Masteropgave. / Format: PDF. Bibl.

Bachelor's thesis. / Format: PDF. Bibl.

Bachelor's thesis. / Format: PDF. Bibl.

Bachelor's thesis. / Format: PDF. Bibl.

Not available / text

Not available / text

This study analyzes the evolution of the regime governing private international trade law from its inception in the eleventh century through to its modern formulation in the twentieth century. It also seeks to explain its development by focusing on three theories of international relations. The regime is defined in terms of its substantive and procedural dimensions. The nature and strength of the norms governing the substantive dimension (prices, liability for defective goods, allocation of transport costs, insurance, and financial and credit arrangements) and the procedural dimension (locus of regulation, methodology of rule creation, and dispute settlement) are analyzed over three historical phases. These three periods are the medieval period, from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries, the early modern period, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, and the modern period in the twentieth century. The regime norms are found to exhibit significant continuity over time, although there has been considerable variation in the rules. The strength of the regime has also varied over the three phases. Three theoretical perspectives (structural realism, functionalism, and sociological analysis) are evaluated for their relative ability to explain the origin, evolution, nature, and strength of the regime. Each perspective is found to offer important insights, but a synthesis of approaches is necessary to capture the complexity and richness of the regime's evolution. Structural realism does not account for the origin of the regime and is of limited assistance in explaining the strength of voluntary standards. It does, however, explain the influence that states' concerns for political/legal autonomy have had on the regime and offers a reasonably good account of the roles that the United States and the United Kingdom have played in the evolution of the regime. Sociological analysis assists in accounting for the origin and nature of the regime, but it does not provide a comprehensive theory of cooperation. Reference to the other approaches is required as a supplement to sociological analysis. Functionalism provides the best explanation of the origin and nature of the regime. However, it is unable to account for variations in the strength of the regime over the three historical periods. Reference to the influence of changing structures of political authority and to the ideas, knowledge, and values of the major commercial actors is necessary as a supplement to functional analysis.

This thesis consists of three essays, which focus on different aspects of economic policy issues faced by developing and emerging market economies. The first essay explores the effect of monetary policy credibility on exchange rate volatility in a small open economy, even if the exchange rate is not an explicit target set by the monetary authority. Using an open economy framework modified from Gall and Monacelli (2005) and Walsh (2006), it shows that monetary policy credibility helps to stabilize the exchange rate as supply and demand side shocks hit the domestic economy. The monetary policy credibility can be achieved by the monetary authority's commitment to certain rules aiming for output/price smoothing. In the empirical analysis inflation targeting is used as a proxy variable for monetary credibility. The GARCH model of selected South-East Asian countries indicates that countries with inflation targeting policies have exhibited reduced exchange rate volatility when other factors are controlled. / The second essay looks at FDI inflows into developing economies. Two distinctive differences of FDI inflows between developed and developing economies are entry modes and evidence of government regulations. This essay investigates the incentives of FDI flows in terms of cost-saving merger, fixed cost of entry and the role of government policies. In particular it shows that, if the cost-saving effect is large and the government intervenes, the foreign firm will consider the FDI through either Greenfield or Brownfield, which corresponds to the situation for FDI flows into developing economies. Otherwise, the foreign firm will only consider Brownfield or staying outside, which stands for the developed economy case. Since one remarkable feature of the FDI flows into developing countries is the benefit of cost-saving from low labour costs, this essay takes this effect into account and provides insights for economic "outsourcing". The multi-stage sequential game model presented in this chapter provides comparable results for the pattern of the FDI flows affected by regulation and institutional factors, which are not addressed by existing literature. Finally, it reveals some intuition and feature of a developing economy where the government regulations on FDI flows are more often observed. / The third essay deals with the resource/revenue reallocation within powerful groups in the economy and the impact of the rent-seeking behavior of these groups on the economic growth and the social welfare. In particular, it introduces a dynamic model of resource-grabbing by status-conscious agents, i.e., agents value not only their absolute consumption levels, but also the relative status within his/her reference group. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of the "positional externalities" on the urge to seek rent and to connect the "tragedy of the commons" problem with relative consumption. The model shows that the greater is agents' concern about their relative status, the more aggressively they tend to behave. Consequently, the social welfare is lower because the growth rate of the public asset is reduced due to higher extraction rate. After introducing heterogeneity, it shows that the social welfare decreases as the distribution of status-consciousness among agents widens. Finally, it provides some policy suggestions that the government might consider to achieve a second best social outcome.

