As of May 2016, the U.S. State Department officially declared a priority date for all green cards for applicants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras that capped the number of visas granted to individuals from these three countries to just 10,000 per year. This inherently created a two to three-year backlog for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status applicants from these countries as well, meaning that SIJS petitioners will remain undocumented for periods of up to six years until their petition is adjudicated by USCIS and their priority date arrives. I research whether the increasingly difficult path to obtaining permanent residency through a Special Immigrant Juvenile Status petition is a result of a change in federal administrations––– between former President Obama’s covert mechanisms of marginalization and deportation of Central Americans to the overtly anti-immigrant rhetoric stemming from Trump––– or if SIJS backlogs are an inevitable phenomenon resulting from U.S. imperialism in Central America throughout the 20th century. I ground my research on pre-existing literature that explains the legal processes of obtaining permanent residency through a SIJS petition and include scholars’ criticisms of the interpretation of the policy by state and federal courts. To exemplify the complications that youth face while petitioning for SIJ status, I also incorporate the perceptions and experiences of several attorneys who have represented SIJS applicants and my own interpretations of how judges treat SIJS applicants courtrooms throughout Los Angeles County.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1935 M61

Existing moral reflection on immigration law and policy is caught in an impasse between (1) proponents of an individual right to free international migration and (2) proponents of a state’s right to control its borders. In Chapter 1, I examine arguments supporting an individual right to free international migration. I show that the case for this putative right cannot be settled solely by considering the strength of individuals’ interest in being able to cross international borders according to their choice. Rather, at a crucial point, the argument for an individual right to free migration turns on the truth of a particular conception of global justice. In Chapter 2, I examine arguments supporting a state’s right to control its borders. I contend that these arguments do not seek to defend the substantive justice of restrictive immigration policies, but rather the legitimacy of processes of political decision-making by which states unilaterally determine their own immigration policies. Abandoning this right-versus-right paradigm, I recast the debate by focusing on two distinct questions: (1) the question of justice in immigration, which substantively evaluates immigrant admission policy; and (2) the question of the legitimacy of immigration law enacted by procedures responsive only to states’ internal political decisions. I further propose that in articulating principles of justice in immigration, we should first develop a conception of global justice which will provide the background for our evaluation of immigration policy. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend a conception of global justice I call cooperation-based internationalism. I argue that co-citizens are joint participants in a scheme of cooperation which provides them with the social goods they need to lead autonomous lives. They therefore owe each other special duties of social justice. In addition, I argue for a duty of assistance which applies among all human persons globally. This duty requires developed states to assist developing states in establishing minimally just institutions. In Chapter 4, I develop a conception of justice in immigration against the background of cooperation-based internationalism. I argue that there is no requirement for states to allow open immigration. Nevertheless, I argue that co-citizens owe each other duties which impose significant moral constraints on immigration policy: states must (1) allow for family unification; (2) eschew policies that select immigrants based on criteria that unjustly call into question the fitness for citizenship of certain current members; (3) regulate labour immigration so that all current citizens benefit equally unless unequal gains benefit worse-off citizens. The duty of assistance is also imposes constraints on immigration policy. Developed states should (4) avoid immigration policies which cause brain drain harmful to international development and (5) admit and resettle refugees. In Chapter 5, I turn to the distinct question of the legitimacy of unilaterally-enacted immigration law. I argue that the application and enforcement of immigration law counts as a coercive exercise of political power which stands in need of justification. I examine the consent and natural duty of justice theories of political legitimacy, concluding that these influential theories cannot establish the legitimacy of immigration law. I conclude by considering the implications of the illegitimacy of immigration law for the evaluation of irregular migration.

