The first essay explores relations between political affiliations and illegal insider trading. Assessing illegal insider trading is challenging due to the nature of the activity. Researchers observe and evaluate only the detected portion of illegal trading, not all illegal transactions. This presents a problem when using traditional empirical techniques to investigate such activity. In our analysis we employ a bivariate probit model that takes into account the partial observability nature of insider trading and provides estimates for the determinants of both the commission and the detection of illegal insider trading. Among our findings, most notable is the influence of the SEC’s political structure on insider trading detection. We show that the political party affiliation within the SEC, past indictments by the SEC, and SEC budget play a crucial role in determining current prosecution. Past SEC indictments significantly decrease the likelihood to engage in illegal insider trading as well. Essay two investigates insider trading returns by corporate insiders in light of their firms’ lobbying activities. Lobbying is a channel firms often use to influence regulatory change. Firms also use lobbying to obtain information on upcoming legislative and regulatory changes that are significant to the firms’ future. Establishing and maintaining these political connections provides informational advantage not only to the firms engaged in lobbying but also to the insiders of these firms who receive an opportunity to base their trading decision on this potentially valuable information. Using data on firm lobbying activities, we provide evidence of an informational advantage acquired by corporate insiders of firms that develop these connections with policymakers. We find that insiders of lobbying firms gain additional return of 138 (156) basis points on their buys (sells) trades relative to transactions placed by insiders of firms that are not engaged in lobbying activities. We also document that the role of establishing and fostering lobbying contacts and the amounts spent on lobbying differ with type of insider transactions and length of investment horizons. The focus of the third essay is the impact of actual trading on material non-public information on firms’ securities. Finance and law scholars present theoretical arguments both in favor of and against trading on material non-public information. However, investigating empirically the actual impact of insider trading on the insider’s firm poses significant challenges due to the lack of precision in identifying from publically available data trades that are based on private information. In this study, we utilize Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) indictments of illegal insider trading to examine the impact of illegal insider trading on the firm. We provide evidence suggesting that illegal insider trading increases stock market liquidity for the involved firms. Our results imply that bid-ask spread following transactions based on private information is narrower for long-run windows. However, we also find results implying that informed trading is associated with reduced liquidity, when estimated with Amihud Illiquidity proxy, reflecting price impact of trades based on private information.

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Formal verification is required for systems that require high assurance. Formal verification can require large and complex proofs that can drastically affect the development life cycle. Through the use of a verification system, such proofs can be managed and completed in an efficient manner. A verification system consists of a specification language that can express formal logic, and an automated theorem tool that can be used to verify theorems and conjectures within the specifications. One example of a verification system is Specware. This thesis presents an analysis of Specware against a set of evaluation criteria in order to determine the level of usefulness Specware can have in the verification of high assurance systems. This analysis revealed that Specware contains a powerful specification language capable of representing higher order logic in a simple and expressive manner. Specware is able to represent multiple levels of abstraction and generate proof obligations regarding specification correctness and interlevel mapping. The theorem prover associated with Specware was found to be lacking in capability. Through this analysis we found that Specware has great potential to be an excellent verification system given improvement upon the theorem prover and strengthening of weaknesses regarding linguistic components. / Naval Postgraduate School author (civilian).

Information asymmetry literature has developed models that explain the relation between uninformed traders and informed traders. In general, these models have shown that first, information asymmetry is a driving force for investor buying and selling behavior. Second, the trades of informed investors reveal some of the information they possess suggesting that the trades of informed investors are informative to market makers. Third, when information about a stock enters the market, the characteristics of the firm can change, e.g., a better information environment reduces the cost of capital (Admati, 1985; Easley and O‟Hara, 2004; Wang, 1993). In this study, I apply information asymmetry theory to explore the trading behavior of active equity mutual fund managers and their role as facilitators of information. In the first essay, I study the information environment of firms mutual funds choose to add to their holdings and how it changes after the inclusion. I identify all new additions to the mutual fund holdings universe from 2002 to 2015 and compare them to the available universe of firms not yet owned by mutual funds. I find that active equity mutual fund managers behave as informed investors and prefer to buy stocks with more opaque information environments i.e., firms with larger spreads, lower trading volume, smaller firms with more growth opportunities, and firms that tend to use more accruals. Fund managers also show a preference for firms that have less analyst following, those in which analysts are less likely to agree on their EPS estimates, and firms in which analysts are more likely to err in their predictions. In other words, mutual fund managers prefer firms that are more likely to be mispriced. Once the funds include the firms, I document a strong improvement in their information environment. Firms attract more analyst coverage, reduce its use of accruals, produce more guidance, increase their market cap, and show increased turnover. The second essay focuses on the herding behavior of mutual funds. The study is the first to document the herding of mutual fund managers after creation of toehold positions by portfolio managers. I use a hand-collected dataset consisting of all toehold acquisitions reported to the SEC from 1995 to 2015 to document a strong herding reaction of active equity mutual funds after toehold announcements. This herding reaction is several times stronger than other mutual fund herding events reported by previous literature. I also document that the strength of the herding reaction varies depending on the identity of the filer or the characteristics of the firm acquired. The herding reaction is stronger for toehold announcements of firms with a smaller market capitalization, better growth opportunities, and those that are more illiquid. I also find that the herding reaction is weaker after the filings of hedge fund managers. My results support the informational herding cascade hypothesis. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

