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The ideology of the Islamic State in Indonesia did not emerge in an abrupt manner, but was the product of a long development. The ideology was one outcome of the role that Islam had played (through the Islamic movement) in the struggle of the Indonesians for the political independance of their country. According to the nationalist point of view this struggle began with the creation of the Budi Utomo in 1908, but the Islamic group consider 1905, the date of the establishment or the Sarekat Dagang Islam, as the starting point. [...]

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Canadian foreign policy towards Indonesia during the governments of Louis St. Laurent (1948-57) and John Diefenbaker (1957-63) was conditioned by Canada's place in the North Atlantic alliance, seen as more central to national interests. The most direct Canada-Indonesia connections were forged by non-government "public diplomats." This thesis utilizes the theory of "mental maps" as a way of understanding how diplomats imagined the world. Policymakers1 mental maps gave prominence to Europe and the North Atlantic. Southeast Asia appeared only as a periphery needing to be held for larger "free world" goals. Ottawa viewed Indonesia through the prism of its alliances and multilateral associations. Canadian diplomacy towards Indonesia was often designed to preserve the unity of the North Atlantic alliance. During the Indonesian national revolution, Canadian representatives on the Security Council acted to help their Netherlands allies. They found a compromise solution that helped to prevent splits within the North Atlantic alliance and the Commonwealth. Policymakers were working out a diplomatic self-image: Canada as mediating middle power. This was a process of myth making in which actions taken for alliance reasons were remembered as part of a global peacemaking mission. However, Ottawa avoided involvement in the second Indonesian-Dutch decolonization dispute over West New Guinea (Papua). Development aid also became part of Canada's diplomatic self-perception. Canada sent aid through the Colombo plan, intended to restore global trade and fight the cold war with non-military weapons. Canadian aid to Indonesia was negligible, primarily wheat. While bilateral relations were limited, non-state actors operating within North America-wide networks forged more important connections. Canadian advisers to Indonesia's National Planning Bureau mapped out a development path based on Western models. McGill University's Institute of Islamic Studies promoted the "modernization" of Islam. Indonesia under Sukarno (1945-65) tried to avoid dependence on aid, but welcomed investment by oil companies such as Asamera and bought de Havilland aircraft from Canada. The seeds for the economic policies of Suharto's New Order (1965-98) were sown during this period by Indonesians based in the Planning Bureau and at McGill. Public diplomacy had a more enduring effect than government policy. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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The main objective of this study is to analyze the political struggle between the Indonesian army and Islamic political parties in the New Order era between 1966--1977. The historical background of the involvement of the army in politics and the attempt of political Islam to establish an Islamic state is a central issue that characterized the relationship between these two groups. When the New Order came to power in 1966, it has exercised strict control over politically organized Islam. With the army emerged as the most significant political force, there was no choice for political Islam except to reformulate its political agenda in order to suit national development program undertaken by the military backed government. The future of political Islam and the involvement of the army in the social and political arena in Indonesia field has since then been central to the development of political system in that country.

This thesis investigates the activities of the Majlisul Islamil A`la Indonesia (MIAI), an Islamic federative organization of pre-independent Indonesia, elaborating in particular on the federation's socio-religious and political stance. Operating for only six years (1937--1943), the MIAI represented Muslim groups, as a counterpart to the "secularists," within the nationalist movement during both the final years of Dutch rule and the early stages of the Japanese occupation. The MIAI was established for the specific purpose of unifying the Islamic organizations---political and non-political, traditionalist and modernist alike---while at the same time reviving Muslim political and socio-religious strength after the decline of the Sarekat Islam, which had for almost fifteen years dominated the nationalist scene. / The mission of the MIAI was seen by Muslims as a response to the threat posed by external forces. It reacted in particular against Dutch policies considered discriminatory by Muslims concerning matters involving Islamic belief and practice, such as marriage and education. The federation also took a strong stand regarding Christian polemic aimed at Islam and took part in Indonesian Muslim response. That the establishment of the MIAI was favored by most Islamic organizations attested to the strong sentiment among Indonesian Muslims for a common front, regardless of their differences on socio-religious and political issues. Together with the GAPI (Gabungan Partai Politik Indonesia or the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties) and the PVPN (Persatuan Vakbonden Pegawai Negeri, or the Association of Government Employees), the MIAI took part in demanding political reform on behalf of Muslim groups. Indeed, notwithstanding its short life span, the MIAI was a pioneer for national unity in general and Indonesian Muslim unity in particular.

This thesis deals with the political activities and Islamic political vision of Mohamad Roem (1908--1983), a prominent Masyumi leader and Indonesian diplomat in the first half of the twentieth century. His life and early education as well as his works are discussed in order to trace the sources which inspired his vision. In his political activities, Roem expressed his Islamic nationalism by joining and founding Islamic movements from the late Dutch colonial period through the beginning of the New Order. He had much political success, especially in the Republican period. However, he was one of many Muslim leaders who also suffered for his political involvement in the Soekarno era, he was jailed for about four years, while in the Soeharto era, he was banned from participating in political activities. He was a moderate Muslim leader who aspired to cooperate with "secular" leaders in his time for the sake of a larger cause. His Islamic political vision had a significant impact and was a major contribution to both the Indonesian state and the Islamic community. His moderation is reflected in his political correspondence with Nurcholish Madjid in which he argued for the need of an Islamic political party without demanding the creation of an Islamic state. Finally, Roem's political activities and Islamic political vision point to a model of activism in a religiously pluralistic country and could possibly serve as an inspiration to Muslim politicians, especially after Soeharto's fall when Islamic political parties found fertile ground for growth.

This thesis was started at a time when Indonesia was in a turmoil of ideological camps, in which international peace and order could be endangered. The nationalists, according to one of their prominent leaders, Roeslan Abdulgani, are still in search of an Indonesian identity, fighting their way to their dim goal, exerting all their strength and their dearly gained knowledge . The Muslim masses, responding to the call of their faith, cherish the aim of establishing a “Baldatun tayyibatun wa Rabbun Ghafur”, a “beautiful, pure and prosperous country under the protection of God the Forgiver”. These Muslims have been and are still willing to sacrifice everything which is dear to them, but due to the lack of the needed knowledge and skill the unwieldly masses can move only slowly, not yet able to compete with the Western educated and skilled nationalists. [...]

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