This thesis is a case study applying George Lakoff’s theories regarding frames to a specific series of legislation dealing with immigration. First, literature is examined regarding changes in Congress and media and the relationship between the two. George Lakoff’s theories on framing are discussed, playing special attention to the familial models and biconceptualism. The case study regards immigration reform legislation that was attempted to pass through Congress in 2007, specifically the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 and the STRIVE Act. The application of Lakoff’s theories to this case study aids in further understanding the link between politics and communication and the importance of persuasion in a political setting. / Department of Political Science

In the period 2004-2007, the highest courts of Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada handed down judgments on the legality of the indefinite detention of non-citizens, specifically non-citizens subject to a removal order whose removal was frustrated. Each of the governments claimed that its intention to remove the non-citizens if and when it became viable to do so sufficed to establish that their detention fell within an ‘immigration’ exception to non-citizens’ rights. The cases thus raised fundamental questions about the relationship between non-citizens’ rights and governments’ power to control national borders. I argue that the indefinite detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is illegal. The detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is lawful if it can be justified as a proportionate measure to effect his or her removal. Indefinite detention fails this proportionality test and as such is an unlawful violation of a non-citizen’s rights. I develop my argument through case studies from the three jurisdictions. I argue that the law of all three jurisdictions contained ample resources to support a ruling that indefinite detention was unlawful. The question then arises as to why this view did not prevail in every jurisdiction. I demonstrate that, taking into account variations in legal frameworks and doctrines, a judge’s response to indefinite detention is at base determined by his or her answer to the question ‘does a non-citizen, against whom a valid removal order has been made, retain a right to liberty?’ The judge’s answer to this question flows through his or her adjudication on the scope of ‘immigration’ exceptions to legal protections of the personal liberty of non-citizens considered in the case studies. I consider the best justification for the view that a removal order revokes a non-citizen’s right to liberty, provided by John Finnis. I argue that it rests on questionable understandings of citizenship, and in operation inevitably undermines the values of community solidarity it seeks to promote.

According to the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistic, California accounts for approximately 2,600,000 illegal immigrants in 2009. This number represents about 25 percent of the entire estimated illegal immigrant population in the United States, which is roughly 10.8 million. Between 2003 and 2008, the U.S. government removed 1,446,338 noncitizens from the United States. This rise in deportation is a result o the changes that have been enacted by the federal government over the years that transformed the nature of immigration enforcement. This thesis explores the California Immigration Enforcement system from the programs established to apprehend illegal aliens in the United States, the rights illegal aliens are granted, the detention facilities where they reside and the immigration courts that ultimately decide their fate. The question that is being asked is whether the current system established works or if reform is needed.

In the period 2004-2007, the highest courts of Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada handed down judgments on the legality of the indefinite detention of non-citizens, specifically non-citizens subject to a removal order whose removal was frustrated. Each of the governments claimed that its intention to remove the non-citizens if and when it became viable to do so sufficed to establish that their detention fell within an ‘immigration’ exception to non-citizens’ rights. The cases thus raised fundamental questions about the relationship between non-citizens’ rights and governments’ power to control national borders. I argue that the indefinite detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is illegal. The detention of a non-citizen subject to a removal order is lawful if it can be justified as a proportionate measure to effect his or her removal. Indefinite detention fails this proportionality test and as such is an unlawful violation of a non-citizen’s rights. I develop my argument through case studies from the three jurisdictions. I argue that the law of all three jurisdictions contained ample resources to support a ruling that indefinite detention was unlawful. The question then arises as to why this view did not prevail in every jurisdiction. I demonstrate that, taking into account variations in legal frameworks and doctrines, a judge’s response to indefinite detention is at base determined by his or her answer to the question ‘does a non-citizen, against whom a valid removal order has been made, retain a right to liberty?’ The judge’s answer to this question flows through his or her adjudication on the scope of ‘immigration’ exceptions to legal protections of the personal liberty of non-citizens considered in the case studies. I consider the best justification for the view that a removal order revokes a non-citizen’s right to liberty, provided by John Finnis. I argue that it rests on questionable understandings of citizenship, and in operation inevitably undermines the values of community solidarity it seeks to promote.

Typescript. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 339-365) / Microfiche. / xvii, 365 leaves, bound ill. 29 cm

Thesis (LL.M.). / Written for the Dept. of Law. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/05/13). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1997. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [186]-210). Also available on the Internet.