequality under alternative income distributions and network structures. I demonstrate the general intuition that transfers obtain in equilibrium when the amount of altruism is sufficiently strong relative to income inequality. Within the networks that I analyze, every equilibrium involving transfers takes the same form: unique income thresholds separate senders from receivers. Effective risk sharing takes place among senders and receivers, while those at intermediate incomes remain in autarky. Every equilibrium gives rise to the same set of allocations. I contrast these predictions with insurance-based theories of transfers in which risk sharing is operative for small in come differences and may fall apart at large income differences. The third chapter uses longitudinal data spanning nearly fifteen years to test whether transfers among family members within Indonesia are consistent with ex post altruism, against the alternative of insurance. I use the predicted effects of permanent versus transitory income on transfers, as well as theoretical predictions from the second chapter regarding the shape of transfer functions , to carry out this test. The results provide some evidence that transfer motives are inconsistent with insurance but consistent with ex post altruism.

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The Suharto New Order was born out of ethnic conflict around religious, ideological and regional/cultural issues that were threatening national chaos. As a pre-requisite to pursuing the socio-political and economic developmental agendas deemed necessary to legitimize their hold on power, the new regime committed the resources of the state behind forging national unity and stability out of potentially antagonistic ethnic and cultural diversity. This study examines how the Suharto New Order sustained the processes that organised the Indonesian nation behind its agendas through an exclusive representation of the state ideology Pancasila, as the ideological pillar of socio-political and economic development. The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, viewed social politics as an arrangement that inextricably linked pluralism, political participation and ideological supremacy and placed critical emphasis on the methods by which a ruling order deployed ideology and culture to craft mass consensus that would underwrite the moral and intellectual legitimacy of hegemonic rule. The study is original in that it contrasts Gramsci's insights into ideology as a discourse of hegemonic legitimacy, in the context of the Suharto New Order's exclusive representation of Pancasila as the ideological pillar of the regime's arrangement of Indonesian life. The study also examines whether the Gramscian model of hegemonic order is robust when employed to explain the Suharto regime's decline and collapse, as well as the prospects for socio-political and economic stability during the post-Suharto transitionary phase and the pressures of Islamic socio-political resurgence, which were accompanied by demands for more liberal democratic processes and participation. Antonio Gramsci provides the analytical framework for the study, and the Suharto New Order the behavioural perspective, with the prime purpose of the research being to test Gramsci's model of hegemonic order and ideological legitimacy against a contemporary context. With Indonesia comprising the world's largest Islamic population, the Suharto New Order's endeavours to construct national consensus and unity around Pancasila's secular-nationalist orientation suggest prima facie a highly appropriate perspective in which to test Gramsci's theories. The post-Suharto era of transition, also offers a timely opportunity to test the Italian Marxist's thoughts on crafting national consensus to underwrite a ruling arrangement's ideological legitimacy in the contemporary environment of Islamic socio-political resurgence accompanied by a global spread of secular, liberal democratic ideals.

