O presente trabalho consiste na tradução anotada da Terceira Parte das Lições do Semestre de Inverno de 1904-1905 intitulada Fantasia e Consciência de Imagem, acompanhada de uma introdução. Nesta apresentamos inicialmente a teoria da intencionalidade desenvolvida nas Investigações Lógicas, cujos elementos são fundamentais para a compreensão da análise da estrutura intencional das imagens físicas e da fantasia empreendida nas Lições. Num segundo momento, buscamos retraçar o percurso analítico feito por Husserl nas Lições, o qual conduz ao reconhecimento de que as fantasias, consideradas inicialmente imagens, possuem uma estrutura intencional semelhante à das percepções. Esta descoberta o levará ao questionamento e à crítica do esquema apreensão-conteúdo de apreensão, até então válido para descrever os diversos modos de consciência intencional, e ao esboço de uma nova teoria para explicitar a diferença entre o caráter atual dos atos presentantes e o caráter inatual dos atos presentificantes, como a memória, a fantasia e a expectativa. / This dissertation comprises the annotated translation of the Third Part of the Lectures from the Winter Semester 1904/1905, entitled Fantasy and Image Consciousness, and an introduction. In the introduction, we initially present the theory of intentionality developed in the Logical Investigations, whose elements are fundamental to understand the analysis of the intentional structure of physical and fantasy images carried out in the Lectures. Secondly, we seek to retrace the analytical path taken by Husserl in the Lectures, which leads to the recognition that fantasies, initially considered as images, have an intentional structure similar to that of perceptions. This discovery will lead him to criticize the scheme apprehension-content of apprehension, hitherto valid for describing the various modes of intentional consciousness, and to outline a new interpretation to explain the difference between the actual character of the acts of presentation and the inactual character\" of the acts of representation, such as memory, fantasy and expectation.

La présente recherche vise à analyser l’essence de la fantaisie considérée comme un vécu intentionnel à partir de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En quel sens pouvons-nous affirmer que la fantaisie, généralement associée à la liberté et à la création, est en effet productrice ? Il nous faut remarquer que la question de la fantaisie s’inscrit parmi les problématiques qui ont contribué à la consolidation du répertoire thématique de la phénoménologie naissante. Cependant, la définition de la fantaisie à laquelle Husserl aboutit à partir de 1904/1905 ne tient pas compte de son aspect libre et productif, mais la considère comme fantaisie re-productrice. Pour arriver à une définition plus large et précise de l’essence morphologique de la fantaisie, sans abandonner la phénoménologie de Husserl, cette recherche propose les objectifs suivants. En premier lieu, montrer les explications que Husserl met à l'épreuve et pourquoi il les rejette. Parmi celles-ci, en plus des explications propres, il faut souligner celles de Brentano et de Twardowski. Deuxièmement, expliciter comment les analyses de la conscience interne du temps et du souvenir ont conduit à la définition canonique de la fantaisie en tant que modification de neutralité appliquée au souvenir. Ensuite, une critique de cette définition est effectuée. Enfin, il est proposé de surmonter les difficultés soulignées à partir d’éléments de la phénoménologie de Husserl, tels que les fonctions que la fantaisie remplit, entre autres dans l’intuition des essences, l’expérience d’autrui et l’expérience esthétique, où la fantaisie opère par la production d’analogues qui ont un effet « harmonisant » sur l’expérience. / The present research is framed in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and aims to analyse the essence of phantasy considered as an intentional experience. In what sense can it be sustained that phantasy, generally associated with freedom and creation, is indeed productive? It should be noted that the question of phantasy appears among the issues that contributed to the consolidation of the thematic agenda of nascent phenomenology. However, Husserl’s definition of phantasy, which is attained in1904/05, does not take into account its free and productive aspect, but rather regards it in a re-productive way. To arrive at a broader, yet precise, definition of the morphological essence of phantasy, without leaving Husserl’s phenomenology, the following objectives are pursued. Firs, I present the possible explanations of phantasy that Husserl puts to the test (among which those of Brentano and Twardowski must be highlighted) as well as the reasons why he rejects them. Second, I explain how the analyses of the internal time consciousness and memory led to the canonical definition of phantasy as a neutrality modification applied to memory. A critique of this definition is subsequently established. Finally, I propose that those difficulties may be overcome by considering other elements of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the functions that phantasy fulfills, for instance in the intuition of essences, in the experience of others and in the aesthetic experience i.a., where phantasy operates by the producing of analogues which have a “harmonizing” effect on experience.

O presente trabalho consiste na tradução anotada da Terceira Parte das Lições do Semestre de Inverno de 1904-1905 intitulada Fantasia e Consciência de Imagem, acompanhada de uma introdução. Nesta apresentamos inicialmente a teoria da intencionalidade desenvolvida nas Investigações Lógicas, cujos elementos são fundamentais para a compreensão da análise da estrutura intencional das imagens físicas e da fantasia empreendida nas Lições. Num segundo momento, buscamos retraçar o percurso analítico feito por Husserl nas Lições, o qual conduz ao reconhecimento de que as fantasias, consideradas inicialmente imagens, possuem uma estrutura intencional semelhante à das percepções. Esta descoberta o levará ao questionamento e à crítica do esquema apreensão-conteúdo de apreensão, até então válido para descrever os diversos modos de consciência intencional, e ao esboço de uma nova teoria para explicitar a diferença entre o caráter atual dos atos presentantes e o caráter inatual dos atos presentificantes, como a memória, a fantasia e a expectativa. / This dissertation comprises the annotated translation of the Third Part of the Lectures from the Winter Semester 1904/1905, entitled Fantasy and Image Consciousness, and an introduction. In the introduction, we initially present the theory of intentionality developed in the Logical Investigations, whose elements are fundamental to understand the analysis of the intentional structure of physical and fantasy images carried out in the Lectures. Secondly, we seek to retrace the analytical path taken by Husserl in the Lectures, which leads to the recognition that fantasies, initially considered as images, have an intentional structure similar to that of perceptions. This discovery will lead him to criticize the scheme apprehension-content of apprehension, hitherto valid for describing the various modes of intentional consciousness, and to outline a new interpretation to explain the difference between the actual character of the acts of presentation and the inactual character\" of the acts of representation, such as memory, fantasy and expectation.

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