Teismų ir teisėjų principas yra gana senas ir nemažai autorių nagrinėtas, bet ši tema yra aktuali ir šiandien, kadangi teisėjų vykdomam teisingumui neretai bandoma daryti įtaką, o taip pat nereti drausminių bylų iškėlimai rodo, kad vidinis teisėjų nepriklausomumas yra ne iki galo išgrynintas iki tobulos formos. Darbe analizuojamos Konstitucijos nuostatos, kurios reglamentuoja teismų ir teisėjų nepriklausomumą bei Konstitucinio Teismo nutarimai, liečiantys teismų ir teisėjų nepriklausomumo principą. Kadangi teismų ir teisėjų nepriklausomumo principas yra vienas iš esminių konstitucinės teisės principų, todėl jis yra įtvirtintas ne viename tarptautiniame dokumente. Darbe taip pat analizuojamos tarptautinių dokumentų nuostatos reglamentuojančios teismų ir teisėjų nepriklausomumą ir jos lyginamos su Lietuvos konstitucinėje teisėje įtvirtintomis nuostatomis. Be to, darbe remiamasi sociologinių tyrimų duomenimis norint išsiaiškinti visuomenės pasitikėjimo teismais lygį. Darbe iškelta hipotezė, kad teisėjų ir teismų nepriklausomumo lygis įtakoja visuomenės pasitikėjimą teismais pasitvirtina, kadangi kuo didesnis teismų ir teisėjų nepriklausomumo lygis, tuo bus didesnis visuomenės pasitikėjimas teismais ir teisėjais. Pirmoje darbo dalyje nagrinėjamas valdžių padalijimo principas, teisminės valdžios santykis su kitomis valdžiomis (įstatymų leidžiamąja ir vykdomąja) bei išskiriami teisminės valdžios požymiai. Antroje darbo dalyje analizuojama istorinė tesimų ir teisėjų nepriklausomumo... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The principle of court and judges is quite old and it has been studied by many authors but this topic is current nowadays as well. The justice supported by judges is often being tried to be influenced as well as frequent disciplinary proceedings show that inner independence of judges is not purified to a perfect form. The provisions of the Constitution which govern the independence of courts and judges are analyzed in the study together with Constitutional Court rulings that are connected with the principle of the independence or courts and judges. As the independence principle of courts and judges is the basic one in the constitutional law it is fortifies in many international documents. The provisions of international documents that regulate the independence of courts and judges are discussed in the study. They are compared to the provisions that are fortified in the Constitution of Lithuania. Besides, the data of sociological researches is used in the study in order to see the level of the trust of the public in courts. The hypothesis is raised in the study that the level of independence of courts and judges influence the public trust in the courts ad judges was confirmed. The higher level of the independence of courts and judges appears the bigger trust of public in courts and judges is. The principle of power division, the ratio of court’s authorities with other authorities (legislature and executive power) as well as the features of the court power are distinguished... [to full text]

Les facteurs historiques, politiques, sociologique ou culturel propres à chacun des deux pays, que nous évoquons dans l’introduction, traduisent une interprétation différente de la notion d’indépendance du juge en France et en Thaïlande. L’exigence d’indépendance attachée à la fonction des juges va de pair en France avec la crainte d’un retour du « gouvernement des juges », et la méfiance à l’égard du corporatisme et du pouvoir des juges. Si l’indépendance du juge est bien établie en France, elle est « une indépendance surveillée ». Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que cette indépendance est moins grande que l’indépendance sans surveillance. En Thaïlande, d’une manière générale, la Justice n’est pas regardée avec méfiance, mais elle a été délaissée. Depuis l’Ancien régime, elle n’a fait l’objet d’une réforme qu’en 1997 où la Constitution thaïlandaise a créé, sans obstacle, selon une interprétation rigide du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs, un vrai corps judiciaire puissant, séparé et isolé du gouvernement et peut-être de la société. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’elle installe une véritable indépendance. L’arbitraire de l’exécutif, qui est la justification de la protection, peut être remplacé par l’arbitraire du corps lui-même. Le statut des juges judiciaires de ces deux pays que nous traitons dans les deux parties de cette thèse exprime cette diversité. / The historical, political, and cultural factors of each country, which we will describe in an introduction, give a different interpretation of judicial independence concept in Thailand and France. The requirement of judicial independence attached to the profession of judge is along with French tradition of fear regarding to return of the "government of judges", corporatism, and the power of judges. If independence of judiciary is well established in France, it would be the "supervised independence". This does not mean that it is less independent than independence without supervision. In Thailand, justice, in general, has not been suspicious by the other powers, but it has been abandoned. The Constitution of Thailand, without obstacle, because of the rigid and strict separation of powers, made Justice which has just been reformed in 1997 since the Ancien Regime, to become a real powerful judiciary, separated and isolated from Government and maybe from society. However, this does not mean that a true independence of judge is established. The arbitrariness of the executive power, which is the justification of protection, can be replaced by the arbitrariness of judge itself. The legal status of judges in both countries which we treat in both parts of this thesis will reflect this diversity.

This thesis is focused on the performance of judicial power in Czechoslovakia in the period of 1948 -- 1953, that is characterized by almost unlimited influence of the ruling party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, on the entire society. It was associated with a destruction of division of power in the state and with intentional limitations of the independence of judiciary. The aim of the work is to identify and analyse particular components of a specific mechanism that was introduced to enable to influence the judiciary decisions according to power and political interests of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia through administrative bodies, especially Ministry of Justice. For this purpose fundamental changes of the legislation, personnel and also organizational changes in the judiciary were carried out.