Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hocevar, Susan Page ; Thomas, Gail Fann. "June 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 10, 2009. Author(s) subject terms:Reputation, Reputation Management, Reputation Spillover, Image, Identity, Public Affairs. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-98). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2009. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Washington State University, May 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-147).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Divinity School, March 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate just what kind of entity a self or person is (p. 1). / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

published_or_final_version / Literary and Cultural Studies / Master / Master of Arts

This thesis investigates a specific kind of criticism of the token-token identity-theory. This criticism is based on recent theories of reference. In the Introduction I argue that more than Davidson's three premisses is needed to establish that mental events are identical to physical events. One needs to invoke principles about what constitutes event-identity. In Part 1 I discuss event-identities. I lay down the constraints an adequate theory of event-identity must satisfy, and criticise the major theories in the literature. I suggest an alternative view, which I defend against some recent proposals. I end Part 1 by exploring a view which takes seriously the possibility of constitution-relations between events. In Parts 2 and 3 I discuss whether the identity-theory can be defended. Part 2 discusses sensations, and I concentrate on S. Kripke's arguments against the identity-view. I distinguish two versions of Kripke's argument, one epistemic, and one metaphysical. The epistemic version of the argument presupposes Kripke's views on content, but fails by its own standards. The metaphysical version is shown to be weak and implausible. Part 3 discusses cognitive events, and concentrates on de re beliefs. I produce an argument which apparently defeats the identity-view. I elaborate two main strategies in defence of the identity-theory. I argue that given a theory of de re beliefs or singular thoughts like G. Evans's, the theory of event-identities I have developed, and some plausible further premisses, the identity-theory seems to be defeated. A reasonable interpretation of this result is to view it as an argument for constitution-relations between mental and physical events. I return to the view I introduced in part 1, and conclude that the token-token identity-theory should probably be replaced by this constitution-view if theories of de re beliefs are accepted.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--School of Education and Dept. of Sociology. University of Missouri--Kansas City, 2007. / "A dissertation in education and sociology." Advisor: Malcolm Linville. Typescript. Vita. Title from "catalog record" of the print edition Description based on contents viewed Dec. 20, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 267-283). Online version of the print edition.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2004. Graduate Programme in Political Science. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 257-269). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ99140