Separate essays on entrepreneurship, joint venturing, and trade comprise this thesis. The emergence of entrepreneurship is common in the real world but relatively less so in classical economic models. If industry incumbents are attributed with full rationality and perfect foresight, then there are few, if any, profitable opportunities left for new entrants (entrepreneurs) to exploit. This essay explains how entrepreneurs can emerge in a dynamic world when firms must choose between a technology strategy that is either statically or dynamically efficient. A model is developed which shows how such opportunities for new entry can occur when incumbents are caught in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game involving technology strategy. A relevance measure and policy implications are then explored. Joint ventures, especially of the R&D type, are becoming increasingly important as a way to gain needed technological and market competencies. Unfortunately, many joint ventures have the characteristics of a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Firms may cooperate or defect in the venture. If contracts, side-payments, and third-party verification of the venture outcome are unavailable, then the dominant solution to the Prisoners’ Dilemma (mutual defection) results. This paper proposes the use of an ex-ante auction to obtain a Pareto-improvement for these ventures. A Pareto-improvement is assured when non-transferable costs and benefits of firms are not conditional on joint venture strategies. When this condition is not met restrictions are required to obtain the Pareto-improvement. The problem of trade between countries that share an international open access resource is becoming significant as the world reaches the limits of critical shared resource stocks. It is modelled as a world with one primary factor, two intermediate goods, one final good (harvested from the open access resource), and two nations where it is assumed that either the trading takes place over one stage (nations are price-takers), or two stages (nations have market power). Imperfect competition and open access generated externalities affect the trading efficiency. To maximize world welfare this essay recommends subsidizing R&D where comparative advantage exists, and creating international agreements to ensure the one-stage game structure is used when trading.

Separate essays on entrepreneurship, joint venturing, and trade comprise this thesis. The emergence of entrepreneurship is common in the real world but relatively less so in classical economic models. If industry incumbents are attributed with full rationality and perfect foresight, then there are few, if any, profitable opportunities left for new entrants (entrepreneurs) to exploit. This essay explains how entrepreneurs can emerge in a dynamic world when firms must choose between a technology strategy that is either statically or dynamically efficient. A model is developed which shows how such opportunities for new entry can occur when incumbents are caught in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game involving technology strategy. A relevance measure and policy implications are then explored. Joint ventures, especially of the R&D type, are becoming increasingly important as a way to gain needed technological and market competencies. Unfortunately, many joint ventures have the characteristics of a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Firms may cooperate or defect in the venture. If contracts, side-payments, and third-party verification of the venture outcome are unavailable, then the dominant solution to the Prisoners’ Dilemma (mutual defection) results. This paper proposes the use of an ex-ante auction to obtain a Pareto-improvement for these ventures. A Pareto-improvement is assured when non-transferable costs and benefits of firms are not conditional on joint venture strategies. When this condition is not met restrictions are required to obtain the Pareto-improvement. The problem of trade between countries that share an international open access resource is becoming significant as the world reaches the limits of critical shared resource stocks. It is modelled as a world with one primary factor, two intermediate goods, one final good (harvested from the open access resource), and two nations where it is assumed that either the trading takes place over one stage (nations are price-takers), or two stages (nations have market power). Imperfect competition and open access generated externalities affect the trading efficiency. To maximize world welfare this essay recommends subsidizing R&D where comparative advantage exists, and creating international agreements to ensure the one-stage game structure is used when trading.