The relationship between Muslims and Christian in Indonesia is and important subject. Apart from a few investigations on certain conflicts in different areas of Indonesia, little effort has been devoted to thoroughly examining the complexity of the relationship between the two religious groups. This study is an attempt to investigate the perspectives of the exclusivist and inclusivist Muslims on Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia, especially during the New Order period (1965-1998). / In dealing with this subject, the theological and legal precepts on the ‘religious’ other as developed in some classical texts are explored briefly. In order to provide the historical background of current Muslim-Christian relations, the study then investigates policies of the Dutch, Old Order, and New Order governments on Muslims and Christians. During the Dutch regime, Christians received better treatment as compared to Muslims. This was deeply resented by some Muslims, who identified the Dutch as Christians and Christians as colonists. By the time Indonesians were approaching independence, Muslim, Christian and other religious groups were preoccupied with deciding the philosophical basis of the state, and the Sukarno government paid scant attention to the hidden tense relations between Muslims and Christians. With the shift to the New Order period, Muslim-Christian relations changed dramatically because Soeharto intentionally and carefully controlled Indonesians based on the policy of SARA. The study found that some elements of SARA policy caused tensions between Muslims and Christians. / In separate chapters, the study then explores the backgrounds and concerns of the exclusivists and inclusivists in relations to Muslim Christian relations. It found that among both exclusivists and inclusivists the degree of ‘exclusiveness’ or ‘inclusiveness’ varied, as they were influenced by their different backgrounds. In addition, within each groups or among individuals, the concerns on issues related to Muslim-Christian relations differed. Four main exclusivist institutions are discussed in the study: the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (KISDI), the Forum Pembela Islam (FPI), and the Laskar Jihad. Key issues discussed by the exclusivists include the Christian ‘other’, relations between religion and the state, Christianisation, and the Ambon conflicts. The relations between the exclusivists and the Christians have been coloured largely by disharmony. Exclusivists believe that Christianity underwent alteration and that the God of Muslims is different from the Christian God, who is described as having offspring. In addition, all exclusivist groups in the study stated the view that it was the Christianisation activities that tore apart the relationship between Muslims and Christians. / In contrast, the relationships between inclusivists Muslims and Christians are coloured largely by harmony. The inclusivists chose to work within the New Order system for changes beneficial to Indonesian Muslims by avoiding direct conflict with the government and occupying themselves with intellectual endeavours. Against such a backdrop, the renewal of Islamic thought, characterised mainly by inclusivism, was introduced and developed. Moreover, the inclusivists hold the view that plurality is a law of nature (sunnatullah). Within this view, all religions are seen to adhere to the same principle of One Truth; and will therefore gradually find their ‘common platform’ or kalimatun sawa. As a reflection of their perspective on religious pluralism, most inclusivists admit the existence and rights of other religious believers, especially the ahl al-kitab. / The study found that it was the exclusivists who were more adamant in criticising the inclusivists through articles in their media or sermons in their mosques. Three of their important critiques are the belief that the inclusivists have established a link with Jews and Christians, that inclusivism weakens Muslim faith by giving new interpretations to the Islamic foundation texts that deviate from the accepted views, and that inclusivists lack concern about Christianisation. In contrast, the inclusivists tend not to criticise or respond to critiques directed at them by the exclusivists, as they consider these to be emotional or personal.

This thesis examines how reason and freedom have been expressed in Islam through a study of the Mu'tazilite movement in 8th century Persia, the Indonesian Islamic scholar and educator Harun Nasution and the Liberal Islam Network formed in Indonesia in 2001.

Thesis (M.S.)--Ohio University, June, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 54-57)

My thesis argues that in 1982-2008, “state Islam” created a pluralistic Indonesia and an anti-pluralistic Malaysia. The rubric of “state Islam” is a political alliance of secular politicians, religious bureaucrats, and Islamic socio-religious organizations. During these twenty-five years, state policy in Indonesia repressed Islam through the political marginalization of the formal and informal institutions of Muslim piety and practice. On the other hand, state policy in Malaysia accommodated Islam through promoting similar institutions. The rise of Islamic political and cultural consciousness in 1979 had triggered leadership transition and elite factionalism in 1982 in Malaysia and in 1989 in Indonesia, during which a new Islamic-centric force of entrepreneurs drove policy change. From 1982 to 2008, Indonesia and Malaysia created new state religious bureaucracies that regulated Islam, persecuted minority Islamic sects, and curbed the political autonomy of socio-religious organizations embedded in Islam. Chapter 1 constitutes a literature review and outlines my argument and key variables, while Chapter 2 provides the historical context of Islam in pre and post-independence Indonesia and Malaysia. The next chapter takes us to Indonesia in 1982-1994, when the Suharto government embarked on its institutional repression of Islam. Chapter 4 demonstrates how in 1982-1994 the Mahathir government in Malaysia launched its parallel institutional accommodation of Islam. Returning to Indonesia, Chapter 5 shows how Suharto’s institutional repression from the late 1990s directly created the conditions for a pluralist Indonesia today. Chapter 6 examines how the Mahathir government, previously locked in a close relationship with Islam through institutional accommodation in the late 1990s to early 2000s, produced a contemporary Malaysia resolutely hostile to political and socio-cultural pluralism. The final chapter explores the concept of unintended consequences and suggests comparative and cross-regional implications for my findings.

This study examines the performance of decentralized health and education service delivery in Indonesia. Results show that education outcomes improved with decentralization, and that local governments are responding to local needs for education services. Decentralization also brings improvement to health services, as mortality rates and life expectancy are significantly improved with decentralization. However, results indicate that decentralization does not improve availability of health services, as only small percentage of municipalities in Indonesia have access to health facilities. The empirical study on the performance of proliferated municipalities provides similar conclusions to those obtained in the examination of general decentralization performance. Proliferated municipalities experience improvement in education outcomes but not so for health outcomes; these results are consistent with the previous examination. Therefore, from the result of this study, there is no evidence to reject proliferation as it does not hurt health and education service delivery outcomes.