Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2007. / Directed by Leila E. Villaverde; submitted to the School of Education. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Oct. 18, 2007). Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-203).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Montana, 2007. / Title from title screen. Description based on contents viewed Aug. 6, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 56-58).

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The main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague objects and to imprecise designation. Evans's argument concerning indeterminate-identity statements is often regarded as a proof that vague objects cannot exist. In chapter I I try to argue that the argument may be refuted by vague objects theorists. In chapter II I present various accounts of what indeterminate identity between objects may consist in and three different characteristics of it. I argue that there are objects whose identity is indeterminate and that such indeterminacy is ontic in the sense that it concerns individuation and spatio-temporal boundaries of objects. I also formulate the argument showing that (independently of Evans's argument) terms designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators. Chapter III is devoted to problems concerning vagueness and identity-over-time. The indeterminate answer to the questions concerning diachronic identity in puzzling cases can be regarded as the correct response by both endurantists and perdurantists. However, while for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence conditions is a conceptual matter, for endurantists it deserves the name of "ontic vagueness". Chapter IV focuses on questions concerning vagueness and identity-at-a-time. I offer a new solution to the problem of the many, according to which in each case in which the problem arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one (vague) object present. The problem arises because each such object has many precisifications, which nevertheless have no ontological significance. I also propose a new account of what it takes for an object to be vague. Chapter V deals with indeterminate identity in the domain of quanta. The first part investigates the various problems concerning identity and individuation of quantum particles, whereas the second part is devoted to analysis and critique of E. J. Lowe's example of alleged indeterminate identity-over-time between electrons.

D.Litt. et Phil. / The aim of this research was to examine the nature of the western self, using a grounded theory approach. The life narratives of a group of mid-life women were analysed utilising the method outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1990) and the data provided fertile ground for the development of a substantive theory of the self. In the past, midlife was considered a part of old age. Changes in western society have meant that midlife has become a significant life period. An examination of the nature of selfhood in historical periods as well as in Prehistory constituted the literature review. Modern and Postmodern approaches to the self were also examined. For the participants, the self occupied the area between identity and soul. The participants considered the soul to be the core of the individual. Identity was described in terms of gender, physical appearance as well as date and place of birth. Closely allied to the soul is said to be the individual value system. The participants regarded the self as having certain features including cognitive, affective, spiritual and physical components as well as unconscious elements. Moreover, the self is dynamic and has an inherent directorial capacity based particularly on individual thinking and feeling components. The substantive theory of the self suggests that the self constitutes a sense of existence resulting from conscious awareness of inherent personal capacity and awareness of the immediate present, personal past and projected future. The purpose of the self is to promote the survival of the individual. The core of the self is represented by the need to survive and is experienced as a feeling of continuity contained within the personal narrative. Survival is furthered by purposeful activity and the creation and development of meaning structures. The self rests on inter-related physical, cognitive, emotional-affective pillars, and responds to environmental currents. Thus the self is essentially a process and is given the feeling of form through the narrative capacity inherent in the individual. The self is situated in a self-space created by the interrelationship of the physical, cognitive and affective components in relation to the environment. Today, mainly through technological developments, the self-space has increased in size, and greater demands are placed on the individual self.

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Since Plato's time, there have been attempts to show that the generally altruistic way of life is superior to the totally selfish way of life. Drawing upon the conclusions of philosophers and social psychologists, I argue that it is better to have a fairly moral character than a totally selfish one. I first argue that it is possible to have genuinely altruistic motivations (rather than disguised selfish motivations). I then show that both the altruistic and the selfish way of life are genuine choices for rational beings. Next I argue that the nature of values is such that they require reinforcement from others in order for us to verify that what we believe to be values are indeed values. I further argue that values are unattainable for the totally selfish person. Subsequently, I point out that values are necessary for an agent to have a meaningful life, and very likely necessary for a human to be able to have a sense of self. Since most people desire to have a meaningful life and a sense of self, I argue that the benefits possible to the fairly moral person outweigh the benefits possible to the totally selfish one, even if the latter can disguise her selfishness completely. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy, 1975 / Includes bibliographical references. / by Ken Siegel. / Ph. D. / Philosophy