I use a quasi-exogeneous shock to information asymmetry among shareholders to evaluate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate disclosure. In the post-Regulation FD period, the merger between a shareholder and a lender of the same firm provides a shock to the information asymmetry among equity investors, because Regulation FD applies to shareholders but not lenders. After the merger, the shareholder gains access to the firm-specific private information held by the lender. I first provide evidence that information asymmetry among shareholders increases after the shareholder-lender mergers. I then use a difference-in-differences research design to show that after shareholder-lender merger transactions, firms issue more quarterly forecasts (including earnings, sales, capital expenditure, EBITDA, and gross margin), and the quarterly earnings forecasts are more precise. This study provides direct empirical evidence that information asymmetry among investors affects corporate disclosure.

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In this dissertation, we investigate three different questions that are related to information asymmetry and principal-agent problems. The first question is whether principal-agent conflicts lead executives to influence the design of their own employment contracts to exploit the shareholders; the second is the question whether conflicts of interest hamper the effectiveness of affiliated analysts in detecting and curbing earnings management; and the third is whether small investors are at an informational disadvantage. The three studies provide evidence on the existence of information asymmetry and principal-agent problems in various contexts. In particular, we find that the benchmarking process of executive compensation observed is a remedy of the agency costs incurred; that analysts from independent research firms monitor firms they cover more effectively than analysts affiliated with investment banks; and, strikingly, that small investors actually may have better information regarding firms’ financials even when compared to professional equity analysts. Together, these studies provide new insights into the cornerstone problems of the finance literature. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2010-04-29 14:19:56.636

This PhD thesis consists of three essays which are interlinked by two themes - the problem of risk and information asymmetry in cross-border mergers and acquisitions carried out by UK investors. Majority of empirical research in finance, and in particular in mergers and acquisitions focuses on the US outward investments. However, UK investors are the second most active when it comes to international acquisitions. The country's physical proximity to continental Europe and common legal system make UK transactions a particularly interesting dataset. In the first essay we try to understand how UK investors decide in which country to invest. We investigate in which cases increased level of risk and higher information asymmetry are desired by UK investors and find that higher corporate governance standards, more stringent accounting standards and strong creditor and shareholder protection deter investors. Legal system seems to be of no statistical significance indicating that the law of the host country does not fully reflect the level of such standards, while lack of significance of media coverage indicates that investors are not concerned about the public scrutiny. The second paper looks at how increased risk and information asymmetry impact the likelihood of using a contingent payout agreement and if investors always will use this method to reduce the risk of overpaying for the target. The evidence shows that deal-specific features reflecting higher asymmetry of information and risk increase the chances of using an earnout contract. However, cross-border transactions do not involve earnout contracts more often than the domestic ones which is most likely due to potential enforcement issues resulting from different legal systems. The last chapter of this thesis looks at the ways in which the acquirer can structure the transaction to reduce the risk that the offer will be rejected. Our results stress the importance of bilateral negotiations. Although the size of the premium is significant, its importance is fairly negligible when compared with the impact of hostile transactions, competing bids and the inclusions of a termination fee. From the above we can infer that carefully planned bilateral negotiations leading to a high premium would maximise the chances of deal completion. Recapitulating, in this collection of essays we try to answer the questions of how risk and information asymmetry influence UK investors' decision where to invest, how to pay for the target and whom and how to acquire in order to maximise the chances that the transaction will be successfully finalised.

Following an attempt to harmonize the U.S. GAAP and IFRS a new IFRS standard became mandatory in the EU known as IFRS 13 “Fair value measurement” in 2013. The new accounting standard aims to decrease inconsistencies with fair value measurement by introducing new disclosure requirements for fair value assets with no active market (level 3). This study investigates how well Swedish listed firms have complied with the new disclosure requirements, and whether their compliance level has affected the information asymmetry between market participants. The sample consists of Swedish listed firms from Nasdaq OMX within the banking, forestry and real estate industry where fair value assets on level 3 are prevalent. The result revealed that Swedish firms had increased their compliance level with the disclosure requirements; furthermore, the regression analysis indicated a negative relation between an increase in disclosure level and information asymmetry after controlling for some variables. However, since the result was not significant suggestions for future research is to increase the sample size outside of the Swedish context.